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Abstract
This research work develops a novel framework for experimental designs of liberalised whole-
sale power markets, namely the Agent-based Computational Economics of Wholesale Electricity
Market (ACEWEM) framework. The ACEWEM allows to further understand the effect of various
market designs on market efficiency and to gain insights into market manipulation by electricity
generators. The thesis describes a detailed market simulations whereby the strategies of power
generators emerge as a result of a stochastic profit optimisation learning algorithm based upon the
Generalized Additive Models for Location Scale and Shape statistical framework. The ACEWEM
framework, which integrates the agent-based modelling paradigm with formal statistical methods
to represent better real-world decision rules, is designed to be the foundation for large custom-
purpose experimental studies inspired by computational learning.
It makes a methodological contribution in the development of an expert computational laboratory
for repeated power auctions with capacity and physical constraints. Furthermore, it contributes
by developing a new computational learning algorithm. It integrates the reinforcement learning
paradigm to engage past experience in decision making, with flexible statistical models adjust
these decisions based on the vision of the future.
In regard to policy contribution, this research work conducts a simulation study to identify whether
high market prices can be ascribed to problems of market design and/or exercise of market power.
Furthermore, the research work presents the detailed study of an abstract wholesale electricity
market and real UK power market.
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Part I
Context and Model Conceptualisation
This part of the thesis overviews the area of study in question and discusses specific problems
attributed to it. Moreover it sets the scene for the content in subsequent parts: II, III and IV.
Chapter 1 discusses the context of the research problem, as well as aims, objectives and scope.
Furthermore, it outlines the methodological approach taken and presents the suggested solution.
Chapter 2 introduces the concept of auctions and their implementation in electricity trading. It
outlines the specific physical constraints that electricity trading is subject to and overviews the
strategic trading behaviour of market participants. Subsequently the discussion enters the case
study and overviews the UK wholesale electricity market in detail. An extensive literature review
covering the conceptual and technical issues of exiting agent-based models for electricity market
is provided to conclude.
1
1 Introduction
1.1 Introduction
This chapter introduces general prerequisites for initiating this research project and states both the
aim and specific research objectives. This is followed by a methodological approach, suggested
solution and detailed outline of the thesis.
1.2 Context and the problem
A quarter of a century ago the electricity industry was largely held in hands of vertically integrated
monopolies across the world. Utility companies had to pay fixed tariffs set by such monopolies
in order to supply electricity to domestic premises. In an attempt to bring rationality and trans-
parency to wholesale electricity pricing, the government in many countries have broken up these
monopolies and reorganised electricity industries to form markets (Green, 2005). The first country
to introduce power market was Chile in 1978 followed by the wave of deregulations starting in the
1990s with the UK. The emerged liberalised power markets, as a prime example of market com-
petition of daily repeated auctions with capacity and physical constraints, tend to be characterized
by: a) an oligopoly of heterogeneous power generators; b) short term inelastic demand (Boren-
stein et al., 1999); and c) complex (but not necessarily complicated) market mechanisms, which
are designed to facilitate both financial and physical trading. Thus, there is potential that these
characteristics in conjunction allow the principal market players to manipulate spot market prices
upwards. Does this happen? Or, is the process of balancing supply and demand in real time by
means of daily repeat auctions, conducted within a framework of known technical constraints, suf-
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ficient to ensure that competitive outcomes prevail? From an expert systems perspective, power
markets rank among the most complex of all markets operated at present as supply and demand
have to be balanced in real time, considering transmission limits and power unit commitment con-
straints. In other words, power markets exemplify market competition of daily repeated bids/offers
of power with capacity and physical constraints. As the result the complexity of a deregulated
electricity market resulted in the failure of power market designs. In the US, the Standard Market
Design proposal in July 2002 failed due to political, regional and stakeholder pressures and was
therefore adapted by the less ambitious Wholesale Power Market proposal (Gross, 2004). The
costs of implementing the Standard Market Design proposal were epitomised by the North-east
Blackout of 2003 and the Californian electricity market debacle (Tomain, 2011). Also in Europe,
electricity market structures were forced to adapt after bearing heavy criticism. UK decided to
supersede the Pool’s flawed governance structure by the New Electricity Trading Arrangements
(NETA) framework but other difficulties arose after doing so. NETA failed to increase either the
liquidity of markets or the participation of the true demand side, raised trading costs, and cost over
£ 700 million (Newbery, 2004).
In general the main efficiency drawbacks of power markets are related to transmission congestion
abuse by a few dominant sellers, poor market designs which invite strategic bidding by suppliers,
the lack of customer response to price spikes, capacity shortage caused by demand growth that is
not matched by new capacity and thin trading of forward and future contracts that are critical for
price discovery and risk management (Maenhoudt and Deconinck, 2010).
This research work attempts to provide a simulation-based solution for key market issues by de-
veloping a novel computational model for researchers and policy makers.
1.3 Aims, objectives and scope
1.3.1 Aim
The aim of the proposed research project is to develop a novel computational laboratory, termed
here the ACEWEM, for experimental designs of restructured wholesale electricity markets in order
3
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to gain insights into the key power market issues considered in objectives of this thesis.
1.3.2 Objectives
The specific research objectives are:
• To develop a reliable tool (the ACEWEM computational laboratory) to serve for engineering
of efficient electricity markets.
• To explore the influence of existing pricing mechanisms on wholesale electricity price for-
mation.
• To explore the influence of alternative congestion management schemes on wholesale elec-
tricity price formation.
• To explore the emergence and impact of strategic behaviour by power generators on whole-
sale electricity price formation.
• To explore the impact of transmission grid physical constraints on wholesale electricity price
formation and trading behaviour of power generators.
1.3.3 Scope
Wholesale electricity markets are complex adaptive systems. Thus, it is difficult (if not unrealistic)
to model all plausible behavioural phenomena arising as a result of the interactions of market
participants. Therefore this PhD thesis focuses on the development of a novel and highly flexible
model for wholesale electricity markets reflecting on the most important and common features of
bidding strategies of wholesale electricity generators while wholesale electricity consumers are
assumed to be ’passive’. This is because the short-run price elasticity of demand for electricity is
negligible (Yusta and Dominguez, 2002; Faruqui and George, 2002).
Furthermore, the proposed ACEWEM model assumes independence between wholesale electricity
generators and wholesale electricity consumers, although a degree of interdependence in terms of
behavioural feedback loops might be expected in reality. The ACEWEM model also assumes that
electricity generators do not directly communicate in order to coordinate their bidding strategies.
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The bidding strategies emerge from bottom-up by means of a bounded rationality stochastic profit
optimisation (SPO) algorithm proposed here for the first time.
The ACEWEM model does not include dynamic investment strategies for capacity expansions
while the demand for wholesale electricity is specified externally. However, using ACEWEM-
based forward-looking scenarios, the implication of alternative investment strategies for wholesale
electricity generation and demand profiles can be explored.
1.4 The methodological approach
Three major approaches to power auctions can be distinguished: (cost-based) optimization models,
equilibrium models, and (top-down or bottom-up) simulation models (Ventosa et al., 2005). A
common application of optimization models in power markets is the capacity expansion planning
of public utilities (Simoglou et al., 2014). A limitation of such models is that they do not adequately
capture strategic interactions between market participants. In contrast, equilibrium models, which
may be viewed as generalizations of cost-based models (Weron, 2014), present generators as
entities engaged in a rational bidding game for which both the rules of the game and information
about rivals are shared among incumbents (Guerci et al., 2010; Weidlich and Veit, 2008). In most
cases both these top-down-type models involve high levels of aggregation and over simplification:
they are not designed to analyse power markets that are heavily influenced by technical details
(e.g. transmission network) and strategic player interactions (Sensfußet al., 2007). Taken together,
by ignoring strategic player interactions and/or the environment (transmission grid) these models
disregard the consequences of learning effects that result from daily repeated auctions conducted
within a framework of known technical constraints (Rothkopf, 1999).
While analytical models provide a reasonable representation of power markets under stationary or
strong periodicity of dynamic disturbances (Kannan and Zavala, 2011), they struggle representing
short-term behaviour (e.g. hourly bids/offers) observed in power markets (Bunn and Day, 2009).
It is not surprising therefore that the complexities of the power markets drive most analytical mod-
elling methods to their limits.
Asymmetric information, imperfect competition, strategic interaction, collective learning, and the
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possibility of multiple equilibria all point to the complexity inherent in power markets.Agent-
based Computational Economics (ACE) - a bottom-up simulation-based modelling approach - is a
methodology that has the potential to overcome the shortcomings of traditional analytical methods
to model complex (power) markets (Tesfatsion (2006) and references therein). In short, ACE mod-
els are computational models of micro-agents (e.g. power generating companies) operating in an
environment (e.g. transmission grid), in which they interact repeatedly with other agents over a pe-
riod of time, thereby permitting the computational study of phenomena as Complex Adaptive Sys-
tems (CASs). For Tesfatsion (2006), CASs “include planner units, i.e., units that are goal-directed
and that attempt to exert some degree of control over their environment to facilitate achievements of
these goals”. Voudouris (2011) argues that the development of realistically rendered ACE models
offers a better way for the representation and scientific investigation of complex, dynamic phenom-
ena such as energy markets.
An important theme in social and economic science is a move towards bottom-up models for the
representation of complex phenomena. Historically, economists have addressed questions about
how decisions are made with aggregated models, assuming perfect information and a rational be-
haviour. In recent years, a disaggregated modelling approach in social and economic science has
advanced,see for example the ACE paradigm (Voudouris, 2011). Furthermore, the ACE paradigm,
using as a basic tool an Agent-based Model (ABM), have become a widely accepted approach to
solving both theoretical and practical problems in energy economics (Weron, 2014).
The key distinction between ACE models (specific models developed based upon the ACE paradigm)
and other types of economic modelling is agent autonomy and interactions between autonomous
agents (see Figure 1.1). Agents in ACE models are decision-making entities capable of reactivity,
social communication, goal-directed learning, and - most important of all - self-determinism on
the basis of private internal processes such as dynamic profit maximisation. Thus, the agent is
modelled as an independent entity that makes decisions and takes actions using the limited share
of influence and/or uncertain information (bounded rationality) available to it, similar to how or-
ganizations and individuals operate in the real world. A main feature of the ACE models is the
repetitive and competitive interactions between the agents - an agent makes publicly available to
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other interacting agents only a subset of their private information and actions (see Figure 1.1).
Following Voudouris (2011), the other important building block in the ACE paradigm is the rep-
resentation of the physical and social environment or space within which agents operate (see the
different layers of Figure 1.1). Each agent may only observe a subset of the multilayer environment
(representing bounded rationality).
The ACE model specifies the initial state of the market by specifying the attributes and methods of
each agent and the characteristics of the environment using observational micro-data. The initial
attributes of any particular agent might include type characteristics (e.g. power generator), struc-
tural characteristics (e.g. cost function), and initial information about other agents (e.g. location
on transmissions grids, maximum production capacity). The initial methods might include market
protocols (e.g. bidding rules), learning modes (e.g. reinforcement learning), trading rules (e.g.
profit maximization), and rules for changing rules (e.g. strategy updating of forecasting models
based on past performance). The market then evolves over time without further intervention. All
events that subsequently occur arise from the historical evolution of agents’ interactions (Tesfat-
sion, 2006; Jennings, 2000).
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Figure 1.1: Agents, organisation, environment, and interactions (source: Kiose and Voudouris
(2014))
ACE models offer three main benefits over other modelling techniques for the representation of
wholesale power markets:
• Capturing emergent phenomena, these phenomena result from the interaction of the individ-
ual entities.
• Providing a natural description of a complex adaptive system. If the system is composed of
behavioural entities (as is the case with power markets), agent-based models are most natural
and closer to reality to model these systems.
• Flexibility. This flexibility comes in different dimensions. More agents for instance can
be added, and the complexity of the agent, their behaviour, degree of rationality, ability to
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learn and evolve can be tuned. This is important when different market designs need to be
integrated in the model.
ACE models are useful when:
• the interaction between the agents is complex (see Figure 1.1)
• the agents exhibit complex behaviour, including learning (see Figure 4.4).
• the representation of physical space (e.g. transmission grid) is crucial
• the aim is to reveal and explain the complex and aggregate market behaviours that emerge
from the interactions of the heterogeneous agents (Koritarov, 2004)
However, ACE models are not appropriate when:
• the dynamics of the systems is linear
• the representation of physical space is of marginal utility
• the interactions between the constituent components of the system is limited
• micro-data is not available
• forecasting is the primary focus of the study (although the ACEWEM framework presented
here is an important step in addressing this shortcoming by integrating ACE models with
formal statistical techniques).
The agent-based approach, due to its advantages over the alternative modelling techniques, is ex-
pected to deliver the best insights into research questions of this thesis and therefore is implemented
into the following suggested solution.
1.5 The suggested solution
To better represent the characteristics of wholesale power market, this thesis introduces the agent-
based Computational Economics of the Wholesale Electricity Market1 (ACEWEM) framework(see
1The ACEWEM software and user guide are available for download from the following source:
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/ha9qk6fn6ol969m/AADoRa5RH MWaqwJ3vHs4xtJa?dl=0
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Figure 1.2). Based on the work of Sun and Tesfatsion (2007b) and Rigby and Stasinopoulos (2005),
Figure 1.2: ACEWEM graphical user interface
the ACEWEM framework can simulate a wide range of power markets. It contains a variety of key
agents (system operator, power generators and wholesale electricity consumers) and other support-
ing environmental elements (e.g. transmission grid). Thus, the ACEWEM framework can represent
real-world agents operating over realistically abstracted power grids, in which both economic and
physical aspects are taken into account. Specifically, the ACEWEM framework proposed here adds
to the literature by:
(a) Suggesting a new decision rule for the strategic offers/bids of the agents competing in repeated
power auctions. The agents learn both from past performance of their strategies as well as
endogenously estimating a statistical model in order to optimize their strategic bids/offers (see
section 4.2.3). Here, it is important to note that the statistical model is developed by selecting
the structure of the GAMLSS-based model developed by Rigby and Stasinopoulos (2005)
using the RL algorithm of Erev and Roth (1998). This is a distinguishing feature of this
research work approach towards realistically rendered ACE models.
(b) Incorporating DA and RT spot markets - see Figure 2.2. This is important because agents
might strategically submit bids/offers across different markets as a way of optimizing total
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profit. Furthermore, physical constraints might not necessarily be taken into consideration in
the DA market. In fact, there are market designs where the physical constraints are resolved
during the operation of the RT market.
(c) Implementing two congestion management schemes, namely the LMP scheme (Hogan, 1992)
and PR scheme (De Vries, 2001) to test the effect of the different congestion management
schemes on market dynamics (e.g. see Experiment 1 and 3 in Chapter 6).
(d) As a result of (b) and (c), developing a least-cost Constrained Optimal Power Flow (COPF)
algorithm so to estimate power outputs from different generators operating in two spot markets
under different congestion management schemes.
(e) Implementing two alternative auction designs, namely uniform and discriminatory (pay-as-bid)
pricing rules (Klemperer, 2004)
From the modelling perspective, wholesale electricity generators and electricity consumer com-
panies are created based on the firms present in the real-word liberalised power markets. The
generation unit portfolio (i.e. a number of power plants that belong to power generating firm)
and relevant corporate behaviour are configured to match the real-world characteristics. Naturally,
these highly active decision-making agents are modelled as heterogeneous (rather than homoge-
neous) and adaptive (rather than passive) agents. The generation companies ’adaptive’ features and
decision-rules include the use of i) a RL2 algorithm to select the best performing strategy from a
discrete list of plausible distributions (called action/strategy domain) with ii) advanced statistical
models to estimate future electricity prices (and load) at grid nodes or electricity regions (depend-
ing on the real-world characteristics of wholesale power market represented). Clearly, prices can
be estimated for each one of the spot power markets, such as 1) the DA market and 2) the RT
market in which companies sell and buy electricity.
2Reinforcement learning was inspired by behaviourist psychology and is an area of machine learning in computer
science, concerned with how an agent ought to take actions in an environment so as to maximize some notion of
cumulative reward - profit in our case (Gieseler, 2005).
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1.6 Detailed outline of the thesis
Part I: Context and Model Conceptualisation
Chapter 1 provides an introduction into the research area. It discusses the background of electricity
industry deregulation and overviews the major issues that the liberalised markets are currently fac-
ing. This is followed by the research aim, specific research objectives and scope. The subsequent
sections on methodological approach and solution justify the contemporary scientific discipline
selected for research methods and nominate the simulation framework with which to refer specific
market design issues.
Chapter 2 sets the scene for wholesale electricity market by reviewing the theoretical and empirical
background for auctions. It also outlines the difficulties of applying a single-unit auction theory
to repeated multi-unit auctions and discusses the outcomes gained from empirical studies. This
is followed by discussion on the main means for electricity trading, namely through power ex-
changes and over the counter marketplaces. Subsequent sections present the electricity congestion
management methods which are followed by overview of the Optimal Power Flow (OPF) problem.
Finally the chapter overviews the UK wholesale electricity market and discusses the peculiarities
attributed to it.
Chapter 3 presents a critical survey of the most prominent work conducted in the field of agent-
based simulations in power markets modelling.
Chapter 4 discusses in details the model for studying electricity markets developed in this work.
In particular it first outlines the overall model structure and characteristics. This is followed by
overview of the main agent types presneted in the model, their decision rules and physical infras-
tructure.
Part II: Model Design
This part of the thesis provides in-depth overview of the proposed model. It presents the overall
architecture and graphical user interface. This is followed by detailed discussion on DA and RT
markets implementation. This part also overviews the conventional RL algorithm and presents the
12
1 Introduction
Stochastic Profit Optimisation algorithm.
Part III: Model Implementation and Application
This part of the thesis sets an experimental study to address the questions of the current research
project. It presents an evaluation and discussion of the results obtained from the simulations per-
formed. In particular Chapter 6 focuses on the abstract wholesale electricity markets while Chap-
ter 7 simulates the real UK power market and outlines the experiments conducted.
Part IV: Discussions and Conclusions
This part of the thesis outlines the regulatory and methodological contributions delivered by this
research work, followed by a summary of the main results. It also provides an outlook for further
research and a summary statements for the main research outcomes in relation to the objectives set
out in the introduction.
1.7 Conclusion
This chapter has presented the rationale for the current research work as well as the aims and
objectives. It has been argued that the traditional modelling techniques are rather weak to address
the complexity of electricity markets. This complexity however can be well captured by an agent-
based modelling paradigm. This chapter has suggested a solution that is based on an agent-based
framework integrated with flexible statistical models. The introduction to the concept of wholesale
electricity markets is expanded in the subsequent chapter.
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2.1 Introduction
The electricity industry in general can be referred to as a set of specific activities: electricity gener-
ation, distribution, transmission, supply and metering. Since its origin the industry was composed
of vertically integrated firms. However during the liberalisation initiated process in the 1980s, a
number of countries around the world introduced the market concept for electricity trading to un-
ravel the monopolies. It was expected that competition in the industry could lower electricity prices
and stimulate emergence of new technologies (Krause, 2005; Weron, 2006).
Electricity trading involves interaction between power generation and retail supply which are sub-
ject to competition. On one side generating firms compete for selling electricity to the wholesale
market and on the other side, load serving entities compete for buying power from wholesale
market to serve their retail customers. Two different establishments exist where trades between
electricity generation and the load serving side are settled, Power Exchanges (PXs) and Over The
Counter Marketplaces (OTCs) (Lai, 2001; Weidlich and Veit, 2008). PXs and OTCs usually also
offer derivative products which allow market participants to hedge their risks.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the concept of auctions and its
theoretical and empirical background. It also discusses and compares the main means for electric-
ity trading, namely organised PXs and OTCs. Section 2.3 overviews the most widely implemented
congestion management methods. Section 2.4 provides a mathematical description for the linear
optimal power flow problem and outlines the electricity market related physical constraints. Sec-
tion 2.5 looks into the issue of market power exercised by electricity producers. Finally Section 2.6
overviews a design of the UK wholesale electricity market.
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2.2 Auctions
Historicallyf auctions were a relatively uncommon way to facilitate exchange of goods or com-
modities. Nowadays however, it is believed that auctions can lead to economic efficiency and
therefore attract a high interest in many industries (e.g. telecommunication, natural resources,
electricity, finance, etc). The study of alternative auction designs generally assumes a benchmark
model where bidders:
• are risk neutral;
• have their independent private valuation of the good1;
• are symmetric;
• make or receive payments as a function of bids alone,
• act in the single-period setting;
• bid for a single unit of an indivisible good.
Thus given these assumptions the Revenue Equivalence Theorem states that the final price achieved
is invariant to the auction design selected. In reality, however, the market participants are asym-
metric, meet repeatedly to bid for the same commodity and are prone to form oligopolies. Under
these circumstances the bidding is unlikely to be competitive, but rather strategic in nature, with
auction participants seeking out opportunities to exercise market power. Therefore the parity of
auction designs is doubtful and hence it is still an open question as to which auction design is the
most efficient.
Among many possible auction designs (see Klemperer (2004)) the two are of a particular interest
due to acquired popularity in economic systems, namely first-price and second-price sealed bid
auctions (Contreras et al., 2001). In the first-price sealed bid auction each bidder submits a sealed
bid (which is hidden from other bidders) to a seller of a single-unit good. The highest bidder
1This means that each bidder’s private valuation of the auctioned good (e.g. 1MW of electricity) is different and
independent of peers’ valuations.
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wins the auction and pays his bid to purchase the good. When the auctioned good is a multi-unit,
multiple winners can be established each of which pays his (discriminatory) winning bid. In this
case the first-price sealed bid auction design is referred to as ’discriminatory’ or ’pay-as-bid’, since
not all the bidders pay the same price. In the discriminatory price auction the sealed bids are
ordered from highest price to lowest. The auction clearing then starts from the highest bid first and
moves towards the lowest bid until the supply of multi-unit good is exhausted. Thus depending on
multi-unit good supply capacity, the lowest bids may not be reached.
The second-price sealed bid auction is referred to as ’uniform price’ and is run likewise, with the
exception that the successful bidders all pay the same price regardless of the bids they actually
submitted. The uniform price equals to the highest (marginal) bid price accepted.
In early research conducted by Branco and de Portugal (1993) and Maskin et al. (1989) the authors
studied multi-unit good auctions, but do not compare discriminatory and uniform price auctions
directly. The comparison was conducted by a number of researchers who have argued that dis-
criminatory price auctions are inferior to the uniform price auctions (Bikhchandani and Huang,
1993; Milgrom, 1989). Thus under uniform price auction the bidders would have a lower win-
ner’s curse and sellers achieve greater revenues. This conclusion, however was drawn from the
assumption that the traded good is a single-unit and as shown by Back and Zender (1993) will
no longer apply when the auctioned good is multi-unit. In later work Wang and Zender (2002)
model a treasury auction environment considering a multi-unit good, non-competitive bidding and
different degrees of price discrimination. They showed that a continuum of equilibria exists for
both uniform price and discriminatory auctions however the entire conclusion is still not clear cut
on whether one auction design prevails the other. In contrast Maskin and Riley (2000); Kirkegaard
(2012) concluded on discriminatory auction superiority over the uniform price design in number
of experiments with symmetrical players. Using the identical setting Mares and Swinkels (2014)
showed that a well chosen asymmetric second price auction performs better than does the sym-
metric (or otherwise) first price auction. The authors however assume a single-shot game rather
then repeated auction. Note that a number of studies suggest that when bidders meet regularly
in the repeated auctions they can easily learn to cooperate to restrain the price from reaching its
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competitive level. Moreover it is also possible that the bidders cooperation masks the advantage of
one auction design over the other which otherwise would be apparent in competitive environment.
Damianov and Becker (2010) in theoretical analysis and later in experimental work (Damianov
et al., 2010) compared the uniform price and discriminatory price auctions in an incomplete infor-
mation setting. They assumed that seller - monopolist, with constant marginal production cost and
no capacity constraint, acts strategically and offers multiple units of a good to buyer in two stage
game. The seller learns based on the results from stage one and applies its strategic decision during
stage two, while the buyers are assumed risk-neutral and face uncertainty about the marginal cost
of the seller. The authors conclude that the sellers’ strategic behaviour, in respect to supply quan-
tity offered, leads to lower prices under discriminatory price auction and thus generates a lower
expected revenue for the seller and a lower trade volume than under uniform price auction. Similar
results were achieved in Abbink et al. (2006). The authors studied treasury auctions in a set of
laboratory experiments conducted to compare uniform and discriminatory auction designs. They
considered a multi-unit good in a series of sequential auctions (75 rounds) with identical set of
participants. The main result discovered was that the uniform auction significantly raises the sell-
ers revenue over the discriminatory auction. It is not entirely clear then why, out of 48 countries
analysed in Brenner et al. (2009) 24 use discriminatory price while 9 countries use uniform price
auctions for government debt. Perhaps the existence of the linked markets (e.g. forward markets
before treasury auctions and secondary markets) undermine the conclusions derived from studies
cited above.
Among many exiting auction markets one particular group which emerged relatively late due to
deregulation of electricity industry may give a clear insight into the problem. Electricity markets
are of a particular interest since they involve multi-unit bidding and asymmetric market participants
(some may have considerable market shares). Also unique for the industry physical constraints
require the same market participants to compete daily in order to sell or buy the electricity on the
series of linked marketplaces. These marketplaces are distinguished and discussed in following
subsection.
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2.2.1 Power Exchanges vs Over The Counter marketplaces
In contrast to conventional means for electricity trading that is mainly through Over The Counter
contracts, PXs offer centralised, regulated marketplaces at which the standardised electricity con-
tracts can be traded. Centralisation facilitates higher liquidity and delivers essential price and
quantities information to the entire electricity industry, while product standardisation makes trad-
ing easier, lowers transaction cost and facilitates wholesale price comparability. Trading at PXs is
risk-free and anonymous.
On the other hand trading at OTCs is typically unregulated and allows for both standardised and
non-standardised products. The products are directly (thus non anonymously) negotiated between
parties that usually involves some counter-party risk. As a result OTCs offer a very limited market
transparency since contract facts remain hidden from the rest of marketplace participants. Nev-
ertheless, OTCs gained popularity in recent years due to product flexibility and lower operating
costs (Feltkamp and Musialski, 2010).
A set of marketplaces with various combination of OTCs and/or PXs form a wholesale electricity
market. There is no standard market design around the world. However from the analysis of market
models implemented in different countries, it is possible to highlight two main types: a) electricity
pooling (centralised market) and b) bilateral trading (decentralised market). The main difference
between these two power market designs is that the trading of electricity through a special power
exchange (referred as a pool) can be optional - bilateral trading (e.g. UK power market, Nord Pool,
etc) or mandatory - electricity pooling (e.g. power market of Spain, Australia, etc) (Lai, 2001).
In electricity pooling market design all electricity generators (apart of the smallest ones) are re-
quired to sell their electricity output to the Pool at the Pool’s Sell Price, similarly the electricity
buyers purchase from the Pool at Pool’s Purchase Price. All generating plants offer price-quantity
pairs to the System Operator. These supply offers all together form an aggregated stepwise supply
curve. The offers submitted by generators can be based on predefined variable costs (cost-based
pools) or can be any prices the generators choose (price-based pools). Also, the Poolcan be referred
as one-sided or two-sided. In one-sided pool the electricity demand is forecast by the system op-
erator, alternately in two-sided pool the demand is recovered from bids submitted by electricity
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Figure 2.1: Pricing in a) one-sided and b) two-sided pool (source: Weron (2006))
buyers (Barroso et al., 2005; Surrey, 2013). In general if no generation and transmission con-
straints are taken into account then the intersection of ranked from highest to lowest demand bids
(stepwise bid function), and ranked from lowest to highest supply offers (stepwise supply function),
determines the market clearing quantity and price (see Figure 2.1). The pool usually operates on
an hourly basis, meaning that bids submitted by buyers and offers submitted by generators are
matched (continuously or in discrete points in time depending on the pool’s design) for every hour
in order to balance the system. The contracts at OTCs in electricity pooling are purely financial
and do not entail electricity generators for physical power delivery. Thus OTCs under electricity
pooling mainly help market participants manage their risks arising as the result of high electricity
price volatility. By setting up a mandatory pool rather than optional the regulator is aiming to
achieve high market transparency (Lai, 2001) as it is believed to prevent some large generators
from gaining market power. On the other hand the disadvantage is that all market participants have
to joint pool which adds to the fixed costs by membership fees, energy fees, etc.
In bilateral trading, power generators are allowed to enter into bilateral trades through OTCs with
buyers. Parties normally negotiate upon bilateral contracts of any length. These contracts entail
physical power delivery and specify the price, amount of wholesale electricity and the period when
this electricity dispatch will take place. The generators have to notify the system operator of con-
tract terms and then proceed to self-dispatch when the contract matures. Also in bilateral trading
power generators are not obliged to sell their electricity to the pool or any other power exchange.
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In general the two market designs can be described by Figure 2.2 as they both comprise a sim-
ilar set of PXs and/or OTCs. The operational procedures however of a common marketplace
can be subject to different rules, which are specific for each market design (e.g. standardised or
non-standardised products, anonymous or non-anonymous trading, contacts stipulate physical elec-
tricity delivery are allowed or restricted, etc.). One important marketplace for long-term electricity
trading is the Forward and Futures market , which we now discuss.
Figure 2.2: General wholesale power market timeline (source: adopted from Petrov and Gore
(2009))
Forward and Futures market
In bilateral trading, this market provides an opportunity for generator and buyer to enter into con-
tracts for future electricity supply of contracted quantity and price. This market usually accounts
for the majority of electricity traded. In the pool market design the generators and buyers have
to buy electricity from pool, thus they cannot contract for the physical delivery. Instead they can
hedge against electricity price volatility (contract for differences). The electricity buyer and gen-
erator agree on a certain volume and price in the contracts for differences. If on the dispatching
day the pool electricity price is higher than the contracted one, the generator pays the buyer the
difference and vice versa when the pool electricity price is lower than contracted one.
Futures are standardised and legally binding contracts that obligate electricity sellers for the future
power delivery at a specified location, date and quantity. In most cases, however the futures are
settled financially between parties on or near the delivery date. Forward contracts also oblige
electricity sellers to deliver electricity at specified location, date and quantity. In contrast to futures,
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the terms and conditions of forward contracts are not standardised, but negotiated to meet the
particular financial or risk management needs of the parties involved. For this reason, they are not
traded at PXs, but usually through OTCs (Stoft et al., 1998).
Another important marketplace for contracts that stipulate physical delivery of electricity at a spe-
cific time on the following day is referred to as the DA market.
Day-ahead market
Day-ahead market is run in order for the system operator to balance the system and also to deter-
mine wholesale electricity prices for the next day delivery based on generation offers2, predicted
demand or demand bids3, as well as scheduled bilateral transactions. In the case of electricity
pooling this is a major market for electricity trading, whereas in bilateral trading the DA market is
run independently of the system operator and enables generators and electricity buyers to fine-tune
their rolling contract positions as their own demand forecasts improve the closer they get to the RT
point of electricity dispatch.
Intra-day market
On the very short term, usually between DA market and an hour prior to real-time dispatch, market
participants enter Intra-day (ID) market. Electricity sellers may want to sell spare capacity, or
electricity buyers may purchase an additional power in order to be able to react to imperfections in
demand forecast or sudden faults in electricity dispatch.
Real-time market
After DA and ID markets closure, the demand and supply of electricity is still not always perfectly
balanced due to imperfections in demand forecast, sudden plant outages, or fluctuating renewable
electricity production. In both market designs the RT market involves participation of the system
operator who continuously levels out imbalances that occur in the system. Thereby the RT is run
usually one hour before electricity dispatch where the system operator accepts bids and offers from
2An offer is a proposal to increase generation or reduce demand (Harris, 2012).
3A bid is a proposal to reduce generation or increase demand (Harris, 2012).
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pre-qualified market participants to provide power regulation to counteract energy imbalances de-
tected during the electricity dispatch window (settlement period). The pre-qualification is required
to ensure that participating electricity generators meet the specific RT market technical require-
ments (ramp up rate, maximum start up cycles, etc.). Qualified power plants effectively submit two
offers: capacity price and incremental power price. Power plants are paid capacity prices for hold-
ing the specified electricity generation in reserve (thus losing the opportunity to sell their output
elsewhere), and incremental power prices for producing electricity required to balance the sys-
tem (Weidlich, 2008). Depending on the congestion management method employed (e.g PR) the
power plants also submit bids: decremental power prices for postponing electricity generation that
was contracted at DA or Forward/Futures market. The process of energy balancing on a transmis-
sion network at real-time is referred to as frequency control. Unbalanced electricity consumption
or injection causes the system’s frequency to deviate from its set-point value (commonly 50 Hz)
that in turn can damage consuming devices or even cause blackouts.
Ex-post trading or imbalance settlement
Ex-post trading or imbalance settlement is a settlement process for the accepted RT market in-
cremental power offers and bids, and also for recovering the system operator’s costs accrued in
balancing the system, as well as charging market participants whose contracted positions do not
match their metered volumes of electricity.
In a liberalised electricity industry the DA, ID and RT markets are referred to as spot markets
similar to the markets where commodities are sold and bought for instant delivery, however the use
of terminology by some authors might differ slightly (Krause, 2005).
The main market participants are (Harris, 2012):
• System operator - a non-commercial organisation that oversees the security of electricity
supply, and is neutral and independent with regard to the market participants.
• Electricity supplier (electricity buyer, load-serving entity) - purchases a wholesale electricity
in order to meet the demand of their end-use customers
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• Electricity generator (electricity seller) - an electricity generating firm that sells a wholesale
electricity, comprises one or more power plants.
• Non physical trader - an organisation without a physical demand for electricity, or any means
of generating electricity (e.g. Banks), to trade electricity
2.3 Congestion management methods
The electricity flow between two nodes is partially governed by the transmission capacity of the
line. In practice it may not be possible to deliver the cheapest electricity available if its flow violates
the capacity limit of any transmission line. In this case the grid is said to be congested. The cost
associated with congestion alleviation can increase dramatically and hence can become a barrier
for electricity trading. For this reason the congestion management problem is seen to be critical
for the smooth functioning of liberalised electricity markets and subsequently attracted a broad
attention within industry and academia (Kumar et al., 2005; Mwanza et al., 2007).
In general the congestion management process comprises four important steps: 1) recognising the
current state of transmission physical capacity and existing constraints; 2) allocation of generating
capacity; 3) estimation of the level of congestion; 4) alleviation of generating capacity. A variety
of congestion management methods exist. Depending on location in the market operation timeline,
these methods can be ascribed to capacity allocation or capacity alleviation type. The two most
common methods of capacity allocation used in liberalised power markets are:
• LMP method also known as Nodal pricing found in diverse implementations in New Zealand
and parts of United States.
• Zonal pricing method is found in Scandinavian market for inter-zonal congestion relief and
in Australia.
These methods are applied prior to electricity dispatch. In contrast, capacity alleviation methods
are used during electricity delivery and thus are usually referred to as remedial actions. The main
methods are:
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• Power Re-Dispatch method as found in the UK.
• Countertrade method as used in Scandinavian power market for intra-zonal congestion relief
Each of these methods of either type maintains energy system security but differs in its influence
on the economics of the electricity market. None of these methods can be clearly referred to as
dominant (Christie et al., 2000; Krause, 2005; Lo et al., 2000).
Locational marginal pricing (Nodal pricing)
The LMP concept was invented by Schweppe et al. (1988) and later finalised for market application
by Hogan (1992). The LMP method is grounded on two key ideas: 1) to set the optimisation task
that incorporates technical specifications of generating units, demand elasticities and transmission
grid physical constraints; 2) optimise the system in a least-cost generating manner or in other words
maximise social welfare. One of the solution output is a price for wholesale electricity at each
transmission node. If the least-cost electricity dispatch is impossible without an ensuing power
congestion, in this case electricity prices vary across the nodes. This is seen to have a positive
effect since price variation provides the correct investment signals to generators and loads. Thus
LMP as methodology comprehends that in addition to the necessity of electricity production it also
has to be delivered to a particular node. Under LMP method generators and electricity buyers do
not explicitly contract for transmission capacity. The capacity is allocated rather implicitly through
the bids and offers submitted (from particular nodes) to the market. The LMP method is usually
used in pool-based market designs where the system and transmission operator is a single body
responsible for clearing the market while respecting transmission constraints.
Zonal Pricing
The Zonal Pricing (ZP) congestion management method is used within the Scandinavian DA elec-
tricity market (Krause, 2005) in order to manage large and long-lasting constraints (Bjorndal et al.,
2003). Similar to LMP, ZP method determines electricity prices for different locations of the trans-
mission grid. However in the congested networks the distinct prices are established not for each
individual node but rather for a group of nodes referred to as zones. This concept is usually used
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when the system operator anticipates that parts of the transmission grid can be potentially con-
gested. Independent System Operator (ISO) splits the system into two price areas located on the
both sides of the ’bottleneck’ and notifies market participants. Market participants have to submit
separate bids and offers to price areas in which they have generating or loading facilities. These
price areas are settled separately at the prices which satisfy transmission grid constraints. Zones
with excess generation will have lower prices than those with excess load. The price difference
is paid to the system operator and later on used to reduce the capacity fee4. If the market is not
congested then only uniform electricity price is established as no price areas exist.
Power Re-Dispatch
For congestion relief in Sweden, Denmark, Finland, UK and smaller internal congestions in Nor-
way, the PR method is adopted along the RT market operation. In particular the ISO clears the DA
market based on supply and demand information received, and by treating the entire transmission
grid as ’copper plate’ as no physical transmission constraints exist. Subsequently when the sys-
tem timeline enters the RT market, ISO adds physical transmission constraints to the optimisation
problem. By solving it the ISO defines the nodes where the power injection has to be increased or
decreased in order to relieve the congestion. The INC and DEC are obtained through bilateral con-
tracts between the ISO and market participants and thus remain closed for the public (Sioshansi,
2011). Subsequently each contracted participant will be instructed to either increase or decrease
their power output at the node and also reimbursed for the service provided according to contract
specifications.
Countertrade
Countertrading is a modified form of PR and is referred to as more market-oriented (De Vries,
2001). In contrast to the PR method the ISO buys and sells electricity at prices determined by
bidding process at power exchange. Only market participants which satisfy specific technical re-
quirements are allowed to trade at RT market. In the case of the offered capacity not being enough
4Capacity fee is applied to electricity generators and electricity buyers and it based on maximum MW consumed (for
buyers) or maximum MW produced (for generators) (Christie et al., 2000)
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to resolve the congestion, the ISO can add a shape to contracted positions (at Forward/Futures
or/and DA markets) by accessing the spinning reserve5 available to it.The costs that the system
operator is subject to (when buy and resell the power) are distributed among market participants as
fixed charges of the transmission grid tariff (Christie et al., 2000).
2.4 Optimal Power Flow
The objective of an OPF algorithm is to find a steady state solution of electricity dispatch which
minimises the loss in power transportation and total generation cost while satisfying limits of
real and reactive power production, transmission constraints, output of compensating devices, and
etc. (Pandya and Joshi, 2008). In practice, the alternating current power flow problem is typically
approximated by a more tractable direct current (DC) OPF (Wood and Wollenberg, 1996; Sun
and Tesfatsion, 2007a) that focuses exclusively on real power constraints in linearised form under
several assumptions (Kirschen and Strbac, 2004):
• The voltage angle6 difference across each branch is sufficiently small (close to zero) in mag-
nitude
• The voltage magnitudes at each node are assumed to be constant
• The resistance for each branch is negligible compared to the reactance7 and can therefore be
set to 0
• There is a reference node on the transmission grid that has voltage angle normalized to 0
These assumptions allow the creation of a model which is a reasonable first approximation for the
real energy system. Such a model is very advantageous for computer calculations and also has some
beneficial properties such as 1) Linearity - if the amount of power ( Megawatt (MW)) in transaction
between nodes is doubled, the corresponding power flow will double as well 2) Superposition - the
5Spinning reserve characterises an unloaded generation that is synchronized and ready to serve additional de-
mand (Hirst, 2002)
6Voltage angle is a phase angle between voltage and current (Parker, 2003).
7Reactance is an opposition of inductance and capacitance to alternating current. Capacitance in tern is the property
of electric conductor to accumulate electric charge. Inductance the physical property of an electric conductor that
causes an electromotive force to be generated by a change in the flowing current (Parker, 2003).
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power flows on the transmission lines can be broken down into a sum of components (Christie
et al., 2000). By taking all the assumptions listed above into account, the power flow Pnm on the
branch connecting node n and node m is calculated by:
Pnm =
1
Rnm
∆ϕnm (2.1)
where, Rnm - branch reactance in per unit, ϕn and ϕm - phase angles at nodes n and m respectively.
The DC OPF objective can be represented as a minimisation of total generation cost and energy
losses as follows:
Minimise ∑
i∈I
Ci(PGi) +
∑
nm∈Ω
∆ϕ2nm (2.2)
With respect to
PGi and ∆ϕnm
where, Ci(PGi) characterises generator’s i cost of production which is a function of its electricity
output; ∆ϕnm is a phase angles difference at the nodes adjacent from both sides to branch nm. The
solution of (2.2) delivers the optimal output level by generators required to meet the system load
at the lowest possible cost and least energy loss. However this solution does not guarantee that
certain generating and transmission grid physical specifications will be respected in order to serve
the power in a robust and reliable manner to the end user. Depending on the congestion pricing
method employed the set of constraints may vary (see Grundy et al. (1996) for extended list of
physical constants), however it is possible to define the crucial ones underlying most of congestion
pricing approaches.
Real power balance constraint for each node. The power plants are coupled together by the
transition grid in such way that the rotors of all generators are in synchronised rotation. However
the synchronisation may be lost due to variations in load and power generation, short circuits,
disconnections of power transmission lines, and similar causes. In order to avoid blackouts the
system frequency stability has to be properly managed at every instant. In particular the frequency
stability across the network is provided by respecting the total power balance at each node. Thus
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the total power flowing to the node n plus the power generated at node n must be equal to total
power withdrawn from node n:
∑
i∈In
PGi +
∑
nm∈Ω
∆ϕnm
Rnm
=
∑
k∈Kn
PLk (2.3)
where, PGi is an electricity output by generator i at node n, PLk is an amount of electricity with-
drawn by load k and node n, Rnm is reactance of branch nm.
Real power thermal constraint for each branch. All transmission lines are made from materials
of finite resistance, thus running electric current will cause them to heat up, which in order can
damage the ability of wires to conduct a power. Thus thermal capacities of the transmission lines
have to be properly managed. Notationally the constraint can be expressed as following:
∣∣∣∣∣∆ϕnmRnm
∣∣∣∣∣ < T Unm (2.4)
where, T Unm is a thermal limit for real power flow on branch nm.
Real power production constraint for each generator. Every distinct generating technology has
unique technical specifications attributed to it. This particular constraint highlights the fact that
each generating technology usually has lower and always upper production limits8:
PLGi ≤ PGi ≤ PUGi (2.5)
where, PLGi and P
U
Gi
are lower and upper production limits accordingly of generator i
Voltage angle setting at reference node. Overall the DC OPF problem is set by z number of
equations with z + 1 number of variables. Computationally this system does not have an unique
optimal solution, unless number of unknowns and number of equations are equal. For this reason
8For example a peak generator can usually produce from just above 0 MW, however a nuclear power plants starts
producing at well above 0 MW level
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the angle at a random node (referred as the reference node) is explicitly set to 0, thus a power
injection at the reference node is simply the negative sum of all other node injections in the system.
ϕ1 = 0 (2.6)
In addition to the physical constraints listed above the phenomenon called ’Loop flows’ is also in-
corporated into DC OPF implicitly. The dispatched power flow is governed by the First Kirchoff’s
Law9, and thus some portions of it are also distributed into other branches that are adjacently con-
nected. The loop flow is defined as a difference between the scheduled power transaction and actual
load of the line.
Consider the 3-bus network in Figure 2.3 using two generators(2000 MW and 1000 MW) and a
load of 3000 MW. Generator at bus 1 is required to dispatch a total power of 2000 MW to the load
at bus 3. But in actual practice, only 70% (1400 MW) of the dispatched power flows from bus 1 to
bus 3. The remaining 30% (600 MW) of power will flow along the non-contract paths 1-2 (from
bus 1 to bus 2) and 2-3 (from bus 2 to bus 3). This remaining flow is known as loop flow.
9First Kirchoff’s Law: a current flows uniformly in a circuit. Electrons do not bunch up. At any node (connection of
2 or more wires) the sum of the currents flowing into the node is exactly equal to the sum of currents flowing out of
the node (University of Texas at Austin, 2012).
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Figure 2.3: Demonstration of Loop flow (source: Chin, 2006)
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2.5 Trading behaviour of electricity producers
All the established markets in general can be referred to as competitive, oligopoly or monopoly
(Frezzi, 2008). The competitive market comprises numerous buyers and sellers of homogeneous
good with negligible individual market share. Thus each market participant cannot affect the ag-
gregate supply, demand or price and hence referred as a price taker (Makowski and Ostroy, 2001).
Moreover the competitive market does not impose barriers for entry and does not impede the cap-
ital flow between economic sectors. In contrast the pure monopoly is characterised by only one
producer that offers inelastic good. This market type has high price levels, supply constraints, and
usually excessive barriers to entry (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 2001). The intermediate between both
market structures is oligopoly. The oligopoly is distinguished by a group of domination producers
each of which controls a considerable marker share. Uncompetitive bidding in an oligopoly may
dramatically influence the market price leading to high pay-offs and hence abnormal profits. This
structure better represents the electricity industry and given its background (used to be organised
as vertically integrated monopolies) implies that a perfect competitive market model cannot be
achieved (Maiorano et al., 1999).
After liberalisation the electricity industries across the globe are characterized by a move toward
oligopolistic competition (Boroumand, 2015). Furthermore in electricity markets, firms trade re-
peatedly interacting on daily basis hence there is an opportunity to develop subtle communication
and collusive strategies (Borenstein et al., 2002). Moreover the concept of electricity market un-
ties some specific attributes that favour firms’ collusion such as 1) an inability to store electricity
efficiently; 2) demand inelasticity in response to price change; 3) electricity flows in the system
according to physical laws through the path that is not necessary an economically efficient. Em-
pirical evidence suggests that the generators have been able to raise prices well above competitive
levels (Borenstein and Bushnell, 2000; Joskow and Kahn, 2001).
Broadly speaking there are three common types of the strategic behaviour in electricity mar-
kets (Twomey et al., 2005; Younes and Ilic, 1998):
• Capacity withholding involves generators reporting reduced production capacity, or power
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Figure 2.4: Illustration of economic and capacity withholding (source: Frezzi (2008))
plant outages, in order to create a deficit for power and thus to rise the market prices for
electricity (see Figure 2.4).
• Economic withholding involves reduction in generator’s output when it offers into the market
the prices above competitive ones (see Figure 2.4).
• Transmission related strategies creating new or enhancing the existing power congestions
with the purpose of increasing prices for electricity in certain zones or nodes. Can be a result
of capacity or economic withholding.
According to Figure 2.4 the impacts from alternative strategic behaviours on market efficiency are
similar. Thus by exercising either strategy the electricity price increases from its competitive level
of ρcm to ρm and the quantity of power produced decreases from qcm to qm. The deviation of market
clearing results from their competitive positions leads to the following consequences:
• Wealth transfer - when the power producers exercise market power10 the wealth11 shifts from
consumers to the strategic players.
10Market power - the unilateral or coordinated ability of market participants to profitably increase prices above compet-
itive levels for a significant period of time (Garcia, 2007).
11Wealth - the total value of the accumulated assets owned by an individual, household, community, or country (Deard-
off, 2006).
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• Deadweight loss - the increase of market price diminishes the benefits to consumers in com-
parison to the raise of producers’ profits, causing an inefficiency to the society.
• Price volatility - the exercise of market power causes considerable price fluctuations espe-
cially when the electrcity demand is price inelastic.
• Supply shortage - strategic behaviour can lead to shortage of power supply, particularly in
periods of peak demand.
• Distortion of price signals - when the market power is exercised for a long time it could lead
to false price signals and as the result to distortion of operating and investment decisions.
Moreover the applied strategies of various types can be classified as static or dynamic. By adopting
the static class strategies the firm attempts to maximise its profits without taking into account sub-
sequent evolution of market variables and the competitors’ behaviour as a response to its strategic
action. In contrast, when dynamic class strategies are employed, the firm anticipates the responses
of other market participants (also strategic players). Firms are said to collude when they all simul-
taneously reach an equilibrium in their long-term profit maximisation actions. Through collusion
the market participants coordinate their strategies in order to maximise individual profits. In the
electricity market there are, in general, two ways of reaching a collusion among power produc-
ers, 1) tacitly or 2) explicitly. Tacit collusion does not involve a communication between power
producers, they individually analyse market prices and respond with their own bidding strategies.
These strategies are negotiated across power producers when they collude explicitly (Ivaldi et al.,
2003).
Market power concerns are probably the most difficult and controversial challenges faced by power
market regulators worldwide. On the one hand, electricity prices have to reflect the scarcity of
resources used for power generation and thus are expected to be high, however they should not
be accelerated by strategic behaviour of market participants. There is always a trade-off between
interests of consumers in low electricity prices and incentives for power generators (Garcia and
Reitzes, 2007).
Research into market design is very important. It can help to 1) reveal the aspects that contribute
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to the market power exertion by trading parties and 2) establish market rules that improve market
efficiency. One of the most prominent power market designs that have been influencing the way
electricity is traded in many countries is implemented in the UK. The UK power market design is
discussed in the following section.
2.6 UK wholesale electricity market
In 1990 the radical reforms introduced by the Governmet allowed for the liberalisation of the
electricity industry in the UK and the establishment of a new wholesale electricity market design
referred as the Pool. The Pool implementation has delivered the following changes to the existing
back then electricity industry (Green and McDaniel, 1998; Newberry, 2002):
• Unbundling four distinct functions of the electricity industry (generation, transmission, local
distribution, and retail services)
• Privatising generation and retail services
• Establishing a compulsory electricity pool for physical power exchange and financial market
for contracts for differences
• Introducing an independent system operator to manage the transmission system (e.g. dis-
patch power plants, maintain system reliability)
The first results of liberalisation were two generating firms controlling over 80% of total capacity.
In the course of the following 10 yeas these companies were broken up and subsequently none of
the firms among existed on the market had more than 25% of total generating capacity (Green and
McDaniel, 1998). It is noteworthy that after liberalisation the electricity prices did not actually
fall, in fact 7 years later they were 35% higher than in the winter of 1990/1991 when market
trading began (OFFER, 1998). Also, evidence confirms that market power exploitation persisted
as generators manipulated prices (by e.g. capacity withholding, bidding strategies) (Green and
McDaniel, 1998; Wolfram, 1999). Overall the failure of pool-base market design is prescribed to
a) market power arising from few sellers, b) poor market design that allows for strategic bidding,
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c) little demand response to price changes and d) absence of information on forward trading for
price discovery (Woo et al., 2003).
In an attempt to reduce the wholesale electricity prices and introduce demand side bidding, the UK
regulator proposed a bilateral model for market design named NETA. NETA came into force in
2001 followed by a drop in wholesale electricity prices (Giulietti et al., 2010). Later in 2005 the
concept of NETA was extended to include Scotland and is currently referred as British Electricity
Transmission and Trading Arrangement (BETTA).
In BETTA the daily power demand is split on 48 half hour chunks called Settlement Periods. Thus
the electricity is considered to be traded, generated, transferred, and consumed in these half hour
portions. For each half hour electricity buyers estimate the energy demand and contract these
volumes in advance with electricity generators in the Forward market or/and Futures market. The
Forward and Futures markets allow the contracts to be struck up starting from years ahead down to
an hour before contracted energy dispatch. This barrier is referred as Gate Closure and illustrated
in Figure 2.5 as dashed line under ’Gate Closure’ notch on electricity market timeline.
Figure 2.5: Overview of the wholesale electricity market of Great Britain (source: Harris (2012))
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The dashed line under the ’24hr before delivery’ notch on the market yellow timeline is symbolic
and does not represent a compulsory border between Forward/Futures and Exchange markets. Dur-
ing period 1 (green arrow 1 in Figure 2.5) market participants buy and sell electricity as they wish.
The only difference is that the contract terms (volume and price) at Forward market are not stan-
dardised and negotiated directly between trading parties (see Section 2.2.1). In contrast in the
Futures market the contracts are standardised and the price determined by market clearing mecha-
nism based on bids and offers received from trading parties (see Section 2.2.1).
At the Gate Closure market participants have to notify (by means of Final Physical Notification)
the system operator about individual contracted positions, namely the amount of electricity each
party is contracted for as the result of Forward market and Futures markets operations. If the
market participant is flexible enough on either demand or supply side and satisfies the specific
requirements by the system operator it can offer or bid additional power to the BM by including
its proposition into the Final Physical Notification. This stage is depicted by green arrow 2 in
Figure 2.5.
The blue stripe (see Figure 2.5) represents the energy dispatch period (half hour window) during
which the generators are expected to deliver the contracted amount of electricity to the system.
At the same time electricity buyers are expected to withdraw the contracted electricity from the
system. The generators that overproduce/underproduce are penalised at the Imbalance Settlement
(green arrow 4 in Figure 2.5) by selling/buying electricity at system sell/buy price. The system
sell and buy prices are designed in a way that market participants have no incentive to deviate
from their contracted positions. The Imbalance Settlement is a closed monetary system in that
all the profits or deficits obtained by the system operator during the Imbalance Settlement are
distributed proportionally amongst all parties. The ISO can buy or sell the electricity ahead of
Gate Closure if it believes that an extra amount of electricity will be needed during the settlement
period. These contracts are called a Pre-Gate Closure BM Unit12 Transactions. They specify the
electricity volumes required in a minute by minute basis across the settlement period.
12BM Unit contains either a generating unit or a consumption unit that is comprised of a collection of consumption
meters. All BM Units are the smallest smallest generating or consumption units that can be independently controlled
Harris (2012)
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2.7 Conclusion
This chapter has outlined the main attributes of wholesale electricity markets, and overviewed the
most widely adopted congestion management methods. It provided detailed specifications of the
UK power market design. It also showed that power markets comprise a set of interrelated market-
places for trading electricity and related products. These marketplaces are usually daily repeated
auctions. This gives potential to trading parties to learn bidding strategies and subsequently exer-
cise market power.
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3.1 Introduction
The electricity industry is a complex economic system that adopts specific real-world aspects such
as asymmetric information, imperfect competition, strategic interaction, collective learning, and
the possibility of multiple equilibria (Amman et al., 2006). In order to address these real-world
aspects and get an insight into market interdependencies, many researchers have developed agent-
based electricity market models. The diversity in implementation approaches makes it difficult for
the new entrant to overview the field. Therefore the literature review in Section 3.2 describes the
key contributions to methodology of Agent-Based Computational Economics to study wholesale
electricity markets. The conclusive summary in Section 3.3 highlights the key similarities and
differences between existing agent-based electricity models.
3.2 Literature survey
The first agent-based models in electricity were tailored for a specific design of the wholesale
electricity market and often developed real-world approximations for the bidding strategies. Thus
the work by Bower and Bunn (2001) developed an agent-based simulation model for the electric-
ity market of England and Wales, with particular focus on two structural aspects: uniform price
auction versus discriminatory price auction. The model simulates a daily repeated market with
two combinations of trading (daily and hourly bidding) and two combinations of settlement ar-
rangements (uniform and discriminatory pricing). Each autonomous adaptive agent represents a
generating firm that owns a number of electricity plants characterised by capacity, fuel type, ef-
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ficiency, marginal production costs and availability. The load agents are modelled as price takers
with no ability to influence the market through strategic behaviour. There is no transmission grid.
As a result the model does not account for physical transmission constraints and the cost of trans-
mission is assumed to be zero. Depending on the market design of choice, each agent at the DA
market submits to the system operator one (daily bidding) or 24 (hourly bidding) bids and offers
all available generating capacity for each plant in his portfolio. The strategic capacity withholding
is not concerned within the model. The generating firms submit strategically increased marginal
generating costs and learn the best performing strategies with the help of the RL algorithm. This
allows the agents to select a bidding strategy that simultaneously 1) maximises profit and 2) enables
reaching a target utilisation rate on plant portfolio. The supply offers are submitted by generators
daily according to the following decision rule:
• if on the previous trading day the target rate of utilisation was not met across the portfolio,
then a percentage is subtracted from the bid price for each plant in the portfolio.
• if on the previous trading day any plant sold output for a lower price than other plants across
the portfolio, then the bid price is raised of that plant to the next highest bid price submitted.
• if on the previous trading day the total profit did not increase across the portfolio, then a
percentage is randomly added or subtracted from the bid price for each plant in the portfolio.
• if on the previous trading day profit and utilisation objectives are achieved across the portfo-
lio, then the decision is repeated.
Moreover the plant with the higher marginal cost of production must always bid higher prices
than the plant, in the same portfolio, with lower cost of production. Finally a generating agent
is allowed to utilise the successful bidding strategy across all the plants within his portfolio. It
is assumed that agents have a comprehensive knowledge of their own portfolio of plants (bids,
output levels, profits), but know nothing about their rivals. The authors impose various limits for
capacity utilisation rate for each generating technology. The average target utilisation rate across
plant portfolios is set to 60%. However for all power plants with closed-cycle gas turbine (CCGT)
technology, nuclear power plants and inter-connectors, the target utilisation rate is set to 100%
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as these plants, in general, trade almost fully contracted. These assumptions are made in order
to avoid explicit modelling of the forward market but still have it implicitly incorporated. At the
same time the model does not capture the interaction between the DA trading and the balancing
mechanism.
The work by Bunn and Oliveira (2001) presents a model for the UK power market primarily
focusing on possible market equilibria. In contrast to the model discussed above, here authors
introduce an active demand side (strategic load agents) and interaction between the DA market and
the balancing mechanism. Each load agent is characterised by: market share, balancing mechanism
exposure, retail price, prediction error, and search propensity. The prediction error reflects the
capability of the agent to predict its own demand while search propensity is a numerical identifier
of how the agents search for the best pay-off and transform past experience into future policies.
The agents of both types 1) markup at DA market based on previous trading day results and 2)
explore DA market outcomes in order to markup at subsequent balancing mechanism. All trading
agents aim to 1) maximise total daily profits and 2) minimise the difference between preferred
and actual exposure to the balancing mechanism. Similar to the model developed by Bower and
Bunn (2001), each generating agent represents a firm that owns a number of electricity plants.
Each electricity plant is characterised by the number of cycles per day it can operate, capacity,
availability, preference for balancing mechanism exposure, marginal production cost, and search
propensity. Whilst equal generating technologies are assumed to have identical marginal, start-
up, and no-load costs, the last two are not considered by agent explicitly during decision making
process. The authors also imposed some additional rules for the generating agents in order to avoid
inconsistent behaviour during the learning process:
• within plant portfolio the generator with higher or equal number of cycles will never undercut
the offers by another plant with equal or less number of cycles;
• the base-load plants (one cycle plants) may run with no profits in certain hours of the day.
• one cycle plants do not run without profit at the beginning or at the end of the day or do not
run at all if the price is to low.
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• multi-cycle plants (peak plants) do not offer prices below marginal cost
• All power plants never bid (offer) above (below) the previous system buy price (system sell
price).
• All power plants never pay more than the marginal cost for speculative DEC of electricity
which the system operator buys in order to balance the system.
It is noteworthy that none of the agents actually learn the absolute bidding strategies, instead they
learn how to choose the markups on the previous day offers and bids, thus the model benefits from
strategies which are unbounded. The entire learning process implemented here can be describes as
sequence of the following actions:
1. For the markups used, each agent determines new expected daily profit (3.1) and acceptance
rate (3.2):
E(Πt j) = E(Πt−1 j) + α ∗ [Πt−1 j − E(Πt−1 j)] (3.1)
E(At j) = E(At−1 j) + α ∗ [At−1 j − E(At−1 j)] (3.2)
where, Πt j and At j is a total profit and acceptance rate at day t of the markup j.
2. Given these values each agent calculates the expected reward for each markup:
E(Rt j) = E(Πt j) ∗ E(At j) (3.3)
3. Each agent calculates the perceived utility of each markup:
U j = u ∗
(S − n
S
)Rank( j)−1
(3.4)
where, u = 1000 for each agent, n = 3, and S is search propensity parameter that defines
agent’s exploration capability.
4. Finally the agent defines a policy that represents a set of probabilities with each value at-
tached to a certain markup. The probability of selecting a particular markup equal the ratio
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of that markup perceived utility and the sum of perceived utilities of all markups:
P j =
U j∑
k Uk
(3.5)
In order to model the balancing mechanism the authors had to adopt several simplifications:
• Absence of transmission grid, and as the result lack of the regional imbalances and transmis-
sion constraints.
• Load profile is fixed to a typical day.
• The continuous nature of trading at DA market and balancing mechanism is simplified and
presented as two sequential one-shot markets.
• Assumed independence between generators and suppliers.
To overcome the issues related to computational time when simulating the real scale power market
the authors utilised a single call auction developed by Cason and Friedman (1997), while adopting
it to reflect trading principles of the real UK power market. Market operations flow is best described
by Figure 3.1. The trading starts at the DA market where the load agents forecast the demand and
place the bids accordingly, while aiming to buy electricity at the lowest possible prices. At the
same time power agents build up generating portfolios by deciding on which power plants to run
given their technical specifications. They also decide on the percentage of capacity to withhold for
trading at the balancing mechanism. After the DA market clears, the agents bid/offer to balancing
mechanism. The system operator clears the balancing mechanism and calculates imbalance prices.
This is followed by the agents’ learning stage and subsequently the market enters a new trading
day thus the process repeats.
Another distinctive work was conducted by Visudhiphan and Ilic (2003) where the authors explored
three different learning algorithms employed by strategic agents, namely:
• Mixed strategy algorithm formulated in Auer et al. (2003)
• Mixed strategy algorithm based on the Boltzman distribution
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Figure 3.1: Electricity market model flow chart developed by Bower and Bunn (2001)
• The algorithm developed by the authors
The first learning algorithm assigns probability pt(i) to each strategy i ∈ K. This probability is a
function of a uniform distribution γK and the weight factor wt(i) associated with each strategy i:
pt(i) = (1 − γ) wt(i)∑K
j=1 wt( j)
+
γ
K
(3.6)
where
γ = min
35 , 2
√
3
5
KlnK
T
 (3.7)
The weight wt(i) is adjusted every trading day based on the rewards received from the actions
selected:
wt+1( j) = wt(t) ∗ exp( γ3K (xˆt( j) +
α
pt( j)
√
KT
) (3.8)
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where T is a total number of market operational days set by the user,
α = 2
√
ln(KT/δ) (3.9)
and δ is a probability error,
xˆt( j) =

xt( j)
pt( j)
, if j = it
0, if j , it
(3.10)
here xt( j) is reward for the chosen action j in day t. This algorithm is used by agents to learn the
best performing strategies.
In the second algorithm based on the Boltzman distribution the probability of choosing the action
j is defined as:
pt( j) =
exp{Rt( j)/τ}∑K
h=1 exp{Rt(h)/τ}
(3.11)
where Rt( j) is the reward obtained due to strategy j ∈ K at day t, τ is a positive parameter referred as
temperature. It affects the degree to which an agent makes use of propensity values in determining
its strategy choice probabilities. The Rt( j) value is updated every day in the following way:
Rt+1( j) =

(1 − α)Rt( j) + α ∗ Πt( j) if j = it,
Rt( j) if j , it,
(3.12)
where Πt is an average of profits associated with action j in the day t and α is a step-size parameter
(0 < α < 1) Similar to the first algorithm the agents here also learn how to strategically manipulate
price-quantity pairs in order to maximise the profits.
In the learning algorithm developed by the author the stratigic agents build the historical record
of the market outcomes in a way that every new market outcome is associated with a discrete
load range, so the agent memory represents a matrix with columns and rows corresponding to the
market outcomes and load ranges respectively. Each agent utilises one of six following strategies
when deciding on the offer price:
• the price is set to the maximum of historic prices
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• the price is set to the mean of historic prices
• the price is set to the minimum of historic prices
• the price is set to the sum of weighted historic prices
• the price is set to the the last bid price plus the difference between the last market price and
the last bid price weighted by a constant β
• the price is set to the target price plus the absolute value of the difference between the last
market price and this target price, weighted by a constant β (represents the success in the
previous trading day)
Unfortunately, no conclusion from the paper can be withdrawn regarding superiority of one learn-
ing algorithm over the others.
Nicolaisen et al. (2000) presented a model of a double auction wholesale electricity market. The
model benefits from a fully connected transmission grid with electricity generators and electricity
buyers located at the nodes. Each transmission line has limited capacity thus the model is able to
address the congestion problem. Every electricity buyer is characterised by a maximum amount
of electricity it can consume per hour, linear marginal revenue and fixed costs. Similar, each
generating plant is characterised by the maximum amount of power it can generate per hour, linear
marginal and fixed costs. Both types of agents trade with the objective of maximising their profits.
The whole trading process is split into market rounds (same as days in the models above). At every
round, electricity generators and buyers submit price-quantity pairs to clearing-house. Bids and
offers are limited by explicitly imposed price caps. The clearing-house matches bids and offers in a
least-cost manner. It starts with selecting the generator with the lowest offer and the buyer with the
highest bid and sets the price to the mean of the offer-bid spread. Finally the volume of contracted
electricity is determined by the tightest constraint, namely a) maximum generating capacity of the
power producer, b) maximum volume of electricity that the load agent can consume or c) maximum
volume of electricity that the transmission line can handle. The distinctive feature of this model is
an implementation of the genetic algorithm which allows the agents to search for the best bid/offer
prices. Each strategy is associated with a number in the interval [0, 1) with step 2−10, thus there
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are about 210 strategies available to each agent. At the end of every round the performance of each
agent is reassessed based on the earned profits, whilst no outcomes from other preceding rounds
are taken into account. The authors argue that by implementing this modelling approach they
were unable to find convincing evidence that the market power of electricity buyers/generators is
negatively/positively related to their relative capacity. They also concluded that changes in relative
concentration have negligible effects on market power, especially for the electricity buyers.
In the later work of Nicolaisen et al. (2001) the authors substituted the genetic algorithm for a
modified Roth-Erev method (Erev and Roth, 1998). In the original Roth-Erev algorithm the agent
j at the end of the nth trading round updates its action propensities q jk(n) in order to select feasible
action k based on earned profits:
q jk(n + 1) = (1 − r)q jk(n) + E( j, k, k′, n,K, e) (3.13)
where, r is a value of recency parameter, k′ is previously submitted feasible action, K is a total
number of feasible actions, e is a value of experimentation parameter, E( j, k, k′, n,K, e) is an update
function which reflects the experience gained from past trading activity, it takes the form of:
E( j, k, k′, n,K, e) =

R( j, k′, n)(1 − e), k = k′
R( j, k′, n) eK−1 , k , k
′
(3.14)
According to the specified algorithm the submitted action k′ is reinforced or discouraged based
on the earned profits R( j, k′, n). Finally given the estimated propensities q jk(n + 1) the choice
probabilities are updated according to the following expression:
p jk(n + 1) =
q jk(n + 1)∑K
m=1 q jm(n + 1)
(3.15)
The authors however argue that the Roth-Erev method described above has two shortcomings,
namely a) parameter degeneracy and b) lack of probability updating in response to zero profits.
They suggest replacing the original recency parameter r with r∗ = (r − eK−1 ), thus the degeneracy
will no longer occur for e = K−1K and as the market progresses the agent will be moved away from
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zero profit actions. In a number of experiments the authors compared the performance of the two
learning algorithms. They argued that each learning algorithm lead to the similar results and thus
the preference cannot be established.
Krause and Andersson (2006), with help of agent-based model, compared thee different con-
gestion management methods for the abstract wholesale electricity market with transmission grid
constraints. Thus the authors studied a) LMP, 2) Zonal pricing and 3) Flow-based market coupling.
Figure 3.2 illustrates the modelled network where the dashed lines separate the zones used for the
zonal pricing simulation. The authors assume only lines from nodes 2-5 and 3-4 have a limited
transfer capacity (100 MW and 150 MW respectively), all other lines are not restricted.
Figure 3.2: Experimental electricity network (source: Krause and Andersson (2006))
Section 2.3 describes the specifics of LMP and zonal pricing methods in detail. According to the
flow-based market coupling algorithm the electricity prices are determined by topological simpli-
fications of the transmission grid, thus a) each country is represented as copperplate as no trans-
mission constraints exist and b) all country to country interconnections aggregated into equivalent
line. Subsequently the country represents one super-node and therefore the LMP scheme can be
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used to solve flow-based market coupling problem. These simplifications transform Figure 3.2 into
Figure 3.3
Figure 3.3: Flow-based market coupling representation of the experimental network in Figure 3.2
(source: Krause and Andersson (2006))
The authors assume that generating agents can deviate from their true marginal costs when looking
for the most profitable supply offer with the help of the RL algorithm. The agents maximise their
pay-offs by a) altering the slope sGi of the marginal cost function, or b) altering the intercept icGi
by setting a specified markup mupGi as illustrated in Figure 3.4.
Figure 3.4: True Marginal Cost and Strategic Choices (source: Krause and Andersson, 2006)
The model benefits from an elastic demand side, therefore electricity buyers reduce electricity con-
sumption or switch to partial self-supply in order to respond to increases in market prices. The
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experimental results suggested different allocations of market power for the different congestion
management schemes. Given these results the authors argued that the distribution of social wel-
fare as well as market power have to be assessed in conjunction with the specific market design,
implying that general conclusions cannot be made.
Perhaps one of the most prominent works was done by Sun and Tesfatsion (2007b). The au-
thors developed an open-source agent-based framework called AMES to address the specifics of
the Wholesale Power Market Platform proposed by U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
for adoption by US wholesale power markets. The AMES benefits from an explicitly modelled
transmission grid and incorporates three main types of market participants, namely the system op-
erator (oversees the security of electricity supply and clears the market), load servicing entities
(electricity consumers) and power generators (electricity sellers). The AMES employs the LMP
congestion management method with uniform pricing auction design and assumes an absence of
demand and supply shocks. Thus all the trading and congestion alleviation is done during the DA
market without need to rebalance the system at RT market.
In AMES the load agents are modelled as price takers, so they always place their bids without
strategic consideration. In contrast the power producers in AMES implement the RL algorithm
(similar to the algorithm discussed in Nicolaisen et al. (2001)) and try to reveal the best bidding
strategy by a trial and error approach based on the profits earned. Each generating agent is char-
acterised by marginal production cost, generating capacity, learning capabilities and initial wealth.
However AMES power producers do not incur start-up, shut-down and no-load costs and also do
not face ramping constants. The authors assume a linear marginal generating cost of the following
form:
MCi = ai + 2 · bi · PGi (3.16)
1 where, ai is an intercept and bi is a slope parameter for the marginal cost of the generator i, PGi
is an electricity output by the generator i. In AMES, generating agents exercise market power by
altering the reported marginal cost curve coefficients and production capacity. This is schemati-
1Note, the marginal cost is: MCi =
dTCi
dPGi
, where the total cost is: TCi = ai · PGi + bi · P2Gi
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cally depicted in Figure 3.5. Note the bottom line liui illustrates the true marginal cost curve of
generator i, while all the above curves iteratively are offered to the market and have higher intercept
and/or slope parameter. In the daily repeated market the agent i, based on the learning parameters
specified, is likely to converge to the single profit maximising strategy out of the set of available
reported marginal cost curves.
Figure 3.5: Marginal cost modification by AMES generating agent (source: Sun and Tesfatsion
(2007b))
Another prominent work has been conducted by the team at Argonne National Laboratory (Conzel-
mann et al., 2005). The authors developed a full-scale agent-based simulation model called EM-
CAS to test the market design and reliability of existing power systems. EMCAS incorporates a
great number of agents of different types, specifically power generation, electricity transmission,
distribution and load companies, system operator, regional transmission organisations and regula-
tors. EMCAS addresses the pool market design for electricity trading and also incorporates three
explicitly modelled ancillary services markets, namely power regulation (balancing mechanism),
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spinning reserve2 and contingency reserve market3. Figure 3.6 illustrates the decision rule of the
EMCAS generating agent. The upper part of Figure 3.6 shows that each generating agent uses
Figure 3.6: Decision rule of EMCAS generating agent (source: North et al. (2002))
its own historical record and publicly available information to build the projected market clearing
price distribution at node for each of the markets. Furthermore the agent determines the opti-
mal combination of generating units that bid to some or all available markets. Subsequently it
constructs the expected utility function based on personal attitude to risk and one or several simul-
taneous objectives (e.g. maximise profits, or minimise the risk). This is illustrated by the middle
section of Figure 3.6. Finally the strategic agent determines and submits price-quantity pairs that
optimise its corporate utility. Overall, at every step the generating agents alter the strategies based
on anticipated market conditions. The strategies are assessed based on performance in respect to
the corresponding objectives.
In the paper by Young et al. (2014) the authors attempt to discover whether an agent-based mod-
elling paradigm can be used to accurately forecast electricity market prices in the New Zealand
2Spinning reserve is a back-up generation capacity which is unconnected from the system but can be brought on-line
within ten minutes (Hirst, 2002)
3Contingency reserve is a power provided by generators that require a longer start-up (typically from 30 to 60 minutes)
(Hirst, 2002)
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electricity market. The model proposed by authors benefits from an explicitly modelled trans-
mission grid that is a 19-node simplification of the 244 node New Zealand grid. The demand
side is modelled as price inelastic while the generating agents can trade electricity strategically
by analysing the market with the help of the RL algorithm. Some power plants are specified as
’must-run’, with a predefined maintenance schedule. The generating capacity of each power plant
is reduced by 12% to account for contracted power at the reserves market which is not modelled
explicitly. The authors conclude that the proposed agent-base model can actually predict the mar-
ket clearing prices with high degree of accuracy. This in turn serves as proof for an agent-based
concept that is able to reconstruct market prices from fundamental market data.
van der Veen et al. (2012) developed an agent-based model to analyse the impact of various
imbalance pricing mechanisms on the performance of a European type balancing market. In the
model, the balance responsible parties are modelled as strategic agents that consume and produce
electricity in order to balance the system. The agents forecast their power commitments with an
error drawn from the Normal distribution with zero mean and user-specified standard deviation
(unique for each agent). The agents employ the RL algorithm to make a choice at each step from
the action domain of one intentional imbalance option that represents a level of over or under-
contracting. Overall the authors analyse six alternative pricing mechanisms and conclude that
single pricing4 approach leads to the highest social welfare.
3.3 Conclusion
The literature review conducted highlights the high research activity in utilisation of agent-based
models to study electricity markets. The analysis of different articles shows that 1) the majority of
models do not incorporate the transmission grid and thus disregard grid congestion concerns, 2) in
most of the models the demand side is reduced to fixed load-profiles, 3) the strategic learning in
majority of the models concerns economic withholding by manipulation of prices, capacity with-
holding usually is not considered, 4) the majority of models rely on the RL algorithm and its com-
4In the single pricing methods the agents with a surplus receive a specific price, and agents with a shortage pay this
price (van der Veen et al., 2012).
52
3 Survey of agent-based models in electricity
binations, whilst the genetic algorithm is very rarely applied but is not completely abandoned, and
none of the papers analysed explicitly integrates flexible statistical models into the agents’ learning
algorithm to better address firms’ real-world behaviour, 5) the most popular research question is
the comparison between discriminatory and uniform price auction designs. The overall conclusion
is that agents report higher marginal costs under discriminatory pricing, however, in general, the
electricity prices are higher under uniform pricing.
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4.1 Introduction
This section outlines a detailed description of the agent-based electricity market model that is de-
veloped to support the aims of this research. The model is very flexible in the sense that is not fixed
to a particular market design. It can be initialised with either a uniform or discriminatory pricing
rule with option of alternative congestion management methods. The model benefits from a realis-
tically rendered transmission grid which is fully customisable and can be extended up to the scale
of realistic wholesale electricity markets. The adaptive market participants are generating agents
that learn the bidding behaviour of the other participants from available information and determine
their strategies in response to the others. These agents employ a realistic learning algorithm which
is a combination of forward looking with statistical modelling and past experience addressed by
the RL algorithm. The demand side is assumed to be inelastic of a price in the short-term, thus the
load agents bid only fixed load profiles. The following section describes the characteristics of the
generating agents, the demand, and the market rules used in the model.
4.2 The ACEWEM from inside
4.2.1 Overview of the ACEWEM Framework
Agent-based Computational Economics of Wholesale Electricity Market (ACEWEM) is a sim-
ulation software framework designed to support research objectives of this thesis. It is mainly
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JAVA-based with option of calling R and Matlab methods which can offer higher degree of compu-
tational robustness, speed or solution optimality. It employs the MASON multi-agent simulation
library (Luke et al., 2005) developed for large custom-purpose JAVA simulations in social sciences.
The ACEWEM framework can simulate different designs of existing wholesale power markets and
operates over a high-voltage alternating current transmission grid starting from hour 0 of day 1 to
a user-specified number of days (for example 365 days). It incorporates a variety of key power
market participants (agents), namely:
• The ISO, who oversees the security of electricity supply
• Power plants (GenCos), which produce and sell electricity
• Load servicing entities (LSEs), which are the wholesale electricity consumers (electricity
buyers).
These market participants, whose key operations are discussed below, act within different power
markers such as the DA and RT market. Both RT and DA markets are explicitly modelled by
ACEWEM framework. The contracted power is assumed to be delivered without failure from
generating agents, thus the bids and offers accepted at the RT market are only used to resolve
transmission grid congestion according to a PR congestion management scheme. As the result
the DA market is cleared without accounting for transmission grid constraints. During the RT
market, transmission constraints are taken into account by accepting electricity bids (for DEC) and
offers (for INC) in order to respect transmission grid congestions. The ACEWEM framework also
employs the LMP congestion management method. Based upon the LMP approach, the overall
transmission grid congestion is resolved at the DA market by solving a least cost optimisation
problem (see Section 4.2.2).
The sequence of actions performed (under PR congestion management scheme) during daily trad-
ing is depicted by UML diagram in Figure 4.1. A trading day starts with the ISO calling for supply
offers from GenCos and demand profiles from LSEs for the DA market. The GenCos randomly
choose a DA price distribution (thus more profitable distributions will have a higher probability
to be selected) from the RL algorithm (specific for DA market) and proceed with fitting the two
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GAMLSS models sequentially, first for the DA wholesale electricity price and second for DA
power commitment (for power commitment GenCos use predefined by user reasonable distribu-
tion). The first model is used to determine a predictive PDF for the DA electricity price while the
second model outputs a point forecast for DA power commitment (the mean of power commit-
ment predictive PDF). This information enters the expected profit optimisation algorithm which is
used to estimate the best reported MC coefficients to hit the highest expected profit. Finally the
estimated MC coefficients along with actual generating capacity are reported by each GenCo to
ISO as DA supply offer. At the next step ISO clears the DA market in a least-cost manner without
accounting for thermal branch constraints. The market clearing results are sent back to all GenCos
who subsequently update their own DA reinforcement learners based on the profits achieved. At
this stage ISO enters the RT market and calls for RT supply offers (for INC) and bids (for DEC).
The GenCos randomly choose a RT INC price distribution from the RL algorithm (specific for
RT INC) and proceed with fitting the two GAMLSS models sequentially, first for RT INC market
clearing price and second for RT INC power commitment. Similar to DA market operation, each
GenCo forecasts the RT power increment and estimates the predictive PDF for RT INC market
clearing price. A subsequent expected profit optimisation routine uses this information and outputs
the best MC coefficients which along with available uncontracted capacity (a difference between
total and contracted at DA capacity) form RT market supply offers. Supply bids are formed in a
similar manner. The GenCos randomly1 choose a RT DEC price distribution from the RL algo-
rithm (specific for RT DEC) and proceed with fitting the two GAMLSS models sequentially, first
for RT DEC market clearing price and second for RT DEC power commitment. Each GenCo fore-
casts the RT DEC and estimates the predictive PDF for RT DEC market clearing price. Given this
information the expected profit optimisation routine optimises for the best MC coefficients. The
coefficients along with available DEC capacity (which is effectively the contracted at DA capacity)
form a RT market supply bid. The offers and bids are reported to ISO who proceeds with clear-
ing the RT market in a least-cost manner. At this stage the ISO also accounts for thermal branch
constraints. The RT market clearing results are sent back to all GenCos who subsequently update
1The randomness is required to guarantee that all the distributions and not only the best performing ones are iteratively
selected. However the best performing distributions will have a higher propensity to be chosen.
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own RT INC and RT DEC reinforcement learners accordingly based on the profits achieved. Then
all the agents enter the following day and the process described above repeats for a number of user
specified days. Note that in LMP implementation the agents do not enter RT market as the possible
congestions are resolved by the DA market clearing mechanism.
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Figure 4.1: ACEWEM sequence UML diagram of the daily trading process
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4.2.2 ACEWEM Independent System Operator
With the objective of minimising the aggregate power generating cost, the ISO operates the DA and
RT market. It solves a least-cost constrained optimal power flow (COPF) problem to determine the
power output from different power generators in order to fulfil the system’s electricity demand.
Within the ACEWEM framework, the formulation of DC COPF differs with respect to the selected
congestion management method. Therefore when an ACEWEM model is launched with the LMP
scheme, the ISO with the help of quadratic programming algorithm implemented in JAVA, R or
MATLAB solves the following DC COPF problem during the DA market (Sun and Tesfatsion,
2007b):
Minimise the total variable cost reported by GenCos:
I∑
i=1
[
aiDAPDAi + bi
DA(PDAi )
2
]
+ η
 ∑
nm∈Ω
(ϕn − ϕm)2
 (4.1)
subject to:
a) Real power balance constraint for each node n=1, ...,N:
∑
k∈Kn
PLk −
∑
i∈In
PDAi +
∑
nm or mn∈Ω
Pnm = 0 (4.2)
where
Pnm =
V20 (ϕn − ϕm)
Rnm
b) Real power thermal constraints for each branch nm ∈ Ω:
|Pnm| ≤ PUnm (4.3)
c) Reported energy generation constraints for each GenCo i=1,...,I:
CapRLi ≤ PDAi ≤ CapRUi (4.4)
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d) Voltage angle setting at reference node 1:
ϕ1 = 0 (4.5)
where, aiDA and biDA are the reported to DA market marginal cost curve coefficients of the gen-
erator i, η is a soft penalty weight on the sum of squared voltage angle differences (η > 0), ϕn is
a voltage angle at node n ∈ Ω - set of all distinct branches nm, PLk is a power withdrawn by k’th
LSE, k ∈ Kn - total number of LSEs at node n, V0 is a base voltage (kV), Rnm is a reactance (Ohm)
for nm (Rnm = Rmn, nm ∈ Ω), CapRLi and CapRUi lower and upper reported generating capacities of
the GenCo i.
When the PR congestion management scheme is selected, the DC COPF problem for the DA
market is similar except occurrence of branch thermal constraints, thus implying transmission grid
with infinite capacity. When the DA market is cleared, the ISO accepts bids and offers in order to
alleviate a possible transmission grid congestion at the RT market. Thus, the ISO with the help of
quadratic programming algorithm implemented in JAVA, R or MATLAB solves the following DC
COPF problem (note the constraint 4.10):
Minimise the total variable cost reported by GenCos:
I∑
i=1
[
VariableCostINCi + VariableCost
DEC
i
]
+ η
 ∑
nm∈Ω
(ϕn − ϕm)2
 (4.6)
where
VariableCostINCi = ai
INCPINCi + bi
INC(PINCi )
2 (4.7)
VariableCostDECi = (ai
DA − aiDEC)PDECi + (biDA − biDEC)(PDECi )2 (4.8)
subject to:
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a) Real power balance constraint for each node n=1, ...,N:
∑
k∈Kn
PLk −
∑
i∈In
PDAi +
∑
i∈In
(PDECi − PINCi ) +
∑
nm or mn∈Ω
Pnm = 0 (4.9)
where
Pnm =
V20 (ϕn − ϕm)
Rnm
b) Real power thermal constraints for each branch nm ∈ Ω:
|Pnm| ≤ PUnm (4.10)
c) Power increment and decrement constraints for each GenCo i=1,...,I:
CapRLi ≤ PINCi ≤ CapRUi − PDAi (4.11)
0 ≤ PDECi ≤ PDAi (4.12)
d) Voltage angle setting at reference node 1:
ϕ1 = 0 (4.13)
here, PINCi and P
DEC
i is a INC and DEC of GenCo i at RT market; a
INC
i , b
INC
i , a
DEC
i and b
DEC
i are
the marginal cost curve coefficients reported for power increment (index INC) or power decrement
(index DEC) by GenCo i.
The decision rule of ISO is illustrated by Figure 4.2. This decision rule is mainly influenced by the
user selection upon the congestion management scheme. See section 4.2.1 for the sequence of ISO
actions.
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Figure 4.2: Decision rule of ISO
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4.2.3 ACEWEM Generating Agents
Within the ACEWEM framework, each GenCo represents an individual power plant with the ob-
jective of maximising the daily profit. The overall decision rule of GenCo is illustrated in Figure
4.3. The different building blocks [e.g. estimation of reported marginal cost curves MC, estima-
tion of the forecasted probability density function (D), use of the RL algorithm to select the most
profitable probability density function] of the decision rule are detailed below.
Figure 4.3: Decision rule of GenCo, i ∈ (DA MC, RT INC MC or RT DEC MC)
At the beginning of each day, every GenCo submits a supply offer to the ISO in the form of a linear
marginal cost curve:
MCDAi = ai + 2biCapi (4.14)
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where ai and bi are the marginal cost curve coefficients and Capi is generating capacity of GenCo
i available for the DA market. Each generating agent is able to submit the ’true’ marginal cost
curve coefficients (e.g. aTi , b
T
i ) or a ’higher’ marginal cost curve coefficients in strategic attempt
to increase its daily profits:
MCDAi = a
DA
i + 2b
DA
i Cap
T
i (4.15)
where aDAi and b
DA
i (a
DA
i ≥ aT , bDAi ≥ bT ) are the reported marginal cost curve coefficients. These
coefficients are not chosen randomly but are selected as a result of the Stochastic Profit Optimisa-
tion algorithm proposed here. Specifically, the Stochastic Profit Optimisation algorithm estimates
the expected profit given the predictive probability density function (PDF) of the wholesale power
price and power commitment. Each agent estimates the predictive PDF of the wholesale power
price and power commitment by building a statistical model using the GAMLSS framework first
proposed by Rigby and Stasinopoulos (2005).
The particular model for wholesale power prices implemented by each generating agent is as fol-
lows:
Mt|µMt , σMt , νMt , τMt ∼ DM(µMt , σMt , νMt , τMt )
g1(µMt ) = X
M
1β
M
1
g2(σMt ) = X
M
2β
M
2
g3(νMt ) = X
M
3β
M
3
g4(τMt ) = X
M
4β
M
4
Effectively, each distribution parameter (µ,σ,ν and τ) at time t is a linear function of explanatory
variables encapsulated in design matrix XM. Here g1(.), g2(.), g3(.) and g4(.) are the link functions
appropriately selected for the DM distribution. Similarly, the model for power commitment is
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defined as follows:
Pt|µMWt , σMWt , νMWt , τMWt ∼ DMW(µMWt , σMWt , νMWt , τMWt )
g1(µMWt ) = X
MW
1β
MW
1
g2(σMWt ) = X
MW
2β
MW
2
g3(νMWt ) = X
MW
3β
MW
3
g4(τMWt ) = X
MW
4β
MW
4
The GAMLSS algorithm, which has been implemented in ACEWEM framework estimates the dis-
tribution parameters (given the information available to market participants) in order to be used by
the agents to realistically address the strategic bidding. In particular as parts of the agents learning,
the statistical models are applied to the bid offer strategy selection process driven by the agent’s
profit optimisation objective. Thus, each agent not only develops regression-type of models for
the distribution parameters µ, σ, ν and τ but also selects the best performing (in terms of received
profits) distribution D(θi) for the regression model based upon the RL algorithm (discussed below).
The agents are incentivised to use different forecasting models (used by the Stochastic Profit opti-
misation algorithm) to better represent their own information sets, thus allowing for a high degree
of heterogeneity.
Reinforcement learning is a learning algorithm that probabilistically selects a strategy m (i.e. a
distribution in our case), while the full set of strategies form the action domain AD of the GenCo
(m ∈ AD). Specifically the GAMLSS framework incorporates a set of flexible distributions which
are selected by the RL algorithm using the realised daily profit as the key criterion. This is to
say that the probability pm(t) of choosing a particular distribution m depends on the realised profit
obtained by using the distribution m within the Stochastic Profit Optimisation algorithm.
Mathematically, the RL algorithm for the selection of the agent-specific model to be used for the
selection of the optimal offer/bid to sell/buy electricity is given by:
pm(t) =
exp( qm(t)T )∑n
j=1 exp(
q j(t)
T )
(4.16)
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with
qm(t) = [1 − r]qm(t − 1) + Rm(t − 1)
Rm(t − 1) =

[1 − e] ∗ Zm′(t − 1), if m = m′
e ∗ qm(t − 1)/[ADc − 1], if m , m′
where m′ denotes the distribution that was actually selected at time t− 1, pm(t) is the probability of
selecting distribution m by generating agent at time t, qm(t) is the propensity of the agent to select
the distribution m and Zm′ is the realised profit of agent at time t − 1 obtained as the result of m′
strategy selection. Note ADc is the cardinality of the action domain AD (strategies repository). T is
a temperature parameter that affects the degree to which the agent makes use of propensity values
in determining its choice probabilities pm(t). The recency parameter r affects the growth of the
propensities over time. The experimentation parameter e allows for spillover effects (see Sutton
and Barto 1998 for details with respect to the RL algorithm).
The Stochastic Profit optimisation algorithm is employed by each adoptive agent i and used to esti-
mate the best reported marginal cost curve coefficients given the agent’s objective. In mathematical
terms this algorithm for DA market can be described as follows:
E(ΠDAi ) = [MC
DA
i ∗ PDAF − TotalCosti] ∗ DU[MCDAi ] (4.17)
and if PR congestion management method is selected, then the Stochastic Profit optimisation al-
gorithm is used to optimise bidding strategies by optimising the expected profit at RT market. It is
described as follows:
E(ΠINCi ) = [MC
INC
i ∗ PINCF − TotalCosti] ∗ DU[MCINCi ] (4.18)
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and
E(ΠDECi ) = [TotalCosti − MCDECi ∗ PDECF ] ∗ DL[MCDECi ] (4.19)
where PDAF , P
INC
F and P
DEC
F are the forecast power commitments at DA and RT for INC and DEC
(mean parameters of corresponding power commitment distributions). DU[MCDAi ], DU[MCINCi ]
andDL[MCDECi ] are the cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) of the GAMLSS-based models.
These CDFs are used to estimate the reported marginal costs MCDAi , MC
INC
i and MC
DEC
i at the
DA and RT markets and characterise the probability of bid/offer acceptance (the chance to sell or
buy electricity at the desired price). Note that subscripts U and L at D characterise Upper (right)
and Lower (left) distribution tails.
To summarise, given the CDFs of the wholesale power prices and power commitments, each gen-
erating agent estimated the probability of acceptance of different MCs (forward looking inn Fig-
ure 4.4). It is important to note that at the DA and RT markets (for INC) the lower reported MC,
which might lead to lower profits, has a higher probability of acceptance. Alternatively for DEC
at RT market, the lower reported MC corresponds to a lower probability of acceptance. Effec-
tively, the optimisation algorithm maximises the expected profit [E(ΠDAi ), E(Π
INC
i ) and E(Π
DEC
i )]
as a function of the reported marginal cost curve coefficients [(aDAi and b
DA
i ), (a
INC
i and b
INC
i ) and
(aDECi and b
DEC
i )] (output decision in Figure 4.4) by taking into account the GAMLSS-based mod-
els (e.g. DU[MCINCi ]). The PDF for use by the GAMLSS-based model is selected based upon the
RL algorithm discussed above.
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Figure 4.4: Overview of GenCo agent
4.2.4 ACEWEM Load Agents
The load agents purchase wholesale power to serve end users in retail electricity markets. It is
assumed that the load agents do not engage in production. They only purchase electricity from the
generating agents. The overall decision rule of load agents is illustrated by Figure 4.5.
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Figure 4.5: Decision rule of LSE
It is important to note that the currently implementation of the ACEWEM framework assumes
that the load agents bid their ’true’ load profiles, thus they do not exercise strategic bidding. One
justification for this is that empirical evidence suggests that electricity demand does not fall in
response to a short-term price increase (Yusta and Dominguez, 2002; Faruqui and George, 2002).
Nevertheless daily stochastic demand shocks are allowed in order to test the dynamics of the
market. The load agents also do not enter the RT market regardless of the congestion management
scheme used.
4.2.5 ACEWEM Transmission Grid
The ACEWEM transmission grid is modelled as a balanced three-phase network with a number of
nodes and branches determined by the user. The reactance of each branch is an absolute branch
reactance, and not a reactance per a unit of length. Phase angle shifts of all generators are assumed
to be zero and the tap ratio2 of each transformer is assumed to be 1, thus the voltage magnitude of
output electricity from a power plant remains constant over time. This is required by the setting
2The ratio of the number of turns in a secondary winding of a transformer to the number of turns in the primary
winding (Parker, 2003).
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of COPF problem discussed in the section 4.2.2. It is also assumed that temperature change does
not effect branch properties and that charging current3 is zero. The ACEWEM transmission grid
has no isolated nodes or branches, every pair of nodes is connected by a linked path consisting
one or more branches. If two nodes are directly connected by multiple branches, these multiple
branches are modelled as a single branch incorporating the aggregate properties of all sub-branches
according to the physical rules. For example if two branches with reactances R1 and R2 directly
connect a pair of nodes the reactance of aggregate simulated branch is RG = R1R2R1+R2 . No complete
connectivity is assumed, hence two nodes are not necessary in direct connection by a single branch.
It is also assumed that the power flows of the ACEWEM transmission grid are governed by Kir-
choff’s current law, meaning that real and reactive power must be balanced at each node regardless
of the fact that the real power must be also balanced across the entire transmission grid, so lost and
consumed energy must be injected.
4.3 Conclusion
In this chapter, the architecture of ACEWEM model was outlined in detail, containing both its
advantages and disadvantages. The advantage is that ACEWEM provides a high flexibility in for-
mulating the agents and the market rules. The agents can be modelled to have different marginal
production costs, capacities, objectives, and learning algorithms. Also the market design sets the
agents’ operational environment and can be modelled as a uniform or discriminatory pricing auc-
tion while applying a variety of congestion management schemes. The obvious model disadvantage
lies in reliance on the quality of input data, which is usually commercially sensitive and thus not
available for public access or just simply does not exist in the required form or quality. As the
result, this renders model verification a difficult task. This will be addressed in the subsequent
Chapter 7 of this thesis.
3Charging Current is a current produced when a d-c voltage is first applied to conductors of an unterminated cable. It
is caused by the capacitive reactance of the cable, and decreases exponentially with time (Parker, 2003)
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Part II
Model Design
This part overviews the entire structure of the ACEWEM model in detail. The discussion is guided
by the ACEWEM class diagram where the model’s main building blocks such as learning, op-
timisation and data fitting algorithms are discussed individually. The chapter also describes the
ACEWEM graphical user interface and comments on input data specification.
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5.1 Introduction
Current agent-based economics research can be divided into the four threads: descriptive thread,
normative thread, theory postulation and methodology advancement (Amman et al., 2006). The
descriptive thread attempts to understand how the applied macro-level policies affect micro-level
agents behaviour. In the normative research the modellers use computational laboratories in order
to test the designs of an economic system and establish the best performing polices given the en-
vironment of adaptive agents. In theory postulation the main emphasis is on experimental study of
potential dynamics of an economic system subject to alternative initial conditions. This is expected
to clarify why certain global outcomes have evolved and what is also important why the others have
not. Finally the researchers constantly seek to improve existing methodology and agent-based tools
in order to achieve a higher degree of realism of simulated economic systems. Most research in
electricity is related to the normative thread, thus aiming to develop a reliable and competitive
market design that eliminates the opportunity for participants to exercise market power.
One important attribute inherited by adaptive agents is heterogeneity. Heterogeneous agents may
differ from one another by unique preferences, attitude to risk, wealth, behavioural rules, learning
capabilities, etc (Axtell, 2005). During the simulation agents are engaged in strategic interaction,
they follow their individual decision rules based on private objectives, acquired success and an-
ticipated market outcomes, while none of the agents has a complete information about the state
of global system. On this basis each agent develops unique strategies to maximise its profit when
competes with the rest of market players.
Adaptation and learning is an evident attribute of human behaviour and it is also central feature of
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ACEWEM agents. The subsequent sections discuss the employed and developed methodologies in
this research work to empower agents’ heterogeneity and adaptivity.
5.2 Overall ACEWEM architecture
Implementing the principles of the agent-based computational economics ACEWEM incorparates
autonomous agents. All the agents in ACEWEM (three main types: ISO, GenCos and LSEs)
implement Steppable class. By being steppable, the agents can be placed on the actions schedule
by the simulation engine to have their step() functions called (sequentially or in random order)
at various times in the future. Additionally, GenCos and LSEs extend SimplePortrayal2D class
in order to be optionally portrayed on the dynamic transmission grid. The ACEWEMmodel class
incorporates DA and RT markets and extends SimState class which contains an important item :
• A discrete event schedule which is a simulation engine. Effectively it wakes up the agents at
various times so they can perform the actions according to their own rules
The ACEWEM class diagram is illustrated by Figure 5.1. It sketches all the main JAVA classes
that are used to support ACEWEM operation.
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Figure 5.1: ACEWEM class diagram
ACEWEMmodeWithUI class encapsulates the visualization in ACEWEM and does not affect the
simulation model’s logic. In particular the methods of this class specify fields and visual elements
reflected by ACEWEM displays.
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BranchPortrayal and NodePortrayal classes extend SimpleEdgePortrayal2D and SimplePortrayal2D
accordingly and are used to draw nodes and branches of the simulated transmission grid on the
ACEWEM display
MultiTimeSeriesChartGenerator class produces time series charts for variables determined by mar-
ket clearing.
InitBranch, InitGenCo, InitLSE and InitNode classes load the data from CSV files and initialise
corresponding objects with parameters adjusted according to supplied data. All initialised objects
are assembled by types and stored in the main model repository.
ACEWEMmodel class is the main model repository and also the main class that controls the sim-
ulated market designed logic. It extends S imS tate which provides a discrete event scheduler that
fires various types of agents in a certain order and time frequency according to simulated market
design rules.
ISO class represents the ACEWEM system operator agent that oversees security of electricity sup-
ply, accepts bids and offers and clears the markets. It implements Steppable interface and thus can
be placed on the schedule by scheduler to have its step(.) method called at various times in the
future.
LSE class represents the ACEWEM load agent type that bids electricity demands to the market for
each settle period. It implements Steppable interface and thus can be placed on the schedule by
scheduler to have its step(.) method called at various times in the future.
GenCo class represents the ACEWEM generating agent type that generates electricity and can
strategically exercise market power in order to maximise profits. It implements Steppable interface
and thus can be placed on the schedule by scheduler to have its step(.) method called at various
times in the future.
QuadProg class includes the methods for setting up and solving the optimal power flow problem
by one of three implemented in ACEWEM quadratic linear programming optimisers from JAVA,
R and Matlab.
SupplyOfferOptimiser class holds the methods for setting up and solving the SPO problem for each
GenCo by one of two implemented in ACEWEM non-linear optimisers from JAVA and R.
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ObjFunction class sets the non-liner objective function for the SPO problem which subsequently
is maximised by non-liner optimisers from SupplyOfferOptimiser class.
ReinforcementLearning class realises a backward looking feature of each generating agent by pro-
viding methods for constructing action domain and also for learning the best performing distribu-
tions applied by agent.
StochasticOptimisation class realises a forward looking feature of each generating agent by pro-
viding methods for specifying the GAMLSS regression model for electricity price and power com-
mitment.
Models class comprises the methods used to modify the fitting data for the GAMLSS use and
estimate predictive distribution parameters.
All aforementioned classes jointly form the framework for DA and real-time market operations.
These markets implementation in ACEWEM is discussed in subsequent sections.
5.3 The Day-ahead market
In ACEWEM different realisations of the DA market have been implemented. One implementation
embodies the aspects attributed to the PR congestion management method. Thus the DA market
is cleared with no transmission grid thermal constraints taken into account and the single market
clearing price is established. Another implementation addresses the specifics of the LMP conges-
tion management scheme. Thus the DA OPF problem incorporates thermal branch constraints and
solution establishes a set of nodal prices rather than a single price. Moreover the DA market can be
executed as a uniform price or discriminatory price auction. This differentiates whether the gener-
ating agents are paid with uniform price (equal to the marginal cost of the most expensive generator
scheduled for electricity dispatch) or with pay-as-bid price (own reported marginal cost) regardless
of what the market clearing price is. At the DA market the agents, upon the user’s preference,
can also submit a strategic offer for the entire market day or for each settlement period (they are
usually 24 or 48 per day). Effectively the DA market is represented by the sequence of simple call
markets for every electricity delivery settlement period of the following day. It is assumed that each
generating agent offers his full available capacity to the DA market (pre-multiplied by a capacity
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availability factor which is unique and constant for each generating technology). Nevertheless the
GenCos in ACEWEM can randomly offer reduced production capacity when the simulation study
intends to incorporate supply shocks. The user can optionally set the location, frequency and mag-
nitude of these shocks or avoid them completely. In cases where electricity supply is less than
electricity demand the market clearing price is set to the maximum possible price and no power
volumes are traded.
The optimal supply offer (a pair of MC coefficients) is determined by a non-linear maximisation
routine. This algorithm optimises the expected profits (see Section 4.2.3) by determining the right
balance between probability of bid/offer acceptance and the magnitude of possible profits to be
earned. The marginal cost coefficients are continuous values, withdrawn from the set of numbers
limited by:
0.5 ∗ aTi < aRi < 1000 ∗ aTi (5.1)
0.5 ∗ bTi < bRi < 1000 ∗ bTi
where, aTi and b
T
i are the true intercept and slope parameter for the marginal cost curve of GenCo i,
aRi and b
R
i are the reported marginal cost parameters output by expected profit optimisation routine.
It is assumed that agents can actually submit offers below their true marginal cost. In some rare
cases the generators can be better off by paying for the electricity produced rather than being
exposed to the no load costs (EDF Energy department representatives, 2013).
The demand side of the DA market is represented by LSE agents. The total load at the DA market
is recovered from the fixed profiles of LSE agents. Nevertheless the LSE agents in ACEWEM can
deviate from fixed loads and randomly bid higher or lower demands when the simulation study
intends to incorporate demand shocks and test the reliability of the system. The user can optionally
set the location, frequency and magnitude of these shocks or avoid them completely.
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5.4 The Real-time market
The RT market implemented in ACEWEM provides the means for the system operator to bal-
ance the congested transmission grid according to PR congestion management method. The power
balance is regulated by the system operator accepting bids and offers from generating agents. De-
pending on the settings specified the agents can bid/offer one reported marginal cost for the entire
market day or a set of marginal costs for the each market settlement period. The maximum capacity
that GenCo i can offer to RT for INC is calculated as follows:
CapINCi = Cap
T
i −CapDAi (5.2)
similarly the maximum capacity that power plant can bid to RT market for DEC is calculated as
follows:
CapDECi = Cap
DA
i (5.3)
where, CapINC is the maximum capacity that can be offered to RT for INC by GenCo i, CapDECi
is the maximum capacity that can be bid to RT for DEC by GenCo i, CapTi is a total generating ca-
pacity of GenCo i and CapDAi generating capacity contracted at DA market. The reported marginal
cost coefficients offered for INC at RT market are limited by:
0.5 ∗ aTi < aINCi < 1000 ∗ aTi (5.4)
0.5 ∗ bTi < bINCi < 1000 ∗ bTi
similarly the reported marginal cost coefficients bid by GenCos for DEC at RT market are limited
by:
0.001 ∗ aTi < aDECi < 2 ∗ aTi (5.5)
0.001 ∗ bTi < bDECi < 2 ∗ bTi
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The upper and lower limits in (5.4) and (5.5) are arbitrary and introduced here to avoid optimisation
algorithm searching for solutions within extremely small and large numbers. It is assumed that total
system load at RT market does not change from its DA market level.
5.5 Stochastic profit optimisation algorithm
In stochastic optimisation problems the optimal solution is determined given the uncertainty in
influential events or outcomes (Gutjahr, 2012). Usually this uncertainty is addressed by predictive
probability density function (PDF). In expected profit optimisation for example, each generating
agent decides on the offer price for his generating capacity. This decision highly depends on the
agent’s expectation regarding the future market clearing price and its own power commitment.
In particular the agents estimate the predictive probability density functions (PDFs) for market
clearing price and power commitment by building statistical models.
When the market clears, the generating agents receive profits that can be represented mathemati-
cally by:
f (MCRi ,Πi(M))
where, MCRi is the decision (or alternately the marginal generating cost) that GenCo i offers to the
market, Πi(M) is the profit earned as the result of submitted MCRi , and M is the market clearing
price that determines a realisation of the profit Πi(M). Therefore the ordinary stochastic optimisa-
tion problem that maximises the expected profit can be written as:
max E
[
f (MCRi ,Πi(M))
]
(5.6)
s.t. aRi ∈ A, bRi ∈ B
where, E is expectation operator, and A and B are the sets of feasible solutions for intercept and
slope parameters of reported marginal cost function. However, expression (5.6) does not lead to
meaningful solutions yet as it ignores the risk. To quantify the risk associated with the decision a
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measure addressed by a cumulative distribution function is employed. Subsequently the problem
to maximise the expected profit can be stated as:
max E
[
f (MCRi ,Πi(M)) ∗ DM(MCR)
]
(5.7)
s.t. aRi ∈ A, bRi ∈ B
or
E(Πi) = [MCRi ∗ PFi − TotalCosti] ∗ DM[MCRi ] (5.8)
where
MCR = aRi + 2b
R
i P
F
i
TotalCosti = aTi P
F
i + b
T
i (P
F
i )
2
here, PFi is a forecast power commitment by GenCo i, a
T
i and b
T
i are the true marginal cost curve
parameters of GenCo i and DM[MCRi ] is a cumulative distribution function of forecasted market
price distribution.
Figure 5.2 well explains the SPO algorithm proposed here. In order to maximise expected profit
the GenCo has to offer a higher marginal cost, however by offering it too high the agent can become
out of merit by having its offer positioned rightwards from the demand curve intersection on the
generating stack (see Figure 5.2). This means that the agent will not be scheduled for electricity
generation and thus no profit will be made. The risk of falling into the out of merit side is addressed
by entire forecasted market price PDF. Thus a very high offered marginal cost will correspond to
the right tail of forecasted price distribution and thus will have a low acceptance probability for
electricity generation. Similarly a very low offered marginal cost will correspond to the left tail of
forecasted price distribution and thus have a high acceptance probability for electricity generation.
To summarise, the SPO algorithm optimises the expected profit and estimates the reported marginal
cost given the predictive PDF of the wholesale power price and power commitment. Each agent
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estimates the predictive PDF of the wholesale power price and power commitment by building a
statistical model using the GAMLSS framework first proposed by Rigby and Stasinopoulos (2005).
Specifically the GAMLSS framework incorporates a set of flexible distributions which are selected
by the RL algorithm (discussed below in Section 5.6) using the realised daily profit as the key
criterion. The agents might have different forecasting models by altering the distributions to better
represent their own information sets - allowing for a high degree of heterogeneity.
Figure 5.2: Merit order generating stack
5.6 Reinforcement learning algorithm
Reinforcement learning is a trial and error type algorithm. The goal-oriented agents adopt RL algo-
rithm to perceive the best strategies through repeated interaction with dynamic environment (Kael-
bling et al., 1996). In other words in the RL algorithm each agent explores all the available strate-
gies and gradually converge to the best performing ones given his objective. Thus the agents tend
to repeat the actions that give them the best rewards.
There are various modifications of the RL algorithm in the literature (see for example Wiering and
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van Otterlo (2012)). This research, however, is grounded in the three parameter RL algorithm pro-
posed by Erev and Roth (1998). The development of this algorithm was inspired by psychological
findings about human learning. These findings are primarily related to Law of Effect and Power
Law of Practice. According to Law of Effect the behaviour of choice is probabilistic. Thus the
choice (with a good outcome in the past) will be selected again with higher probability than the
choice that led previously to worse outcomes (Thorndike, 1898). The Power Law of Practice prin-
ciple states that the learning effect is stronger just after the event occurred and gradually dissolves
as the time passes (Blackburn, 1936). In a simulation study the parameters called experimentation
and recency account for Law of Effect and Power Law of Practice accordingly. The parameter
called propensity is assigned to every possible action that agent can choose from his action domain
and represents the likelihood for that action to be selected randomly in the future. At the beginning
of simulation all the propensities attached to the agent’s actions are assumed to be equal as if the
agent had no experience. This is shown in Figure 5.3. The set of distributions (upper blocks from
D1 to D10) represent the agent’s action domain with choice probabilities equal across all the dis-
tributions. In order to adopt negative pay-offs this work relates the choice propensities with choice
probabilities through the Gibbs-Boltzmann distribution with a positive temperature parameter:
pD3(t) =
exp(
qD3 (t)
T )∑n
j=1 exp(
q j(t)
T )
(5.9)
where, pD3(t) is the probability of selecting distribution D3 by the agent at time t, qD3(t) is the
propensity of the agent to select the distribution D3, T is a temperature parameter that determines
a degree to which the agent concentrates on actions with high propensities. Usually temperature
parameter is used as leverage to allow for more exploration at the beginning of simulation and
allow a focus on exploitation later on. The propensity parameter is calculated according to the
following expression:
qD3(t) = [1 − r]qD3(t − 1) + RD3(t − 1)
where, RD3(t − 1) is a reward obtained as the result of selecting distribution D3 at time t − 1. The
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reword is determined as follows:
RD3(t − 1) =

[1 − e] ∗ ZD3(t − 1), if D3 = Dt−1
e ∗ qD3(t − 1)/[ADc − 1], if D3 , Dt−1
where Dt−1 denotes the distribution that was actually selected at time t − 1, ZD3 is the realised
profit of agent at time t − 1 obtained as the result of D3 distribution choice. Note ADc is the
cardinality of the action domain AD (distributions repository). Thus as shown in Figure 5.3 and
according to the algorithm discussed above, if any distribution performs particularly well in terms
of profits its probability of choice will be increased in each successful round. Moreover if such
good performance is frequent enough so that the recency effect is relatively low, it is expected that
the agent converges at some point in time to the best performing distribution.
Figure 5.3: Graphical illustration for the RL algorithm
Erev and Roth highlight the advantage of using this RL algorithm rather than static equilibrium
models based on forecast results from twelve different experimental games. The authors also argue
that the proposed RL algorithm performs better than the other learning models they developed.
Many agent-based modellers with primarily research in the electricity industry often apply this
learning algorithm or its modifications.
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5.7 The GAMLSS tool
Generalized Additive Models for Location, Scale and Shape framework was introduced by Rigby
and Stasinopoulos (2005) to overcome limitations associated with Generalized Linear Models (Mc-
Cullagh and Nelder, 1989) and Generalized Additive Models (Hastie and Tibshirani, 1990). In the
GAMLSS framework the exponential family distribution assumption for the response variable y
(for example DA electricity price or system load) is relaxed and replaced by a general distribution
family, including highly skew and/or kurtotic discrete and continuous distributions. In particular
this makes GAMLSS a preferred choice amongst other tools when modelling price or load since
historically these variables exhibit high positive and negative peaks. This dynamic requires highly
flexible distributions in order to be captured. The required flexibility is achieved by the GAMLSS
capability of modelling not only the mean (location parameter) but other parameters of the dis-
tribution of y as linear parametric and/or additive non-parametric (smooth) functions of explana-
tory variables (for example historic and forecast weather data, social events, price in preceding
hour/day/year). GAMLSS model integrated to ACEWEM implies the independence of response
variable yi observations (e.g. DA electricity price, power commitment) distributed with probability
density function f (yi|θi) conditional on the vector of distribution parameters θi = (θi1, θi2, ..., θip)
where each p’th distribution parameter is related to explanatory variables (e.g. historic and forecast
weather data, price in preceding hour/day/year). The GAMLSS allows for modelling of up to four
distribution parameters, for exmple mean (µ), standard deviation (σ), skewness (ν) and kurtosis (τ),
where two first parameters are mostly characterised as scale parameters, and other two as shape
parameters.
In particular, each agent assumes that, for i = 1,2,...,n observations of the response variable Yi
(wholesale electricity price/power commitment) have probability density function fY (yi|θi) condi-
tional on θi = (µi, σi, νi, τi), which is a vector of four distribution parameters, each of which can be
a function of explanatory variables. This is denoted by:
Yi|θi ∼ D(θi) (5.10)
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i.e. Yi|(µi, σi, νi, τi) ∼ D(µi, σi, νi, τi) independently for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, where D represents
the distribution of Yi. Let Y> = (Y1,Y2, . . . ,Yn) be the n length vector of wholesale electricity
prices/power commitments of the generating agent. For k = 1, 2, 3, 4, let gk(.) be a known mono-
tonic link function relating the distribution parameter θk to predictor ηk:
gk(θk) = ηk = Xk βk, (5.11)
i.e.
g1( µ) = η1 = X1 β1
g2(σ) = η2 = X2β2
g3( ν) = η3 = X3 β3
g4( τ) = η4 = X4 β4
where µ, σ, ν and τ are the distribution parameters - vectors of length n; X1, X2, X3 and X4 are
design matrices of independent variables for each one of distribution parameters; β1, β2, β3 and β4
are the unknown parameters to be estimated.
The parameter vectors βk with k = 1, 2, 3, 4 are estimated within the GAMLSS framework by
maximising the penalised log likelihood function lp defined by:
lp =
n∑
i=1
li (5.12)
where, lp is the log likelihood function of the data and li is the log likelihood function of observation
yi (e.g. electricity spot price, power commitment or system load). This is achieved using the fitting
algorithms described in Rigby and Stasinopoulos (2005) and implemented in JAVA (Kiose and
Voudouris, 2014). The Rigby and Stasinopoulos (RS) algorithm requires the first (and optionally
observed or expected second) derivatives of the log likelihood with respect to the parameters µ, σ,
ν and τ.
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Figure 5.4 shows a flowchart of the GAMLSS fitting algorithm with RS. The fitting process is ini-
tialised by the user specifying the formula to model parameters of distribution as functions of the
explanatory variables (e.g. using linear, non-linear or smoothing terms). The user also provides
data comprising of observations for response (e.g. spot electricity prices) and explanatory variables
(e.g. weather data, social events, price in preceding hour/day/year) with distribution of choice.As
noted above, the fitting algorithm uses the first (and optionally observed or expected) second deriva-
tives of the log likelihood with respect to the distribution parameters and is based on the algorithm
used for the fitting of the MADAM models proposed by Rigby and Stasinopoulos (1996). If the
user chooses to model the distribution parameters as linear parametric or non-parametric (smooth)
functions of the explanatory variables the model fitting enters the backfitting cycle to estimate βk,
h jk and λ jk. When the fitting process passes all the internal cycles it returns the fitted values for
each modelled parameter of the distribution specified.
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Figure 5.4: Flowchart of the GAMLSS fitting algorithm
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5.7.1 GAMLSS Model Selection
Based on the work of Voudouris et al. (2012), this section describes the model selection strategies
adopted in this research project. In the search for an appropriate GAMLSS-based model for elec-
tricity spot prices or power commitments, three components have to be specified as objectively as
possible namely, 1) the distribution of choice, 2) the link functions and 3) explanatory variables for
each distribution parameter modelled.
In ACEWEM the selection of the appropriate distribution is not affected by the user, instead it is
purely a result of an agent evolution process. It is reasonably assumed that the most profitable
model is the one that better than others captures the market dynamics. Thus by trial and error the
agent explores all available1 distributions and with help of the RL algorithm and converges to the
most appropriate one. The selection of the link function is usually determined by the range of
parameters in hand, thus for example for electricity prices and power commitments the log link
function would be a natural selection to ensure that values remain on the positive side (important
for power commitments as these values can be close to zero). For any response variable distribution
the selection of terms for all distribution parameters is done using a stepwise GAIC procedure with
two alternative strategies:
• The Strategy A is described by Figure 5.5. This strategy iterates through one parameter at
the time by fixing the others in forward and backward GAIC procedures. The algorithm
determines a set of explanatory variables that respond to the lowest GAIC criteria. These
variables are then included to the predictor and the algorithm proceeds with defining the
best set of variables for other distribution parameter while keeping the rest of the parameters
fixed. This GAIC minimisation procedure is performed forward (where it adds terms to the
parameter) and backward (where it withdraws terms from the parameter), thus after strategy
execution the remaining terms meet the lowest GAIC criteria
• The Strategy B is described by Figure 5.6. This strategy forces all the distribution parameters
to have the same explanatory variable. Thus the variable is selected if its inclusion to the
1Six suitable for the current study distributions, namely NO, TF, TF2, PE, SST and JSU were shortlisted to be used by
agents in forecasting models
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Figure 5.5: Flowchart of the model selection strategy A
predictor in all distribution parameters improves the GAIC
Figure 5.6: Flowchart of the model selection strategy B
Both strategies were applied to select appropriate models for the electricity market prices and
power commitments. Overall strategy A and strategy B highlighted the similar set of explanatory
variables for both models. Note however it was found sufficient to develop the model only for the
mean distribution parameter (see Section 7.3.4), while the other parameters were estimated only by
constants. This allowed to dramatically reduce computational timing while providing reasonable
results.
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5.8 The Graphical User Interface
In order to facilitate the use of ACEWEM by prospective researchers and decision makers a graph-
ical user interface (GUI) has been developed. The GUI (see Figure 5.7) allows for easy access and
control of simulation settings. It also delivers plots and graphics that illustrate a transmission grid
(in the dynamic mode) and simulation outcomes. The simulation input data is supplied by means
of comma separated values (CSV) files that are located in the ACEWEM software root folder. The
set of supplied CSV files consists:
• NODE.csv specifies the code and the coordinate location for each of the simulated transmis-
sion grid:
Node Code X Coordinate Y Coordinate
Node1 42.4268 27.46372581
... ... ...
• BRANCH.csv specifies the positioning between the nodes and also the branch physical pa-
rameters such as Reactance (% of apparent power in MVA) and Capacity (MW):
From Node To Node Reactance Capacity
Node1 Node5 0.021438 625
... ... ... ...
• LSE.csv specifies the LSE code, locations on the transmission grid at node and the percent-
age of total system energy demand the LSE withdraws from the network for each of the
market settlement periods:
LSE Code At Node Demand
LSE1 Node3 0.0075
... ... ...
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• GENCO.csv specifies the GenCo code, locations on the transmission grid at node, true
marginal cost parameters, total generating capacity, generating technology and capacity
availability factor:
GenCo Code At Node Intercept Slope Total Cap Technology Cap Factor
Gen1 Node3 130.04 0.025 440 Pumped Storage 0.4
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
• DATA.csv specifies the historical and projected data (e.g. system load, market outcomes such
as electricity prices, power commitments or days of the week, settlement periods) used for
initialisation of the GAMLSS fitting models and subsequently for the forecasting of market
prices and power commitments:
Date WDay SP Load MCP LMP1 - LMPN Gen1 MW - GenI MW Etc.
14/02/12 3 1 33256 42 41 ... 57 311 ... 563 ...
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
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Figure 5.7: ACEWEM graphical user interface
The Model tab illustrated by Figure 5.8 allows for selecting a learning algorithm for the GenCos
(RL algorithm or SPO algorithm) and congestion management scheme (LMP or PR). It also allows
the user to introduce a negative or positive shock in electricity demand by specifying the shock
magnitude and the occurrence day.
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Figure 5.8: ACEWEM graphical user interface: Model tab
The Displays tab (see Figure 5.9) incorporates the time-series plots for quick visualisation of the
market performance. The plots illustrate the dynamics of key market variables (e.g. electricity
prices, GenCos supply offers) which can be shown individually or jointly for side-by-side com-
parison. It also incorporates display panels that visualise the entire transmission grid in dynamic
mode for DA and RT markets, in particular the congested branches are coloured with tints of red
proportional to the ratio of electricity flow to branch capacity. Fully congested branches are marked
in black colour.
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Figure 5.9: ACEWEM graphical user interface: Displays tab
5.9 Conclusion
This chapter described the main characteristics of the ACEWEM model design and illuminated
its main components interlinkage. The economic modelling principle to keep models as simple as
possible is respected. The ACEWEM structure may seem complex but the emphasis was not to
make it complicated. The entire learning algorithm can be split into two components: backward
looking and forward looking. The backward looking part adopts the well established and broadly
used RL algorithm, whereas forward looking algorithm is based on the SPO procedure introduced
for the first time by this research work. Also the elegant solution in linking these two components
allowed the constitution of a novel computational learning algorithm that is very promising in
capturing the realistic decision marking. This conclusion follows from analysis of experimental
results discussed in subsequent chapters.
94
Part III
Model Implementation and Application
In the following part a simulation study is conducted for an abstract and the real UK power markets.
It analyses the impact of specific changes in the market design and auction rules. The simulation
study results are expected to deliver important insights for policy makers and market regulators
in the electricity industry. The effect of different market designs and pricing rules on electricity
trading outcomes, especially on electricity price dynamics, is assessed through specific experiments
and compared to the benchmark scenario. Thus the differences in the experimental results can be
unilaterally referred to the changes between simulation scenarios.
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6.1 Introduction
According to an agent-based paradigm the emerging events are driven solely by agent interactions
once initial conditions have been specified (Amman et al., 2006). For this reason the conclusions
drawn from simulation study of an abstract market can be far more general compared with mod-
elling of the real system. In the abstract market the initial state of the system is strictly known to
the modeller, while the imperfections of estimation techniques can be passed into the simulation
model when the aim is to simulate a real economic system. For example the information on elec-
tricity production costs is commercially sensitive and thus is not publicly available. Therefore the
imperfections in these costs estimation can make it difficult to explain real market outcomes by
simulation study. Thus this chapter analyses the abstract wholesale electricity market initialised
under different market designs in a number of experiments.
6.2 Abstract six-node electricity market
The ACEWEM framework can be initialised with real-world data to explore plausible strategies
by competing electricity generators in repeated electricity auctions. In practise, the daily strategies
of generating utilities are not entirely based on the individual marginal cost of production, but also
depend on daily strategies of their competitors. Clearly, the ’collective’ strategies are reflected in
the ’emergent’ price (the price that emerge from the individual profit maximising offers/bids) of
the wholesale power market.
To get an insight into the plausible strategies of competing market participants, the ACEWEM
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framework is used to simulate a realistically-rendered abstract wholesale power market with six
electricity generating agents and four load agents with known features/properties. For example, the
’true’ marginal cost curve coefficients and generating capacity (see Table 6.1) for each generating
agent are assumed to be known so that conclusions can be drawn.
Table 6.1: Input parameters for power generating agents
ID Capacity (MW) MC intercept (aT ) MC slope (bT )
GenCo1 110 14 0.005
GenCo2 100 15 0.006
GenCo3 520 25 0.01
GenCo4 200 30 0.012
GenCo5 600 10 0.007
GenCo6 430 12 0.017
The market participants are distributed across a six-node transmission grid (as illustrated by Fig-
ure 6.1). Specifically the locations of agents are as follows: GenCo1 is located at Node1, LSE1
and LSE2 at Node2, GenCo2 and LSE3 at Node3, GenCo3 at Node4, GenCo4 and LSE4 at Node5,
GenCo5 and GenCo6 at Node6. The ISO agent operates the wholesale power market from outside
the network. All nodes are sequentially joined by branches that have their physical parameters
reported by Table 6.3. There are 24 call auctions within a single trading day.
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Figure 6.1: Transmission grid illustration for abstract market (ACEWEM graphical user interface)
The transmission grid base values are presented in Table 6.2. Base apparent power is three-phase
apparent power common to the entire transmission grid and is a product of its base voltage and
current measured in the unit of Volt-Amps (VA). Base voltage is a nominal rated voltage of the
entire transmission grid, set to 10 kV.
Table 6.2: Transmission grid base values
Base apparent power (MVA) Base voltage (kV) Soft penalty weight
100 10 0.005
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Table 6.3: Physical parameters for transmission grid branches
From To Capacity (MW) Reactance (% on base apparent power)
Node1 Node2 450 2.81
Node2 Node5 250 3.04
Node2 Node3 400 0.64
Node3 Node4 450 1.08
Node4 Node5 340 2.97
Node5 Node6 340 2.97
Node6 Node1 360 3.15
Daily load profiles for all load agents represent a typical winter day (see Figure 6.2) reaching a
minimum in electricity demand from 3 till 6 o’clock and maximum from 16 till 19 o’clock.
Figure 6.2: 24-hour electricity demand profiles of the load agents
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Having specified the settings for the realistically-rendered abstract market, the experiments for
different congestion management schemes (LMP and PR) may be conducted. This will enable
us to explore the plausible daily strategies of the market participants and the price dynamics of
wholesale power markets - important building blocks for electric utilities operating in the real-
world power markets.
6.2.1 Benchmark
In the ’benchmark’ experiment, the generating agents do not exercise market power. In particular
the agents do not optimise their strategies and thus report only true marginal costs and true produc-
tion capacities (see Table 6.1). The results reported here are based upon: a) the LMP congestion
management scheme with uniform price auction design (see Table 6.4) and b) the PR congestion
management method with discriminatory price auction design(see Table 6.5).
Table 6.4: Benchmark case results for LMP congestion management scheme
Power
generating
agent
Marginal
cost curve
intercept
Marginal
cost curve
slope
Average
nodal price
(Unit/MWh)
Average
power
commitment
(MW/h)
Daily profit
(Unit/day)
GenCo1 14 0.005 22.50 110 20992.10
GenCo2 15 0.006 28.55 100 31084.46
GenCo3 25 0.01 29.30 215 13390.78
GenCo4 30 0.012 31.37 75 2456.53
GenCo5 10 0.007 16.22 444 33162.12
GenCo6 12 0.017 16.22 124 6287.94
Table 6.4 shows that on the ’benchmark’ market (absence of strategic bidding by generating agents)
cleared under LMP congestion management scheme, all the GenCos are scheduled daily for power
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generation by the ISO. GenCo1 and GenCo2 sell all their generating capacity at every hour. While
GenCo3, GenCo4, GenCo5 and GenCo6 sell (on average) 41%, 38%, 74% and 29% of generating
capacity accordingly. Overall all generating agents accumulate non-zero daily profits calculated
by:
ΠDAi =
23∑
h=0
[
NPDAhi P
DAh
i − (aTi + bTi PDAhi )PDAhi
]
(6.1)
where NPDAhi is the nodal price at GenCo’s i node at hour h; a
T
i and b
T
i are the true marginal cost
curve coefficients and PDAhi is the power commitment at hour h.
It is noteworthy that the average nodal prices differ across the nodes. This points out the presence
of transmission grid congestion. This suggests that it is not always possible to dispatch the cheapest
generator due to branch thermal constraints even when the generating agents offer true marginal
costs.
Table 6.5 shows that under thePR congestion management scheme GenCo1 and GenCo2 sell
all their generating capacity at every hour. GenCo4 sells zero MWs and GenCo5, GenCo6 and
GenCo3 sell 95%, 66% and 2% of generating capacity. Note that the power commitments of
GenCo3, GenCo4, GenCo5 and GenCo6 differ under the LMP congestion management scheme
(see Table 6.4). This is because under the PR congestion management scheme, electricity conges-
tion does not affect the order of the least-cost power dispatch (see section 4.2.2). The DA market
clearing price at hour h equals the marginal cost of the last generating agent scheduled for power
production to fulfil at total electricity demand. According to discriminatory price auction the profits
are calculated here based upon the pay-as-bid price:
ΠDAi =
23∑
h=0
[
PABDAhi P
DAh
i − (aTi + bTi PDAhi )PDAhi
]
(6.2)
where PABDAhi is pay-as-bid price received by GenCo i that equals to his reported marginal cost.
After the DA market is cleared, the ISO operates the RT market in order to alleviate the possible
electricity congestion. For the RT market, the ISO resolves the transmission grid congestions by
solving the COPF problem with added branch thermal constraints (see section 4.2.2). The ISO
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estimates the least-cost optimal dispatch per hour. The daily profits (for GenCo3 and GenCo4) at
RT market are calculated according to:
ΠINCi =
23∑
h=0
[
PABINChi P
INCh
i − (aTi + bTi PINChi )PINChi
]
(6.3)
where PABINChi is the pay-as-bid price. This price equals to marginal cost reported by GenCo i to
the RT market for INC.
The daily profits (for GenCo5 and GenCo6) at the RT market are calculated according to:
ΠDECi =
23∑
h=0
[
(aTi + b
T
i P
DECh
i )P
DECh
i − PABDEChi PDEChi
]
(6.4)
where PABDEChi is the pay-as-bid price. This price equals to marginal cost reported by GenCo i
to the RT market for DEC. Note that in order to avoid negative profits at the RT market for DEC,
the slope parameter of the reported marginal cost curve by GenCo i equals to bTi /2. The market
clearing price at hour h for RT INC/DEC equals to the marginal cost of the last generating agent
scheduled for power dispatch.
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Table 6.5: Benchmark case results for the PR congestion management scheme
Power
generating
agent
Market Marginal
cost curve
intercept
Marginal
cost curve
slope
Average
power
commit-
ment (MW
/ h)
Average
market
clearing
price (Unit
/ MW)
Daily
profit (Unit
/ day)
GenCo1
DA
14 0.005 110
21.64
1452
GenCo2 15 0.006 100 1440
GenCo3 25 0.01 8 89
GenCo4 30 0.012 0 0
GenCo5 10 0.007 567 54536
GenCo6 12 0.017 284 37473
GenCo1
RT INC
14 0.005 0
32.58
0
GenCo2 15 0.006 0 0
GenCo3 25 0.01 170 8907
GenCo4 30 0.012 107 4191
GenCo5 10 0.007 0 0
GenCo6 12 0.017 0 0
GenCo1
RT DEC
14 0.0025 0
11.37
0
GenCo2 15 0.003 0 0
GenCo3 25 0.005 0 0
GenCo4 30 0.006 0 0
GenCo5 10 0.0035 196 0
GenCo6 12 0.0085 81 0
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Moving away from the idealised Benchmark market reported above, the experiments conducted
below assume that the agents build a GAMLSS-based forecasting model in order to strategically
develop their bids/offers. Thus, the agents are not forced to submit their bids and offers based upon
their true costs of production. In particular, each GAMLSS model is used by the agents to estimate
the forward-looking PDF of the price and power commitment, given the information at time t. For
this particular reason we have simulated the price and power commitment process for the first 365
days based upon the Normal (NO) distribution in order to ’control’ for the best forecasting model
that the agents can use to develop their strategic bids/offers. This will also enable us to control
for information symmetry/asymmetry in the market. Thus, we will be in a position to draw some
conclusions with respect to the repeated nature of the daily power auctions.
6.2.2 Information symmetry under the LMP congestion management scheme:
Experiment 1
In Experiment 1, the generating agents employ the same structural forecasting models for the nodal
price and the power commitment of the DA market.
The structure of the model for the estimation of the predictive PDF of nodal price is given by:
Mt|µMt , σMt ∼ NOM(µMt , σMt )
µMt = β
M
01 + β
M
11 ∗ Mt−1 (6.5)
log(σMt ) = β
M
02 + β
M
12 ∗ Mt−1.
While the structure of the model for the estimation of the predictive PDF of power commitment is
given by:
Pt|µMWt , σMWt ∼ NOMW(µMWt , σMWt )
µMWt = β
MW
01 + β
MW
11 ∗ Pt−1 (6.6)
log(σMWt ) = β
MW
02 + β
MW
12 ∗ Pt−1
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These are two autoregressive type models where distribution parameters are the linear functions of
the preceding day price (model (6.5)) and preceding day power commitment (model (6.6)). Note
that since the same structural model is utilised by every agent, there is no forecasting asymmetry
among the agents. In other words, the market dynamics observed in this experiment are not affected
by information asymmetry.
Figure 6.3 shows that agents with different cost of production exhibit different dynamics with re-
spect to their offers over time. In particular, the two least expensive power plants expect to sell
their full capacity. It is of note that the risk assumed by the agents is characterised by the prob-
ability of acceptance for the reported MCs, which is discussed in section 4.2.3 and illustrated by
Figure 6.4. Therefore GenCo1 and GenCo2 effectively select a risk averse strategy by offering
marginal costs that have a high (about 90%) probability of acceptance (see Figure 6.4). Also note
that the marginal costs are higher by factor of 1.4 (for GenCo1) and 1.7 (fro GenCo2) compared
with the true marginal production costs. GenCo3, GenCo4, GenCo5 and GenCo6 are the most
expensive power plants. They find it optimal to take a higher risk and offer their production ca-
pacity close to the expected nodal price at about 50% probability of acceptance (see Figure 6.4)).
Observed behaviour confirms the risk-taking strategy of the ’expensive producers’, which is also
seen in the real markets as some power produces tend to make offers with a lower probability of
acceptance but with higher returns, thus making strategic offers based upon predicted peak prices
during the DA market.
Figure 6.3: Reported MC, true MC, forecast average nodal prices and actual average nodal prices
in Experiment 1
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Figure 6.4: Probability of acceptance for reported MC in Experiment 1
Figure 6.5: Probability density function of the average nodal price in Experiment 1: a - day 1; b -
day 500; c - day 1000; d - day 1500; e - day 2000; f - day 2500, g - day 3000, h - day
3500
An interesting observation relates to the dynamics of the nodal prices. Figure 6.3 clearly shows
that the volatility of the average nodal prices decreases over time (each simulation step represents a
trading day). This can be explained by examining the daily predictive probability density function
of the nodal price of the DA market which is showed by Figure 6.5.
Figure 6.5 illustrates that the predictive PDF of the average nodal prices with 500 days interval
(from day 500 to day 3500). It is clear from the figure that the predictive PDF of the average nodal
prices at day 500 (PDF with the symbol α) is ’fatter’ in the middle of the distribution than other
PDFs illustrated. This indicates that during the first 500 days there is a higher degree of uncertainty
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compared with uncertainty around the expected nodal prices at day 3500 (note the predictive PDF
of the average nodal prices at the day 3500 - PDF with the symbol h). This indicates that the
information used to form the offers for the DA market is more precise. Thus, information symmetry
and better information over time cause the emergence of competitive markets out of individual
profit maximisation actions. These results contradict the conclusions suggested by Bunn and Day
(2009): the repeated nature of the daily power auction with a substantial amount of information
in common, gives rise to a continuous evolution of learning with no evidence of convergence to a
stationary solution.
An interesting question is whether the emergence of competitive markets out of individual profit
maximisation actions is also observed when the system is characterised by frequent supply and
demand shocks. This is addressed in the experiment below.
6.2.3 Information symmetry with shocks under the LMP congestion
management scheme: Experiment 2
In Experiment 2, the repeated random positive shocks in demand and random negative shocks in
supply are introduced. By simulating contingency in the load and generating capacity we aim a) to
test system reliability and b) to access electricity price variability at certain nodes. Two agents were
selected, namely GenCo5 (for shocks in electricity production) and LSE4 (for shocks in electricity
demand). The shock mechanism is as follows:
• The upper generating capacity of GenCo5 submitted to ISO is pre-multiplied daily by the
random number withdrawn from the set X = {x : 0.3 ≤ x ≤ 1.0; x ∈ R}. This represent a
generation outage up to 70% of agent’s capacity.
• The hourly electricity demands submitted by LSE4 to ISO are pre-multiplied daily by the
random number withdrawn from the set X = {x : 1.0 ≤ x ≤ 1.2; x ∈ R}. This represents a
random load increase up to 20% of LSE4 total demand.
Figure 6.6 shows the dynamics of node electricity prices and reported marginal costs by the gener-
ating agents. First the reader is advised to focus on the average electricity price at Node6 (location
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of GenCo5 and GenCo6), the higher volatility compared with the Experiment 1 can be observed.
The increased price volatility is reflected by the scale of the PDF modelled by GenCo6 (see Fig-
ure 6.7). This suggests that GenCo6 has a higher probability of acceptance for extreme offers com-
pared with Experiment 1. This also explains the enhanced exercise of market power by GenCo6.
Thus the average reported marginal cost by GenCo6 in Experiment 2 is 1.3 times higher compared
with the average reported marginal cost in Experiment 1.
Figure 6.6: Reported MC and actual average nodal prices in Experiment 2
Figure 6.7: Probability density function of GenCo6 and GenCo3 for the average nodal prices in
Experiments 1 and 2 on 3500th day of market operation
The results of Experiment 2 show that demand/supply shocks can intensify the strategic behaviour
of some generating agents (note the different dynamics compared with the nodal price of the re-
ported MCs by GenCo 5 and GenCo 6) by increasing the volatility of the power price under the
LMP congestion management scheme. In order to test the effects of the different congestion man-
agement methods, the experiment below reproduces Experiments 1 and 2 under thePR congestion
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management scheme.
6.2.4 Information symmetry under the PR congestion management scheme:
Experiment 3
In Experiment 3, every generating agent employs the GAMLSS model to forecast the average
MCP and the average daily power commitment. Power congestion, unlike Experiments 1 and 2, is
resolved here according to PR congestion management scheme. Therefore each generating agent
forecasts the price and commitments both for the DA market and RT market (for INC and DEC).
Figures 6.8, 6.9 and 6.10 illustrate the reported MC, true MC, forecast average MCP and market
average MCP for DA, RT (for INC) and RT (for DEC) markets. The figures show that agents with
different costs of production exhibit different dynamics with respect to their offers and bids over
time. In the long run (DA market - see Figure 6.8), we observe the MCP falling below true MC
for GenCo3 and GenCo4. This indicates that in order to fulfil the total electricity demand in a
least-cost manner, these power plants are not required for power generation. Note, this is possible
since the solution of DA COPF under the PR congestion management scheme does not account for
transmission grid thermal constraints (see Section 4.2.2). This behaviour also confirms the risk-
taking strategy of the more expensive ’peak producers’, which base their strategic bids/offers upon
predicted peak prices during the DA market. On the other hand, less expensive power generators
(GenCo1, GenCo2, GenCo5 and GenCo6) maximise their expected profit when offering below the
expected MCR with a 90% probability of acceptance. This behaviour confirms the strategy of the
’base load producers’.
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Figure 6.8: Reported MC, true MC, forecast average MCP and actual average MCP in Experiment
3 (DA market)
Figure 6.9: Reported MC, true MC, forecast average MCP and actual average MCP in Experiment
3 (RT market for INC)
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Figure 6.10: Reported MC, true MC, forecast average MCP and actual average MCP in Experiment
3 (RT market for DEC)
The RT market is cleared accounting for branch thermal constraints (see Section 4.2.2). Further-
more, the clearing of the RT market takes into account the total generating capacity contracted at
DA market. As a result, GenCo3 and GenCo4 are the only power producers that have commitments
to produce power. This means that the MCP at RT market for INC is considerably higher compared
with the DA market. It is interesting to observe that the other ’cheaper’ power plants submit their
offers just below the offers of ’expensive’ producers, namely GenCo3 and GenCo4. This is a clear
indication of the emergence of collective learning in repeated auctions with capacity and physical
constraints.
At RT market, the ISO also accepts bids from GenCos in order to balance the congested system.
We observe that the ISO only schedules GenCo5 and GenCo6 for DEC to alleviate the electricity
congestion. Note that strategic behaviour by each agent here is to bid below its ’true’ MC. It is
noteworthy that the other power plants submit their bids close to bids of GenCo5 and GenCo6.
To summarise, information symmetry causes the emergence of competitive markets (cleared ac-
cording to PR congestion management method) out of individual profit maximisation actions. It
is also interesting to observe how the agents’ competitive behaviour changes when the system is
characterised by frequent supply and demand shocks and when the market is cleared based upon
the PR congestion management scheme. This is addressed in the experiment below.
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6.2.5 Information symmetry with shocks under the PR congestion
management scheme: Experiment 4
In Experiment 4, random positive shocks in demand (LSE4) and random negative shocks in supply
(GenCo5) are introduced for the DA market. The contingency mechanism is described in the
section 6.2.3.
Figure 6.11 illustrates the average MCP dynamics at DA market (left), RT market for INC (middle)
and RT market for DEC (right). It suggests that when the system is subject to power shocks, the
average MCP undergo a series of frequent peaks with the RT market for INC expressing higher
volatility.
Figure 6.11: Average MCP at DA market (left), RT market for INC (middle) and RT market for
DECt (right) in Experiment 4
Note that since the generating agents implement an identical GAMLSS model (4.16) to forecast
MCP, the predictive PDFs are identical across all agents. Figure 6.12 compares the predictive PDF
of the MCP between Experiments 3 and 4 at the DA market (left figure), the RT market for INC
(middle figure) and the RT market for DEC (right figure). It is clear that the scale of the PDFs of
Experiment 4 is higher compared with the scale of the PDFs in Experiment 4. This suggests higher
market volatility. As argued earlier, a higher market volatility can intensify strategic behaviour
since extreme bids/offers have higher probability of acceptance. Indeed, the agents report offers
(compared with Experiment 3) at the DA market higher by a factor of 1.2, at the RT market for
INC higher by a factor of 1.9 and bids at the RT market for DEC lower by a factor of 1.1.
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Figure 6.12: Probability density function of each generating agent for the average MCP in Experi-
ments 3 and 4 on 3500th day of market operation
6.3 Conclusion
From an expert systems perspective, this thesis proposes a detailed computational model for re-
peated power auctions operating across realistically rendered transmission grids that are subject to
congestion.
To get an insight into the plausible strategies of competing market participants, an ACEWEM
framework is used, simulating a model wholesale power market with six electricity generating
agents and four load servicing agents with known features/properties. In particular, this research
work explores two market designs:
• Market design 1: The wholesale power market is managed according to a LMP congestion
management scheme.
• Market design 2: The discriminatory price wholesale electricity market is managed accord-
ing to the PR congestion management scheme.
The results reported are of significant practical value to market participants and regulators. The
key practical insights from the experiments are:
• Enhanced dissemination of information (leading to information symmetry) and either the
LMP or PR congestion management scheme leads to competition over time, even when mar-
ket participants are heterogeneous (in terms of production costs, capacity and technology).
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• ’Expensive’ power producers tend to exhibit risk-taking behaviour when compared with the
behaviour of ’less expensive’ power producers - reflecting presciently behaviour observed in
real-world liberalized power markets.
• Overall, the PR congestion management scheme seems to result in higher market prices
compared with the LMP congestion management scheme. This points to the importance of
the market participants in understanding the rules of the daily repeated auctions.
• Unexpected supply or demand shocks lead to the likelihood of market power being exer-
cised, particularly under the PR congestion management. Thus, advanced information about
’power outages’ will curtail this from happening.
• Incumbent costs of production structures affect their ability to participate in DA or RT mar-
kets, with high cost producers more active in RT markets.
Finally, apart from the success which this model demonstrates as an application of agent-based
computational laboratory for liberalised power markets, and the behavioural insights which emerged,
its practical value is considerable. Unravelling conditions under which collusive pricing is ob-
served as a manifestation of conduct rather than market structure has been an elusive task in many
business and policy circles. This is because it requires an estimate of what the profit-maximizing
prices should be in the perfect market (the benchmark experiment). The computational technique
presented here does achieve that, notwithstanding the various simplifications involved in any mod-
elling specification, and can thereby provide a baseline from which to compare both market struc-
ture (e.g. LMP congestion management scheme) or market conduct (e.g. strategic submission of
offers).
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7.1 Introduction
This chapter presents a realistic model of the UK wholesale electricity market. The heterogeneous
agents that represent UK power plants of various generating technologies, implement the SPO
algorithm proposed by this research work. The following sections of this chapter introduce a
novel methodology for estimating marginal generating costs of UK power producers based on the
GAMLSS framework and information recovered from real bidding data. Also presented is the
overall structure of the model and the detailed data on the UK market participants and physical
infrastructure. Validated model and simulation experiments with various market design scenarios
are then carried out. Concluding remarks from these experiments are outlined in the final section
of this chapter.
7.2 Estimating the marginal cost of electricity generation in the
UK
The marginal concept in power generation refers to the rate at which the cost of electricity pro-
duction changes with respect to extremely small increases in generating output. Even when the
concept of marginal cost is completely agreed in principle, its estimation involves far more than
calculations founded upon a set of rules. Since none of the existing methods have proved to be opti-
mal, the thesis proposes a new marginal cost estimation technique based on analysis of real bidding
data with flexible GAMLSS models. Fitting a GAMLSS parametric distribution to the bidding data
often results in a model that agrees well with the data in high density regions, but poorly in areas
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of low density. For unimodal distributions, such as the normal (NO) or Student’s t (SST), these
regions are known as the ’tails’ of the distribution. One reason why a model might fit poorly in the
tails is that by definition, there is less data in the tails on which to base a choice of model, and so
models are often chosen based on their ability to fit data near the mode. Another reason might be
that the distribution of bidding data is often more complicated than the usual parametric models.
The entire GAMLSS distributions family was developed as a package that can model tails of a
wide variety of distributions, based on theoretical arguments. One approach to distribution fitting
that involves the marginal cost is to use a non-parametric fit (the empirical cumulative distribution
function, for example) in regions where there are many observations, and to fit the marginal cost to
the tail(s) of the bidding data.
Figure 7.1: Offers to Balancing Mechanism accepted by National Grid Operator for power genera-
tion (example of Grain CCGT power station)
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Figure 7.2: GAMLSS estimated smoothed centile curves
Figure 7.3: Estimated marginal cost curve with truncated distribution
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Figure 7.1 illustrates the real UK bidding to Balancing Mechanism data for Grian CCGT power
plant. It is noteworthy that market participants regularly bid resources at prices in excess of
marginal costs (Borenstein et al., 2002; Joskow and Kahn, 2001). The industry expertise suggests
that bidding above the true marginal cost takes place in about 50% cases (EDF Energy department
representatives, 2013). Therefore given the full scatterplot of bids the GAMLSS semi-parametric
model is used to estimate centile curves (see Figure 7.2) and truncate the bidding data above 50%
(see Figure 7.3). Presumably the remaining bidding data holds the information on the true marginal
cost of the power producer. Since in ACEWEM the marginal generating costs are assumed to have
a linear form, Figure 7.3 purposely illustrates linear approximation of 50% centile curve. A priori
we expect the line parameters to be clearly positive to have an economic sense that is also con-
firmed by the results achieved. The estimated marginal cost curve (see Figure 7.3) has a positive
intercept value (58.16) and slope parameter (0.0134). An identical approach has been applied to
other power plants located in UK and estimated marginal costs are reported in the Table 1.
7.3 UK electricity market model
The ACEWEM framework is used to simulate the UK wholesale electricity market and analyse
the impact of specific changes in the market design on the market performance. It is also used to
get an insight into strategies of competing market participants. Figure 7.4 illustrates the UK trans-
mission grid modelled by the ACEWEM framework. The locations of GenCos and LSEs on the
transmission grid are coloured in green and blue accordingly. The nodes are connected by branches
and coloured in black. Table 1 and Table 2 presents the actual and estimated characteristics of UK
GenCos and LSEs accordingly. The LSEs do not act strategically and are price takers with de-
mands characterised by the fixed percentage (see Table 2) of the total system’s load illustrated by
Figure 7.5. It is assumed that based load power plants(e.g Nuclear, Coal) do not act strategically
and thus always bid/offer true generating costs. Moreover it is assumed that there is no error in
demand estimations by load agents, thus they bid only to DA market while electricity congestions
at BM are resolved only by bids and offers accepted from generating agents.
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Figure 7.4: UK transmission grid in ACEWEM
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Figure 7.5: UK electricity load during year 2012 (measured every half-hour)
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7.3.1 Model validation
According to Law (2006) a valid simulation system can be used to draw conclusions about the real
one.Two approaches will be used for comparing real and simulated systems including 1) correlated
inspection approach and 2) calculation and alysis of Mean Absolute Percentage Error (MAPE).
According to the first approach, in the validation process for the proposed UK market model it is
graphically assessed whether the simulated price dynamics on the DA market corresponds to the
observed one in the real UK power market. The price dynamics accessed by converting prices to
growth rates:
mht =
ln(Mht )
ln(Mht−1)
here, Mht and M
h
t−1 current and previous day wholesale electricity price at settlement period h. The
ACEWEM simulation model is run with input data that characterises the UK electricity industry
during the year 2012. Figure 7.6 illustrates the dynamics of real and simulated market clearing
prices. It is remarkable that the real price dynamics (but not the real price itself) can be well
reproduced by simulation model. This result supports the model validity.
In the simulated model the load variability plays an important role in price formation. The GenCo
availability is assumed to be constant over the year. This is a simplification, whereas in reality
a percentage (2% - 10%) of total generating capacity, depending on the time of the year, is off
for planned maintenance (OFGEM, 2012). Moreover in a simulated model the renewable energy
availability is also assumed to be constant over the year whereas in reality water levels and wind
energy vary considerably throughout the year, month and even day. Due to the simplifications
above the model cannot serve as electricity price forecasting tool (it is also not the research aim),
the ACEWEM is expected to provide deeper insights into the market operation.
The quantified measure of whether the model can be validated follows from the MAPE approach.
This approach measures an accuracy of simulated data as a percentage of the error, and is defined
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by the formula:
MAPE =
1
n
n∑
t=1
∣∣∣∣∣At − S tAt
∣∣∣∣∣ (7.1)
where At is a vector of actual price observations, S t is a vector of simulated price observation and n
is a total number of observations. The MAPE of the real and simulated DA price is approximately
equal to 20%. This means that about of 80% of the real DA electricity prices were accurately
simulated by ACEWEM. Overall this validates the model to be able to realistically simulate the
UK wholesale electricity market. The 20% loss in accuracy can be associated with the events in
the real market that are not accounted for in ACEWEM (e.g. power plant outages, unavailability
of renewable generation etc.).
To summarise, it has been shown that agents behaviour and interaction on the micro level is able
to generate the price dynamics at macro level. The micro level behavior has been validated quali-
tatively by domain experts (EDF Energy department representatives, 2014). The macro level data
have been validated by comparing statistical properties of output electricity prices from the model
with statistics of the real-world system.
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Figure 7.6: UK real and simulated price dynamics
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7.3.2 Conventional reinforcement learning
This simulation is set to analyse the performance of the conventional RL algorithm (Erev and
Roth, 1998). In particular here the GenCos do not build statistical models to find the optimal
strategies, instead they employ RL algorithm and select the marginal cost parameters directly from
corresponding action domain based on the profits earned. Thus the agents do not build predictive
models and only make their decisions based on the former performance. Figure 7.7 illustrates
the real and simulated (with reinforcement learning) UK DA market clearing price. Overall the
Figure 7.7: DA market clearing price year 2012
simulated price dynamics can be seen as reasonable, however according to Figure 7.8 the RL
algorithm performance is rather poor in the case of low and high demand hours. Thus for example
the SPO algorithm performs considerably better (see Figure 7.8) as the marginal costs offered by
agents result in more realistic market clearing prices. This example effectively shows the limitation
of the conventional learning algorithm to address the behaviour observed in the real UK power
market. Whilst the RL algorithm is grounded solely on experience acquired by strategic agents,
this simulation study however suggests that in the real UK power market the generators take into
account future anticipated market clearing prices and power commitments when deciding on the
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Figure 7.8: DA market clearing price November - January 2012
marginal costs to report.
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7.3.3 Benchmark
Under the ’benchmark’ experiment, GenCos do not exercise market power. In particular the agents
do not optimise their strategies and thus report only true marginal costs and true production capac-
ities (see Table 1). The results reported here are based upon: a) the LMP congestion management
scheme with uniform price auction design and b) the PR congestion management method with
discriminatory price auction.
Figure 7.9 illustrates the average nodal prices at various GenCos locations. Note that these electric-
ity prices vary across the nodes, which indicates that the system is congested and therefore cannot
be cleared in the least-cost manner. Another important observation relates to the fact that the UK
transmission grid is actually unable to provide the least-cost electricity dispatch given the highest
market efficiency (the power producers report only true marginal costs and production limits, thus
they do not even attempt to exercise market power, which is unlikely to occur in reality).
Figure 7.9: Average nodal prices across the UK transmission nodes
The average power commitments by generating technology are illustrated in Figure 7.10. It shows
that on the efficient market the most expensive power producers receive zero (see Oil and OCGT) or
negligible (Pumped Storage) capacity allocation, while the total demand is fulfilled mainly by base
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load and renewable generation. Figure 7.10 illustrates average power commitments by generating
technology.
Figure 7.10: Average power commitments by generating technology allocated by LMP congestion
management clearing mechanism
Figure 7.11 illustrates the real UK DA wholesale electricity price and the DA market clearing price
determined by the PR congestion management clearing mechanism on the perfectly competitive
market. This plot outlines an extension that the actual strategic bidding takes on the real UK
wholesale electricity market. This also confirms the importance of the UK power market research
towards more efficient market design since the main issue is clearly evident.
The average DA power commitments by generating technology are illustrated in Figure 7.12. Sim-
ilar to LMP congestion management clearing results, the most expensive power producers (OCGT
and Oil technologies) remain idle during entire 2012 period. Note that according to PR method-
ology, no account is made for transmission capacity at DA market. Thus the power output from
Pumped Storage technologies is partially substituted by a cheaper electricity source. Also, this
experiment points out a limited branch capacity between wind farms and transmission grid. Thus
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Figure 7.11: DA market clearing price
unlike the LMP case, here wind farms both onshore and offshore are constantly dispatched up to
full available capacity. Nevertheless, similar to the LMP method, the total electricity demand is
also fulfilled mainly by base load and renewable generation.
Figure 7.13 illustrates BM (INC) and BM (DEC) market clearing prices. The price for INC un-
dergoes two peaks over the year. These peaks highlight the fact that more expensive generation is
required to fulfil higher demand levels observed during the winter months (see Figure 7.5). Indeed,
Figure 7.14 shows that PS generating technology was dispatched few times over the winter months
which influenced two high price jumps. Moreover Figure 7.14 reports that mostly renewable gen-
eration is regulated to withhold the electricity output in order to balance the system throughout
the year. This in turn explains the particular price dynamics observed at BM (DEC) market. Flat
line indicates that no other technology apart from renewable generation sets the market clearing
price. This price equals the true marginal production cost of renewable electricity producers which
is negligible (close to zero).
The average BM INC and DEC by generating technology are illustrated in Figure 7.14. Here the
ISO rebalances the system by incorporating the transmission capacity constraint into the market
clearing algorithm. Due to congestions, the relatively cheap electricity from renewables is cut off
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Figure 7.12: Average power commitments by generating technologies (PR scheme, DA market)
and replaced by power produced from more expensive generators (Combined Cycle Gas Turbine
(CCGT), Pumped Storage (PS)). It is interesting to note that on the efficient market with no strategic
bidding the Open Cycle Gas Turbine (OCGT), Crude Oil (OIL) and most of PS technologies are
not engaged in the generation schedule over entire 2012 year. Presumably these technologies exist
to provide the means for ISO to balance sudden demand shocks and unpredicted generation outages
which are not modelled in this experiment.
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Figure 7.13: Market clearing price for INC and DEC (PR congestion management scheme, BM
market)
Figure 7.14: Average BM INC and DEC by generating technology allocated by power the PR con-
gestion management clearing mechanism
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7.3.4 Information asymmetry under the LMP congestion management scheme:
Experiment 1
In Experiment 1, each generating agent selects a structural forecasting model for the DA nodal
power price and DA power commitment with the RL algorithm based on model performance (prof-
its earned) over the preceding days. A structure of the model for the estimation of the predictive
PDF of DA nodal price is given by (Serinaldi, 2011):
Mt|µMt , σMt , νMt , τMt ∼ DM(µMt , σMt , νMt , τMt ) (7.2)
g1(µMt ) = β
M
01 + β
M
11WD + β
M
21S P + β
M
31 Mt−1 + β
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41 Mt−2 + β
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51 Mt−7 + β
M
51 M
min
t−1
g2(σMt ) = β
M
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g3(νMt ) = β
M
03
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While the structure of the model for the estimation of the predictive PDF of power commitment at
DA is given by:
Pt|µMWt , σMWt ∼ NOMW(µMWt , σMWt ) (7.3)
µMWt = β
MW
01 + β
MW
11 WD + β
MW
21 S P + β
MW
31 LOADt + β
MW
41 Pt−1
log(σMWt ) = β
MW
02
where, WD is a week days categorical variable; S P is a settlement period categorical variable;
Mt−1, Mt−2 and Mt−7 are the nodal electricity prices lagged by 1,2 and 7 days accordingly; Mmint−1
is a minimal electricity nodal price observed on the preceding day; LOADt is a day t total system
load anticipated by generating agent; Pt−1 is a preceding day power commitment; DM is the dis-
tribution selected by the agent with corresponding set of link functions g1(.),...,g4(.) from the RL
algorithm’s action domain. The action domain is supplied with distributions subject to condition
that µ parameter should be an exact mean of response variable. These distributions are: NO, TF,
TF2, PE, SST and JSU.
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Figure 7.15 illustrates the average nodal prices at the UK DA market. It is noteworthy that the
price spread across the nodes is considerably lower compared to the benchmark case. This can be
explained by the fact that generating agents implicitly perceive the electricity congestion through
the nodal price forecasting.It is interesting to observe that the collective learning actually equalises
the prices across the nodes while elevating the overall price level in the system. This follows on
directly from the fact that power producers lift the reported marginal costs in order to optimise
the expected profits. This is addressed by Figure 7.16 which shows that the agents of different
Figure 7.15: Average nodal prices across the UK transmission grid nodes
generating technologies exhibit different dynamics with respect to their offers over time but overall
often report marginal costs above their true levels. Note that the risk assumed by the agents is
characterised by the probability of acceptance of the reported marginal costs (see Table 7.1). Thus
on average the OCGT, Pumped storage and OIL generating technologies are willing to take a high
risk and offer their reported marginal costs below 50% probability of acceptance. As the result
these reported marginal costs are considerably higher than anticipated market price. The remaining
technologies effectively select a risk averse strategy by offering marginal costs that have a high
probability of acceptance (see Table 7.1). The observed behaviour confirms the risk-taking strategy
of the ’expensive producers’, which is also seen in the real markets as some power producers tend
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Figure 7.16: Average offer price and true marginal cost of production across generating technolo-
gies (LMP scheme, DA market)
to make offers with a lower probabilities of acceptance but with higher returns - making strategic
offers based upon predicted peak prices during the DA market.
Generating Technology Average OAP
OCGT 0.2404
HYD 0.8728
WINDON 0.8728
CCGT 0.6274
PS 0.3991
WINDOFF 0.8728
OIL 0.2016
BIOMASS 0.8728
Table 7.1: Average OAPs selected by various generating technologies
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Figure 7.17 illustrates average power commitments by generating technologies. Note that through-
out the entire year the total system demand is mainly fulfilled by renewable, base load and partially
peak generation. OIL and OCGT mostly produce only during the winter months when total load
reaches its maximum values.
Figure 7.17: Average power commitments by generating technologies (LMP scheme, DA market)
Figure 7.18 illustrates the dynamics of average distribution parameter values across all electricity
generators. It is noteworthy that during time period from November to January both µ and σ pa-
rameters reach their highest values. This causes a higher degree of uncertainty around the expected
price and hence intensifies the strategic behaviour by power producers. In particular, during the
November - January period (see Figure 7.16), the agents submit higher reported marginal costs
compared to preceding months. This behaviour confirms the implicit collective learning by Gen-
Cos without direct collusion, as they substantially inflate reported marginal costs just by analysing
market outcomes.
There is an open discussion on the choice of auction design that facilitates better the efficiency of
the UK power market. Generally in the electricity industry, two auction designs are commonly
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Figure 7.18: Average mean and standard deviation parameters of selected distribution by generat-
ing agents
employed 1) uniform pricing and 2) discriminatory pricing. In uniform pricing a single market
clearing price is determined (in case of LMP congestion management method this is a single price
per node). This price is usually the most expensive offer accepted by the ISO for electricity gener-
ation which is paid to all scheduled generators. In contrast, under discriminatory pricing a single
market clearing price is also established, however power producers are paid their offer prices. It is
still an open discussion as to which auction design is best for UK.
Some authors favour the uniform price design. For example Kahn et al. (2001); Bunn and Oliveira
(2001) argue that uniform pricing reinforces the competition and lowers the market inefficiencies.
In contrast, the outcomes from several studies, for example Xiong et al. (2004); Bin et al. (2004);
Bakirtzis and Tellidou (2006); Cincotti et al. (2006) reveal that in discriminatory price auctions the
agents offer higher marginal costs, however social welfare is respected better comparing to uniform
pricing.
Binmore and Swierzbinski (2000) explore the empirical studies that analyse the uniform and dis-
criminatory price auctions. Thus some studies suggest that discriminatory pricing contributes to
higher sellers’ revenues more than the uniform pricing. Others suggest the opposite. The conclu-
sions from theoretical considerations are rather confusing; therefore this thesis attempts to shed a
light on the problem by conducting a simulation study on UK market cleared with LMP congestion
management method under the discriminatory and uniform pricing rules. The advantage of one de-
sign against the other is best assessed through the estimation of excessive profits earned by power
plants. Thus Figure 7.19 illustrates the difference between profits earned under discriminatory and
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uniform price auctions across different generating technologies. Overall the profits earned under
Figure 7.19: The profit difference across generating technologies under discriminatory and uniform
price auction design (LMP scheme)
the uniform price auction are considerably higher for infra-marginal power plants. Peak power
plants (OCGT, PS and OIL) are usually marginal producers (the ones that set the market clearing
price) and therefore are indifferent with respect to auction design.
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7.3.5 Information asymmetry under the PR congestion management scheme:
Experiment 2
In Experiment 2 every generating agent employs the GAMLSS model to forecast the market clear-
ing price and the power commitment (see model 7.3 and model 7.2 in Section 7.3.4). Power con-
gestions, unlike in Experiments 1, are resolved here according to the PR congestion management
scheme. Therefore each generating agent forecasts the price and commitments both for the DA
market and BM (separately for INC and DEC). Figure 7.20 illustrates the electricity price dynam-
ics at DA market and BM for INC and DEC. It can be seen that electricity prices are considerably
Figure 7.20: Wholesale electricity price (PR scheme, DA, BM (INC) and BM (DEC) markets)
higher in this experiment compared to the benchmark case (see Section 7.3.3). This follows directly
from profit-maximising behaviour of power producers that exercise market power by reporting in-
flated marginal costs. Note that the strategic behaviour of electricity producers at BM for DEC is to
bid below their ’true’ MC. Figure 7.22 suggests that unlike the benchmark case, the DEC price at
BM is mainly set by two generating technologies, namely renewable and base-load, which justifies
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the observed price dynamic. The base-load generation by model assumption bids electricity prices
without strategic consideration (and thus does not manipulate the electricity prices), while renew-
ables have very limited space for decreasing their reported marginal costs. Note, true marginal
generating costs of renewable electricity producers are close to zero.
Figure 7.21: Average power commitments by generating technologies (PR scheme, DA market)
The average reported marginal costs across generating technologies offered to the DA market are
illustrated by Figure 7.23. Note that renewable technologies offer above their true MC throughout
the entire year, while peak producers (e.g. OIL, PS, OCGT) exercise market power mainly during
the winter months when the electricity demand reaches its highest values (see Figure 7.5).
Figure 7.21 illustrates average power commitments across generating technologies allocated by
the DA clearing mechanism. Similar to results of Experiment 1 (where the market was cleared
according to the LMP scheme) the system demand throughout the entire year is mainly fulfilled by
renewables, base-load and partially by peak generation. OIL and OCGT technologies are scheduled
for electricity dispatch during the winter months only.
Overall the capacity allocation at the DA market cleared by two presented congestion management
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Figure 7.22: Average BM INC and DEC by generating technology (PR scheme, BM market)
schemes undergoes similar dynamics. Note that PR scheme COPF problem does not account for
transmission thermal constraints while LMP scheme COPF problem does. This suggests that gen-
erally there are no severe electricity congestions in the system. In this sense the UK transmission
grid is sufficiently developed to facilitate the least cost electricity dispatch.
Figure 7.24 illustrates average reported marginal costs across generating technologies offered to
the BM market for INC. Similar to the DA market, majority of generating technologies offer above
their true MC with exception for OCGT and OIL generators. According to Table 7.2 the offer
acceptance probabilities for the marginal costs reported by OCGT and OIL technologies are very
low. This suggests that these generating technologies are too expensive (even when they offer true
marginal costs) to run.
Thus according to results obtained, the economic existence of peak OCGT and OIL technologies
on the UK transmission grid can be difficult to justify. Perhaps the capacity allocation share of
these peak producers is replaced by a cheaper base-load generation that in the real-world is re-
stricted from participation of the BM market due to its technical specifications. Nevertheless the
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Figure 7.23: Average offer price and true marginal cost of production across generating technolo-
gies (PR scheme, DA market)
proposed model allows for bids and offers from base-load generation at the BM market. This is
done to address specific aims of this research, in particular to allow for the tantamount comparison
of alternative congestion management schemes. Note, the proposed model does not simulate con-
tingency in electricity demand or generation output, thus the BM market is integrated only for the
purpose of congestion alleviation.
Figure 7.25 illustrates average marginal costs across generating technologies bid for DEC at the
BM market. It is interesting to observe that all generating technologies, apart from CCGT, bid
exactly or close to their true marginal costs. First of all, the strategic OCGT, PS and OIL pro-
ducers bid the lowest prices they can for the provision of DEC. This could be seen as attempt to
become competitive in the market and earn some (at least negligible) profits. Note however that
throughout the entire year these technologies remain idle for providing DEC at the BM market (see
Figure 7.22). In fact from the least-cost production perspective, without taking system reliability
into account, these electricity producers should be dispatched first for DEC. The reason why this is
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Figure 7.24: Average offer price and true marginal cost of production across generating technolo-
gies (PR scheme, BM market for INC)
not the case is because the system is congested and mainly renewable generation (expensive in this
case) and base-load is required to provide the means (e.g. DEC) for congestion alleviation. The
renewable electricity producers are also strategic, however they choose to bid true marginal costs
as a way to address their risk concerns (see Table 7.2) and maximise the expected profit. In fact the
bids submitted by renewables are extremely unlikely to be accepted according to their expectation
of the forthcoming market clearing price (see Table 7.2). Nevertheless renewables benefit from
their strategic offers due to scarce transmission capacity between nodes they are located on and the
rest of the UK transmission grid.
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Figure 7.25: Average offer price and true marginal cost of production across generating technolo-
gies (PR scheme, BM market for DEC)
Generating Technology Average OAP Average OAP Average OAP
DA BM for INC BM for DEC
OCGT 0.00411479 0.000554403 1
HYD 0.876204495 0.993315635 0.174197158
WINDON 0.876204497 0.992496848 0.174197158
CCGT 0.583800091 0.700363626 0.998981436
PS 0.204787773 0.113858747 0.999826109
WINDOFF 0.87620449 0.988298698 0.174197158
OIL 0.002669161 0.000168187 1
BIOMASS 0.876204497 0.991016735 0.174197158
Table 7.2: Average OAPs selected by various generating technologies (PR congestion management
scheme)
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The comparison of two alternative pricing rules (uniform pricing vs and discriminatory) reveals
that social welfare is maximised under discriminatory price auction design. This is addressed by
the profit differences illustrated by Figure 7.26.
Figure 7.26: The profit difference across generating technologies under discriminatory and uniform
price auction designs (PR scheme)
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7.4 Conclusion
In order to gain insight into the real power market operation the ACEWEM framework is used
to simulate the UK wholesale electricity market. The simulated market comprises 173 electricity
generators with known physical parameters and estimated marginal costs, and 356 load servicing
entities with known demand profiles. All these market participants are distributed across the simu-
lated UK transmission grid that comprise 471 nodes which are connected by branches with known
physical parameters. Four market designs with different congestion management methods and auc-
tion pricing rules were explored. These were, namely, the PR and LMP schemes for congestion
management with uniform or discriminatory price auction rule. This study attempts to analyse the
extent to which these market designs permit and even contribute to the exercise of market power
by UK power producers through strategic reporting of marginal generating costs.
It has been shown in Section 7.3.1 that the simulated electricity market efficiently replicates the
real UK market price dynamics. Thus the proposed computational approach inspired by the inte-
gration of the agent-based modelling paradigm with formal statistical models, appears to be useful
in reflecting well the type of behaviour observed in the real UK power market. Also Section 7.3.2
compares the performance of the SPO algorithm against conventional RL and highlights the supe-
riority of the former.
In Experiment 1 the simulated UK market is cleared under the LMP congestion management
scheme. The experiment reveals the fact that the higher electricity market price variability in-
tensifies the strategic bidding by power producers. It also confirms that the expensive generating
technology producers express a risk taking behaviour and report their marginal costs well above
anticipated nodal prices. The comparison of different auction price rules shows that discrimina-
tory pricing employed by the UK market design lowers the excessive profits earned by electricity
producers while the uniform pricing lowers the social welfare.
In Experiment 2 the simulated UK market is cleared under the PR congestion management scheme.
The obtained results confirm the key findings from Experiment 1. Thus the peak power producers
as the result of profit-maximising behaviour tends to select the strategies with higher acceptance
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risk. Alternately the profit-maximising strategy for base load power plants is to offer low profit
marginal costs but with high acceptance probability. The comparison of two auction designs also
indicates that discriminatory pricing rule contributes to the higher social welfare comparing to
uniform pricing rule. Therefore this confirms the rationality of switching from uniform pricing to
discriminatory pricing that was done by the UK market regulator at 2001. Note that for 10 years
from 1991 to 2001 the UK power market was run under uniform price auction design.
The outcomes from both experiments indicate the absence of major electricity congestions within
the UK transmission grid that would dramatically affect the least-cost electricity dispatch. The
minor congestions however arise in the branches connecting the renewable generation. Most of
the renewable electricity producers entered the UK generation mix only in the recent few years.
Therefore these experiments reveal that the transmission capacity is lagging behind the current
renewable electricity expansion in the UK.
Simulation study of an abstract power market (see Chapter 6) reveals that the LMP congestion
management scheme delivers a higher social welfare and therefore is superior to PR congestion
management scheme. This conclusion, however, does not hold for the real UK power market sim-
ulation results. Figure 7.27 illustrates the difference between profits earned (average for uniform
and discriminatory price auction designs) across generating technologies under LMP and PR con-
gestion management schemes. In this case it is hard to highlight the most efficient congestion
management scheme for the UK, as on average, the corresponding profits earned by power produc-
ers are very close to each other. According to experimental results above, in the UK transmission
grid electricity congestions primarily arise in the branches connecting the renewable generation.
Thus in order to re-balance the system it is the renewable generation that is regulated for the DEC
(where it has a very limited space for exercising market power due to negligible true marginal gen-
erating costs) and non-strategic base-load for the INC at the BM market. For this particular reason
there are no excessive profits earned by market participants at the BM market. Effectively, only the
DA market remains the main scene for strategic price manipulation under both congestion man-
agement schemes. In this case none of the alternative congestion management schemes is clearly
dominant.
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Figure 7.27: The profit difference across generating technologies under LMP and PR congestion
management schemes (average for uniform and discriminatory price auction designs)
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Part IV
Discussions and Conclusions
This final part of the thesis seeks to outline the main regulatory and methodological contributions
delivered by this research work. It also provides summary statements for the main research out-
comes in relation to the objectives set out in the introduction. This part is completed with directions
for future research, followed by a general research conclusion.
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8.1 Introduction
In this thesis the agent-based electricity market model called ACEWEM has been developed and
applied to study the research questions. The model incorporates alternative market designs com-
prising the DA market for trading the electricity contracts and RT market for balancing the system.
The model comprises three types of market participants, namely the independent system operator,
load entities and asymmetric electricity generators. The load agents are specified with fixed de-
mand profiles while the generating agents have learning capabilities represented through the SPO
algorithm. This learning algorithm has been proposed by this thesis and extends the conventional
RL algorithm by introducing the forward looking feature of agents based on flexible statistical
models. The model has been run to simulate two markets, first the abstract six-node case with pre-
simulated data and second the UK power market with data for year 2012 from the UK electricity
sector. The resulting model price dynamics are compared to prices observed at the real UK power
market. The developed simulation model delivers the realistic daily and seasonal patterns of UK
electricity prices on the DA and RT market. The model therefore can be used to support decision
making by engineers and policy makers in the electricity sector.
The major contributions that have been achieved through the current research work are summarised
in Section 8.2. This is followed by summary on the main research outcomes in Section 8.3. The
suggestions for future research work in the studied field are formulated in Section 8.4.
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8.2 Contributions
The contributions of the current research work are rather spread across two levels:
• At regulatory level the contributions are the gained insights into the operation of wholesale
electricity markets under alternative auction designs and congestion management schemes
with an application to abstract (six-node case) and realistic (UK power market) systems.
• At methodological level the developed simulation model has added to advancement of agent-
based electricity modelling technique.
Contributions to market regulatory
Part III shows that the agent-based paradigm can provide strong insights into the pricing and strate-
gic behaviour in the power markets. The assumption that strategic market players do not only assess
past results but also forecast future market outcomes (this is addressed in the SPO learning algo-
rithm) allowed the replication of the real market price dynamics to a high degree. This presents a
detailed study of a six-node abstract case and the real UK power market. Furthermore this research
provides insights into the application of alternative market designs and pricing rules. This aspect
is especially important for existing power markets since the minor changes in design regulation
can cause serious undesirable events both in electricity supply reliability and capital expenditure.
The experimental study conducted in Part III analyses the impact of alternative market designs and
pricing rules on overall market efficiency. Moreover it provides insights into emergence of strate-
gic trading and reasons for its intensification. Therefore it can help the regulator to prevent market
power manipulation by market participants through providing the means to discover a suitable
market design.
Methodological contributions
Part II outlines the agent-based computational framework for electricity trading that accounts for
the learning behaviour of market participants in the repetitive auctions by using the SPO algorithm.
It represents an improvement on the models discussed in the literature review (see Section 3) by
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providing a far more realistic decision rule based on the flexible statistical models. The developed
model is a first merger of an agent-based paradigm with the statistical GAMLSS framework (Rigby
and Stasinopoulos, 2005) for electricity market modelling. The important contribution here is that
the agents do not withdraw the discrete strategies from an action domain (likewise it is done in
the RL algorithm). Instead the agents fine-tune their decisions (outputs from profit optimisation
routine) by trying on the distributions from the GAMLSS family as part of forecasting model
selection process with the RL algorithm. This way the agents are insured against bidding the
strategies that they never apply in the real markets. It has been shown that the SPO algorithm is
superior to conventional reinforcement learning (see Section 7.3.2) as it leads to better simulation
results in terms of replicating the real-world price dynamics. Also, the model was validated based
on 1) graphical verification with the real-world price dynamics and 2) statistical confidence interval
technique (see Section 7.3.1). This indicates a high model potential to serve as a comprehensive
simulation tool for the future industry research.
8.3 Evaluation of research objectives
Objective 1: To develop a reliable tool (the ACEWEM computational laboratory) to serve for en-
gineering of efficient electricity markets.
This thesis has developed a novel framework for experimental designs of liberalised wholesale
power markets, namely the ACEWEM computational laboratory. The ACEWEM is not prescribed
to any particular market design and size and therefore is highly customisable. Moreover it is mainly
written in JAVA computer language that makes the ACEWEM easily extensible. Also all the li-
braries it integrates are proved to be reliable and free of charge to use.ACEWEM can simulate
large power systems which until recently could only be handled by commercial softwares. There-
fore ACEWEM can be used without limitations by prospective researchers, industry professionals
and policy makers.
Objective 2: To explore the influence of existing pricing rules on wholesale electricity price forma-
tion.
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It has been confirmed that discriminatory price auction design currently employed by the UK
power market lowers the prices paid to power producers. Thus it delivers a higher social welfare
comparing to uniform price auction design (see Chapter 7).
Objective 3: To explore the influence of alternative congestion management methods on wholesale
electricity price formation.
Two different simulated markets (abstract electricity market and UK electricity market) were ini-
tialised with alternative congestion management schemes. First with LMP congestion manage-
ment scheme (from capacity allocation type methods) and second with PR congestion manage-
ment scheme (from capacity alleviation type methods). In the simulated abstract power market it
has been revealed that the LMP scheme lowers the excessive profits earned by power producers
and thus delivers a higher social welfare. This conclusion, however, is not a clear cut given the
structure of the real UK power market. Both congestion management schemes perform similar in
terms of maximising social welfare and none of them can be clearly referred as dominant for the
UK electricity industry.
Objective 4: To explore the emergence and impact of strategic behaviour by power generators on
wholesale electricity price formation.
It has been shown that peak power producers are willing to take a high risk when selling their elec-
tricity. Moreover this trading behaviour does not simply emerge as agents collusively offer high
marginal costs to lift market clearing price. It rather follows from individual expected profit max-
imising strategies based on each agent’s anticipation regarding future market clearing outcomes.
Similarly the risk averse behaviour by base-load generating technologies also follows from indi-
vidual expected profit maximising strategies. Overall the exertion of market power considerably
increases market clearing prices.
Another important research finding relates to the intensification of strategic behaviour by power
producers. It has been shown that increasing market clearing price variability intensifies the strate-
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gic bidding by all generating technologies. Therefore the regulator should seek for the means to
keep price variability low to support market efficiency.
Objective 5: To explore the impact of transmission grid physical constraints on wholesale electric-
ity price formation and trading behaviour of power generators.
It has been shown that generating agents implicitly perceive the electricity congestion through
price forecasting. Thus the results of Experiment 1 (see Section7.3.4) reveal that collective learn-
ing equalises the prices across the nodes while raising the overall price level in the system.
Another interesting research outcome relates to the UK transmission grid. It was observed that
there are no severe congestions in the UK transmission grid to dramatically effect least cost gener-
ation dispatch. The minor congestions however persist in the low capacity branches that connect
the renewable generation (mainly wind farms) to the UK transmission grid. In this instance the UK
transmission grid operator should improve the congested branches to allow for 100% renewable
energy utilisation.
8.4 Prospective research work
The proposed agent-based simulation model can be enhanced in several ways. First in the cur-
rent state, the model does not account for interconnection capacities with neighbouring countries.
To improve the simulation outputs the model needs to adopt implicitly or explicitly the electric-
ity systems around the UK. Thus the ACEWEM framework needs to be extended to allow the
representation of coupled wholesale power markets. This is particularly important when different
market mechanisms and structures need to be integrated (e.g. EU power markets).
The experimental study has highlighted the importance of transmission grid physical constraints in
the electricity price formation process in the UK. It is noteworthy that the market clearing mech-
anism implemented in the model assumes quadratic objective function linear in parameters with
linear constraints. This simplification might be relaxed in future work and replaced by a con-
strained non-linear optimisation routine in order to better account for the branch resistance and the
harmonic nature of voltage and current. While the focus of this research was mainly placed over
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the market design issue it would be also interesting to analyse implications from altering market
structures or the effect of various regulatory interventions (for example to promote a certain gen-
erating technology) on market dynamics. A set of other improvements to the model developed can
be introduced. For example the development of specialised GUI so that appropriate visualisations
can support the design and exploration of alternative experiments of real-world power markets by
domain experts - to conduct controlled computational experiments of real-world power markets
using the ACEWEM framework. Also to enhance the ecology of the decision rules to include
in future alternative business strategies (e.g. bid to ensure dispatch, bidding based on corporate
utilities with different attitudes to risk). Finally to develop an endogenous investment strategy for
capacity decommissioning/expansion.
8.5 Conclusion
Aside from the methodological claims made in this work (see Section 8.2) and the practical insights
it yields, this thesis draws attention to the conditions under which collusive pricing is observed.
This is a finding that has important policy implications. In setting out to provide a computational
laboratory that can be used for controlled computational experiments of wholesale power markets,
the approach adopted here provides a fertile basis for evaluating the interactions between policy
makers, politicians, business executives and key consumers.
In designing a simulation framework to model a large scale system the very first dilemma faced
by the researcher is a trade-off between the level of disaggregation and behavioural analysis. The
agent-based paradigm, along with constantly improving computational power, provide the potential
for the good balance between two options thus allowing modelling of a detailed market structure
with complex behaviour rules in repeated auctions. The model outlined in Part II of this thesis
benefits from interaction between different marketplaces, an explicitly modelled transmission grid,
differentiation between generating technologies, advanced learning algorithm based on flexible
statistical models and composite strategies offered daily by generating agents (the bidding strategy
decision by agent is unique for each individual settlement period). This research propagates the
concept of bounded rationality to address the way people or firms learn and make decisions. To
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improve the performance of the conventional RL algorithm (which does not address forecasting
capabilities of agents) this thesis develops the SPO algorithm based on flexible statistical models.
Nevertheless it still requires several assumptions to be imposed on the agent’s rationality. First
of all the algorithm implies that market players adapt true optimality to their decision making,
this assumes that market participants possess strong reasoning capabilities. However this can be
relaxed if the modeller finds this assumption inadequate. Moreover the algorithm assumes that the
agent can infer the strategy output without actually trying it. Nevertheless this learning algorithm
is expected to reasonably address the key aspects of the way the strategic power producers behave.
Also due to the high degree of simlarity between simulated and real market electricity prices the
model can be qualified to represent a real-world power market to a great extent. It is truly hoped
that the simulation model demonstrated here can be built upon in order to be transformed from
exciting academic practise into complete computational laboratory that can be actively used by
future researchers and policy makers.
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UK generation database
Power plant Node Plant Type Capacity Available MC intercept MC slope
Aberthaw B ABTH LCOAL 1586 1 23.0321 0.0049
Aberthaw GT ABTH OCGT 51 1 90.8188 0.0122
Aigas AIGA HYD 20 0.458 0.0004 0
An Suidhe ANSU WINDON 19 0.286 0.0004 0
Andershaw LINM WINDON 45 0.286 0.0004 0
Ardkinglas ARDK WINDON 19.25 0.286 0.0004 0
Arecleoch AREC WINDON 120 0.286 0.0004 0
Baglan Bay BAGB CCGT 552 1 19.2273 0.0219
Barking BARK CCGT 1000 1 30.5678 0.0219
Barry CARE CCGT 245 1 33.68 0.0188
Beinn an Tuirc 2 CAAD WINDON 38 0.286 0.0004 0
Beinn Tharsuinn ALNE WINDON 29 0.286 0.0004 0
Black Law BLLA WINDON 121 0.286 0.0004 0
Bowbeat KAIM WINDON 33 0.286 0.0004 0
BP Grangemouth GRMO CCGT 120 1 23.5743 0.0219
Braes of Doune BRAC WINDON 74 0.286 0.0004 0
Brigg KEAD CCGT 260 1 79.8535 0.0004
Caledonian Paper Mill MEAD CCGT 20 1 23.5743 0.0219
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Carraig Gheal Wind
Farm
FERO WINDON 46 0.286 0.0004 0
Cashlie (Killin Cas-
cade)
KIIN HYD 11.12 0.458 0.0004 0
Cottam Development
Centre Limited
COTT CCGT 395 1 23.5743 0.0219
Ceannacroc CEAN HYD 20 0.458 0.0004 0
Clachan CLAC HYD 40 0.458 0.0004 0
Clunie Cascade CLUN HYD 61.2 0.458 0.0004 0
Clyde North ; South ;
Central
CLYS WINDON 348 0.286 0.0004 0
Cockenzie COCK MCOAL 1102 1 20.0032 0.0196
Connahs Quay DEES CCGT 1380 1 25.1655 0.0036
Corby GREN CCGT 401 1 23.5743 0.0219
Coryton COSO CCGT 800 1 23.1805 0.0227
Cottam COTT LCOAL 2000 1 19.3217 0.0005
Cottam COTT CCGT 395 1 23.5743 0.0219
Cowes FAWL OCGT 145 1 97.8282 0.0019
Crauchan CRUA PS 440 0.4 52.0167 0.0253
Crystal Rig 2 Stage 1 CRYR WINDON 138 0.286 0.0004 0
Culligran CULL HYD 19.1 0.458 0.0004 0
Damhead Creek KINO CCGT 805 1 20.1433 0.0219
Deanie DEAN HYD 38 0.458 0.0004 0
Deeside DEES CCGT 515 1 21.3356 0.0324
Derwent WILE CCGT 228 1 27.7228 0.0957
Didcot A DIDC LCOAL 2058 1 22.9853 0.0196
Didcot A GTs DIDC OCGT 100 1 97.7591 0.0385
Didcot B DIDC CCGT 1550 1 21.9402 0.0332
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Dinorwig DINO PS 1644 0.4 51.4701 0.1328
Docking Shoal Wind
Farm
WALP WINDOFF 500 0.377 0.0004 0
Drax DRAX LCOAL 3894 1 20.8033 0.0175
Drax DRAX OCGT 30 1 90.8188 0.0122
Dungeness B DUNG NUC 1081 1 6.6324 0.0001
Dunlaw Extension
(Dun Law)
DUNE WINDON 29.75 0.286 0.0004 0
Edinbane Wind (Skye) EDIN WINDON 41.4 0.286 0.0004 0
Eggborough EGGB LCOAL 1932 1 20.8014 0.0196
Enfield (Brimsdown) BRIM CCGT 408 1 25.7484 0.0074
Errochty ERRO HYD 75 0.458 0.0004 0
Fallago FALL WINDON 144 0.286 0.0004 0
Farr Wind Farm
(Tomatin)
FAAR WINDON 92 0.286 0.0004 0
Fasnakyle FASN HYD 138 0.458 0.0004 0
Fawley FAWL OIL 1000 1 90.8188 0.0122
Fawley FAWL OCGT 65 1 90.8188 0.0122
Fawley CHP (Cogen) FAWL CCGT 158 1 23.5743 0.0219
Ferrybridge FERR LCOAL 1960 1 20.1433 0.0196
Ferrybridge FERR OCGT 21 1 90.8188 0.0122
Ffestiniog FFES PS 360 0.4 57.6606 0.0599
Fiddlers Ferry FIDF LCOAL 1987 1 20.3104 0.0051
Fiddlers Ferry FIDF OCGT 21 1 90.8188 0.0122
Fife Energy WFIE CCGT 123 1 23.5743 0.0219
Finlarig FINL HYD 16.5 0.458 0.0004 0
Foyers FOYE PS 300 0.4 47.892 0.0385
Glendoe GLDO HYD 100 0.458 0.0004 0
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Glenmoriston Hy-
dro Group Stage 1
(Moriston Cascade)
GLEN HYD 37 0.458 0.0004 0
Glens of Foudland
Wind (SRO)
KINT WINDON 26 0.286 0.0004 0
Gordonbush Wind GORW WINDON 70 0.286 0.0004 0
Gordonstown Hill
Wind Farm
KINT WINDON 12.5 0.286 0.0004 0
Grain (Stage 1) GRAI OIL 1300 1 90.8188 0.0122
Grain (Stage 1) GRAI OCGT 55 1 90.8188 0.0122
Grain (Stage 2;3) GRAI CCGT 1290 1 58.1621 0.0134
Great Yarmouth NORM CCGT 420 1 22.2444 0.042
Greater Gabbard
Offshore Wind Farm
Stage 1
LEIS WINDOFF 500 0.377 0.0004 0
Griffin Windfarm
(near Aberfeldy)
GRIF WINDON 204 0.286 0.0004 0
Grudie Bridge ORRI HYD 22 0.458 0.0004 0
Gwynt Y Mor Off-
shore Wind Farm
Stage 1
GWYN WINDOFF 39 0.377 0.0004 0
Hadyard Hill HADH WINDON 117 0.286 0.0004 0
Hartlepool HATL NUC 1207 1 6.6324 0.0001
Heysham HEYS NUC 2408 1 6.6324 0.0001
Hill of Towie KEIT WINDON 48.3 0.286 0.0004 0
Hinkley Point B HINP NUC 1261 1 6.6324 0.0001
Hunterston HUER NUC 1074 1 6.6324 0.0001
Immingham Stage 1 HUMR CCGT 1218 1 22.7148 0.0773
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Indian Queens INDQ OCGT 140 1 87.9179 0.0025
Inverawe TAYN HYD 25 0.458 0.0004 0
Invergarry INGA HYD 20 0.458 0.0004 0
Ironbridge IRON LCOAL 964 1 21.4014 0.0196
Keadby KEAD CCGT 735 1 23.7035 0.0026
Keadby GT KEAD OCGT 25 1 73.7237 0.0306
Kilbraur STRB WINDON 67 0.286 0.0004 0
Killingholme KILL CCGT 900 1 50.7649 0.0424
Killingholme 2 KILL CCGT 665 1 26.2032 0.0083
Kilmorack KIOR HYD 20 0.458 0.0004 0
Kings Lynn A WALP CCGT 340 1 23.5946 0.0064
Kingsnorth KINO LCOAL 1940 1 21.3809 0.0287
Kingsnorth KINO OCGT 26 1 90.8188 0.0122
Kinlochleven KILO HYD 20 0.458 0.0004 0
Langage LAGA CCGT 905 1 21.3187 0.011
Lincs Offshore Wind
Farm
WALP WINDOFF 250 0.377 0.0004 0
Little Barford EASO CCGT 665 1 23.5743 0.0219
Littlebrook LITT OIL 1370 1 90.8188 0.0122
Littlebrook LITT OCGT 105 1 97.8011 0.0066
Livishie GLEN HYD 15 0.458 0.0004 0
Lochay LOCH HYD 47 0.458 0.0004 0
London Array CLEH WINDOFF 630 0.378 0.0004 0
Longannet LOAN LCOAL 2284 1 27.4002 0.0696
Luichart LUIC HYD 34 0.458 0.0004 0
Lynemouth BLYT SCOAL 420 1 21.4014 0.0196
Lynes Common FAWL OCGT 49.9 1 90.8188 0.0122
Marchwood MAWO CCGT 900 1 22.2331 0.004
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Mark Hill Wind Farm MAHI WINDON 56 0.286 0.0004 0
Medway GRAI CCGT 700 1 24.6466 0.0073
Millennium Wind MILW WINDON 65 0.286 0.0004 0
Minsca CHAP WINDON 37.5 0.286 0.0004 0
Mossford MOSS HYD 18.66 0.458 0.0004 0
Nant NANT HYD 15 0.458 0.0004 0
Neilston NEIL WINDON 80 0.286 0.0004 0
Ormonde HEYS WINDOFF 150 0.377 0.0004 0
Orrin ORRI HYD 18 0.458 0.0004 0
Pembroke PEMB CCGT 2100 1 22.6968 0.012
Peterborough WALP CCGT 405 1 64.6223 0.0219
Peterhead PEHE CCGT 1180 1 22.0257 0.0047
Pitlochry CLUN HYD 15 0.458 0.0004 0
Quoich QUOI HYD 18 0.458 0.0004 0
Rannoch RANN HYD 45 0.458 0.0004 0
Ratcliffe on Soar RATS LCOAL 2000 1 20.2676 0.0113
Ratcliffe on Soar RATS OCGT 21 1 93.9989 0.0026
Rocksavage ROCK CCGT 810 1 21.2009 0.0219
Roosecote HUTT CCGT 229 1 89.7722 0.0219
Rosehall SHIN WINDON 25 0.286 0.0004 0
Rothes Bio-Plant GLRO BIOMASS 52 0.633 0.0004 0
Rugeley RUGE LCOAL 996 1 20.6766 0.0094
Rugeley RUGE OCGT 22 1 91.3042 0.0122
Rye House RYEH CCGT 715 1 25.5785 0.0125
Saltend SAES CCGT 1100 1 20.3361 0.0129
Seabank SEAB CCGT 1234 1 25.2069 0.0219
Sellafield Stage 1 HUTT CCGT 155 1 23.5743 0.0219
Severn Power USKM CCGT 850 1 23.71 0.028
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Sheringham Shoal
Offshore Windfarm
NORM WINDOFF 315 0.377 0.0004 0
Shin SHIN HYD 18.62 0.458 0.0004 0
Shoreham BOLN CCGT 420 1 24.434 0.0026
Shotton DEES CCGT 210 1 24.434 0.0026
Sizewell B SIZE NUC 1207 1 6.6324 0.0001
Sloy SLOY HYD 153 0.458 0.0004 0
South Humberbank SHBA CCGT 1285 1 24.4656 0.0006
Spalding SPLN CCGT 880 1 23.9968 0.0042
St Fillans SFIL HYD 16.8 0.458 0.0004 0
Staythorpe STAY CCGT 1700 1 23.1301 0.0889
Stevens Croft CHAP BIOMASS 45 0.633 0.0004 0
Stoneywood Mills
(Wiggins Teape
Stoneywood)
DYCE CCGT 12 1 23.5743 0.0219
Sutton Bridge WALP CCGT 819 1 15.3361 0.0001
Taylors Lane WISD OCGT 144 1 95.8302 0.0122
Teesside TODP CCGT 1875 1 23.5743 0.0219
Thanet Offshore
Windfarm
CANT WINDOFF 300 0.377 0.0004 0
Tilbury TILB MCOAL 1104 1 21.4014 0.0196
Tilbury TILB OCGT 26 1 90.8188 0.0122
Toddleburn Wind
Farm
DUNE WINDON 27.6 0.286 0.0004 0
Tongland TONG HYD 33 0.458 0.0004 0
Tormywheel BAGA WINDON 32.4 0.286 0.0004 0
Torness TORN NUC 1215 1 6.6324 0.0001
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Torr Achilty (Beauly
Cascade)
BEAU HYD 15 0.458 0.0004 0
Tummel TUMB HYD 34 0.458 0.0004 0
Uskmouth USKM SCOAL 363 1 22.7928 0.0485
Walney STAH WINDOFF 364 0.378 0.0004 0
West Burton WBUR LCOAL 1972 1 19.7003 0.0009
West Burton WBUR OCGT 15 1 81.2061 0.0025
West Burton B WBUR CCGT 1370 1 23.5743 0.0219
Whitelee WLEE WINDON 592 0.287 0.0004 0
Wilton Stage 2 TODP CCGT 99 1 23.5743 0.0219
Wylfa WYLF NUC 980 1 6.6324 0.0001
Table 1: UK generation database
UK load servicing entities database
LSE Node Load (% total UK load)
Anglesey Aluminium WYLF 0.005597418
BOC TEMP 0.000492187
British Energy DUNG 0.00013511
British Energy EGGB 0.000772058
British Energy HEYS 0.002219666
British Energy HINP 0.000458409
British Energy SIZE 7.72E-05
British Nuclear Group DUNG 3.86E-05
British Nuclear Group HINP 1.93E-05
British Nuclear Group IROA 6.43E-05
British Nuclear Group OLDS 3.22E-05
British Nuclear Group SIZE 3.86E-05
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British Nuclear Group TRAW 1.93E-05
British Nuclear Group WYLF 0.001910843
Celsa TREM 0.001833637
Central Networks East (EMEB) BESW 0.007079768
Central Networks East (EMEB) BICF 0.003057348
Central Networks East (EMEB) CHTE 0.009955684
Central Networks East (EMEB) COVE 0.009195207
Central Networks East (EMEB) DRAK 0.003543745
Central Networks East (EMEB) ECLA 0.006888685
Central Networks East (EMEB) ENDE 0.0097839
Central Networks East (EMEB) GREN 0.013072866
Central Networks East (EMEB) RATS 0.010689138
Central Networks East (EMEB) WALP 0.004705692
Central Networks East (EMEB) WBUR 0.005288595
Central Networks West (Aquila) BISW 0.008899894
Central Networks West (Aquila) BUSH 0.002924168
Central Networks West (Aquila) BUST 0.006846221
Central Networks West (Aquila) CELL 0.009652651
Central Networks West (Aquila) ECLA 0.001273895
Central Networks West (Aquila) FECK 0.004838871
Central Networks West (Aquila) IROA 0.001199263
Central Networks West (Aquila) KITW 0.007720577
Central Networks West (Aquila) NECH 0.006794107
Central Networks West (Aquila) OCKH 0.002264059
Central Networks West (Aquila) OLDB 0.001864519
Central Networks West (Aquila) OLDS 0.000599631
Central Networks West (Aquila) PENN 0.005854127
Central Networks West (Aquila) RUGE 0.004387218
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Central Networks West (Aquila) WIEN 0.002653948
Centrica ABTH 0.000138005
Centrica CARE 6.90E-05
CORUS ALDW 0.003783083
CORUS RAVE 9.65E-05
CORUS STSB 0.001351101
CORUS TEMP 0.000231617
CORUS TINP 0.001138785
CORUS WHSO 0.001863168
Drax Power Limited DRAX 0.001775733
E.ON (UK) plc (Powergen) COTT 0.000772058
E.ON (UK) plc (Powergen) GRAI 0.000887866
E.ON (UK) plc (Powergen) IRON 0.000321691
E.ON (UK) plc (Powergen) KINO 0.000772058
E.ON (UK) plc (Powergen) RATS 0.000829962
E.ON (UK) plc (Powergen) SHRE 0.000160845
Eastern Power Networks AMEM 0.001235811
Eastern Power Networks BARK 0.001880033
Eastern Power Networks BRFO 0.010340178
Eastern Power Networks BRIM 0.004535165
Eastern Power Networks BURW 0.004983994
Eastern Power Networks EASO 0.00408721
Eastern Power Networks ELST 0.001656119
Eastern Power Networks GREN 0.001860142
Eastern Power Networks MILH 0.003952946
Eastern Power Networks SUND 0.009258559
Eastern Power Networks TILB 0.003324481
Eastern Power Networks TOTT 0.005231453
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Eastern Power Networks WALP 0.008438124
Eastern Power Networks WARL 0.004243469
Eastern Power Networks WATS 0.00380024
Eastern Power Networks WISD 0.000860549
Eastern Power Networks WTHU 0.000646379
EDF (Formerly LPN) BARK 0.003090639
EDF (Formerly LPN) BRIM 0.002339002
EDF (Formerly LPN) CITR 0.016722493
EDF (Formerly LPN) HACK 0.00679433
EDF (Formerly LPN) LITT 0.001874404
EDF (Formerly LPN) MILH 0.000481938
EDF (Formerly LPN) NEWX 0.005383364
EDF (Formerly LPN) REBR 0.002531234
EDF (Formerly LPN) SJOW 0.013635046
EDF (Formerly LPN) WHAM 0.011134799
EDF (Formerly LPN) WIMB 0.002551166
EDF (Formerly LPN) WISD 0.006261152
EdF Energy WBUR 0.001158086
Exxon Mobil SFEM 0.000413051
Fellside Heat and Power HUTT 0.000414981
First Hydro DINO 0.011580865
First Hydro FFES 0.02316173
Ineos (Innovene) Grangemouth GRMO 0.001443748
International Power RUGE 0.000579043
National Grid GRAI 0.001190899
National Grid SFEG 0.000965072
Northern Electric BLYT 0.003256067
Northern Electric FERR 0.003456606
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Northern Electric FOUR 0.000329033
Northern Electric HARM 0.001814274
Northern Electric HAWP 0.002079936
Northern Electric LACK 0.004283508
Northern Electric NORT 0.009210198
Northern Electric OFFE 0.001399571
Northern Electric OSBA 0.005596337
Northern Electric POPP 0.000972507
Northern Electric SALH 3.49E-05
Northern Electric SPEN 0.004505062
Northern Electric SSHI 0.001022741
Northern Electric TYNE 0.003593992
Northern Electric WBOL 0.005265207
NORWEB (UU) BRED 0.006559669
NORWEB (UU) CARR 0.004907835
NORWEB (UU) HUTT 0.002007284
NORWEB (UU) KEAR 0.012722001
NORWEB (UU) MACC 0.000903349
NORWEB (UU) PADI 0.003840315
NORWEB (UU) ROCH 0.001708436
NORWEB (UU) SMAN 0.005940766
NORWEB (UU) STAH 0.001066763
NORWEB (UU) STAL 0.007639486
NORWEB (UU) WASF 0.003038441
NORWEB (UU) WHGA 0.005704637
Railtrack BARK 0.000714153
Railtrack ELST 0.000250919
Railtrack LEIB 0.000289522
178
Appendices
Railtrack PAFB 0.000337775
Railtrack POPP 0.00011272
Railtrack RUGE 0.000350321
Railtrack SELL 0.000714153
Railtrack SING 0.000714153
Railtrack WYMO 0.00019784
RWE Npower plc (Innogy) ABTH 0.000424632
RWE Npower plc (Innogy) CARE 0.000212316
RWE Npower plc (Innogy) FAWL 0.000386029
RWE Npower plc (Innogy) LITT 0.000295955
RWE Npower plc (Innogy) TILB 0.000424632
Saltend SAES 0.001930144
SEEBOARD Power Networks BEDD 0.013389583
SEEBOARD Power Networks BOLN 0.016815015
SEEBOARD Power Networks CHSI 0.010350326
SEEBOARD Power Networks KEMS 0.001490625
SEEBOARD Power Networks KINO 0.003086285
SEEBOARD Power Networks LALE 0.001371374
SEEBOARD Power Networks LITT 0.00011581
SEEBOARD Power Networks NFLE 0.003570861
SEEBOARD Power Networks NINF 0.008060876
SEEBOARD Power Networks WIMB 0.003619282
SEEBOARD Power Networks WWEY 0.006576533
Sembcorp (Formerly ICI) TODP 0.000386029
SHELL MOSM 0.000453584
SHEPD ABNE 0.000823786
SHEPD ALNE 0.000723804
SHEPD ARBR 0.000762407
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SHEPD ARMO 0.000550091
SHEPD BEAU 0.000574797
SHEPD BOAG 0.000613786
SHEPD BRAC 0.000752177
SHEPD BRID 0.000650459
SHEPD BROA 0.000252849
SHEPD BROR 0.000225827
SHEPD BUMU 0.001016028
SHEPD CAAD 0.000497977
SHEPD CASS 4.25E-05
SHEPD CEAN 5.64E-05
SHEPD CHAR 0.000652389
SHEPD CLAY 0.001009465
SHEPD COUA 0.000619576
SHEPD CRAI 0.000660109
SHEPD DOUN 0.000154412
SHEPD DUBE 0.000279871
SHEPD DUDH 0.000745036
SHEPD DUGR 0.000123529
SHEPD DUNO 0.000360937
SHEPD DYCE 0.000741175
SHEPD ELGI 0.001142645
SHEPD FASN 7.72E-06
SHEPD FAUG 7.82E-05
SHEPD FIDD 0.000499907
SHEPD FRAS 0.000519209
SHEPD FWIL 0.001205182
SHEPD GLAG 0.000511488
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SHEPD GRUB 0.00026829
SHEPD INNE 0.00133759
SHEPD KEIT 0.001366542
SHEPD KIIN 5.79E-05
SHEPD KILO 7.72E-05
SHEPD KINT 0.00134338
SHEPD LUNA 0.001374263
SHEPD LYND 0.000654319
SHEPD MACD 0.000445863
SHEPD MILC 0.001048068
SHEPD MYBS 0.000291259
SHEPD NAIR 0.000793289
SHEPD PEHG 0.000555881
SHEPD PERS 0.000943068
SHEPD PORA 0.000276976
SHEPD REDM 0.000768197
SHEPD SFEG 0.000297242
SHEPD SFIL 5.79E-06
SHEPD SHIN 7.72E-05
SHEPD SLOY 6.18E-05
SHEPD STLE 0.000233547
SHEPD STRI 0.000384099
SHEPD TARL 0.000488326
SHEPD TAYN 0.000400119
SHEPD THSO 0.000497977
SHEPD TUMB 0.000251498
SHEPD WIOW 0.000909098
SHEPD WOHI 0.000876285
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Southern Electric AMEM 0.001168749
Southern Electric AXMI 0.002374388
Southern Electric BOTW 0.003523095
Southern Electric BRLE 0.004262737
Southern Electric CHIC 0.001152398
Southern Electric COWL 0.014173553
Southern Electric EALI 0.004631746
Southern Electric FAWL 0.001451698
Southern Electric IVER 0.009791244
Southern Electric LALE 0.004340904
Southern Electric LOVE 0.012667148
Southern Electric MANN 0.013548184
Southern Electric MELK 0.007621884
Southern Electric MITY 0.006413727
Southern Electric NHYD 0.004270747
Southern Electric NURS 0.008370379
Southern Electric TYNE 0.000133521
Southern Electric WISD 0.002756839
SP Distribution BAGA 0.001233362
SP Distribution BAIN 0.000868565
SP Distribution BERW 0.000631157
SP Distribution BONN 0.001623251
SP Distribution BRAE 0.000773988
SP Distribution BROX 0.001115623
SP Distribution CATY 0.001198619
SP Distribution CHAP 0.000912958
SP Distribution CHAS 0.001847148
SP Distribution CLYM 0.001329869
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SP Distribution COAT 0.00173713
SP Distribution COCK 0.000849263
SP Distribution COYL 0.000710293
SP Distribution CROO 0.001262314
SP Distribution CUMB 0.000851194
SP Distribution CUPA 0.001291266
SP Distribution CURR 0.000252849
SP Distribution DEVM 0.000858914
SP Distribution DEVO 0.001231432
SP Distribution DEWP 0.002053673
SP Distribution DRCR 0.000413051
SP Distribution DRUM 0.001511303
SP Distribution DUMF 0.001594299
SP Distribution DUNB 0.000976653
SP Distribution DUNF 0.000775918
SP Distribution ECCL 0.000826102
SP Distribution EERH 0.001947515
SP Distribution EKIL 0.001314428
SP Distribution EKIS 0.000679411
SP Distribution ELDE 0.001036487
SP Distribution ERSK 0.000494117
SP Distribution GALA 0.000685201
SP Distribution GIFF 0.001586578
SP Distribution GLLU 0.000386029
SP Distribution GLNI 0.000494117
SP Distribution GLRO 0.000872425
SP Distribution GORG 0.000712223
SP Distribution GOVA 0.000810661
183
Appendices
SP Distribution GRMO 0.001264244
SP Distribution HAGR 0.000914888
SP Distribution HAWI 0.000528859
SP Distribution HELE 0.000453584
SP Distribution HUNF 0.000169853
SP Distribution INKE 0.001019116
SP Distribution JOHN 0.000922609
SP Distribution KAIM 0.001748711
SP Distribution KIER 0.001428307
SP Distribution KILB 0.000901377
SP Distribution KILS 0.000683271
SP Distribution KILT 0.001721689
SP Distribution KILW 0.00039568
SP Distribution LEVE 0.000828032
SP Distribution LING 0.001362682
SP Distribution LINM 0.000750826
SP Distribution MAYB 0.000461304
SP Distribution NEAR 0.001522884
SP Distribution NETS 0.000283731
SP Distribution PAIS 0.000907168
SP Distribution PART 0.000943841
SP Distribution POOB 0.001980328
SP Distribution PORD 0.001683086
SP Distribution RAVE 0.000567462
SP Distribution REDH 0.00093612
SP Distribution SACO 0.001312498
SP Distribution SANX 0.000772058
SP Distribution SHRU 0.001078951
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SP Distribution SIGH 0.002071045
SP Distribution SPAV 0.000820311
SP Distribution STHA 0.001057719
SP Distribution STIR 0.00160974
SP Distribution STLE 0.001057719
SP Distribution TELR 0.000633087
SP Distribution TONG 0.00054044
SP Distribution WFIE 0.000573253
SP Distribution WGEO 0.001713968
SP Distribution WHHO 0.001250733
SP Distribution WISH 0.00161167
SP MANWEB BIRK 0.005157669
SP MANWEB CAPE 0.004831529
SP MANWEB CARR 0.002205916
SP MANWEB CELL 0.003382134
SP MANWEB FIDF 0.005231263
SP MANWEB FROD 0.001476836
SP MANWEB KIBY 0.007016112
SP MANWEB LEGA 0.006521955
SP MANWEB LISD 0.007152665
SP MANWEB PENT 0.004031574
SP MANWEB RAIN 0.0076307
SP MANWEB SWAN 0.00100593
SP MANWEB TRAW 0.001459095
SP MANWEB WYLF 0.001241231
SSE Generation Ltd FERR 0.000443933
UPM KYMMENE MEAD 0.000842894
WPD (formerly SWALEC (Infralec)) ABTH 0.003979262
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WPD (formerly SWALEC (Infralec)) CARE 0.001989631
WPD (formerly SWALEC (Infralec)) PEMB 0.004030867
WPD (formerly SWALEC (Infralec)) PYLE 0.00248946
WPD (formerly SWALEC (Infralec)) RASS 0.004567376
WPD (formerly SWALEC (Infralec)) SWAN 0.011554571
WPD (formerly SWALEC (Infralec)) UPPB 0.005535657
WPD (formerly SWALEC (Infralec)) USKM 0.005243482
WPD(formerly SWEB) ABHA 0.004932097
WPD(formerly SWEB) ALVE 0.00413186
WPD(formerly SWEB) AXMI 0.002038811
WPD(formerly SWEB) BRWA 0.004054268
WPD(formerly SWEB) EXET 0.006091149
WPD(formerly SWEB) INDQ 0.008959922
WPD(formerly SWEB) IROA 0.006306553
WPD(formerly SWEB) LAND 0.005306932
WPD(formerly SWEB) OLDS 0.003153276
WPD(formerly SWEB) SEAB 0.006504393
WPD(formerly SWEB) TAUN 0.002323315
Yorkshire Electricity BRAW 0.009261688
Yorkshire Electricity CREB 0.008299515
Yorkshire Electricity DRAX 0.000570595
Yorkshire Electricity ELLA 0.00622968
Yorkshire Electricity FERR 0.009680696
Yorkshire Electricity GRIW 0.003204663
Yorkshire Electricity JORD 0.001294007
Yorkshire Electricity KEAD 0.005797836
Yorkshire Electricity KIRK 0.005649304
Yorkshire Electricity NEEP 0.001475142
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Yorkshire Electricity NORL 0.001212591
Yorkshire Electricity PITS 0.002141726
Yorkshire Electricity SAEN 0.001982183
Yorkshire Electricity SHEC 0.001917559
Yorkshire Electricity SKLG 0.012368547
Yorkshire Electricity THUR 0.003253269
Yorkshire Electricity WIBA 0.000721245
Yorkshire Electricity WMEL 0.013815155
Table 2: UK load servicing entities database
UK transmission grid database
From To Reactance (% on base apparent power) Capacity (MW)
ABEW ERRO 0.0057 264
ABEW GRIF 0.016595 264
ABHA EXET 0.005118213 2780
ABHA LAGA 0.002722 2780
ABNE CHAR 0.0566 132
ABNE GRIF 0.0999 132
ABTH COWT 0.005449 935
ABTH PYLE 0.014523 935
ABTH TREM 0.021438 625
ABTH UPPB 0.00575494 1725
AIGA KIOR 0.00594 111
ALDW BRIN 0.007628 625
ALDW WMEL 0.003891 955
ALNE MOTA 0.0014 458
ALVE INDQ 0.009688996 2780
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ALVE TAUN 0.00766875 2780
AMEM ECLA 0.003523 3400
AMEM IVER 0.002015 3400
ARBR DENS 0.0337 183
ARBR TEAL 0.0527 183
ARDK INVE 0.021 132
ARDK SLOY 0.0233 132
ARDR BEAU 0.01826 535
ARDR STRB 0.02796 535
AREC MAHI 0.01349 214
ARMO DUGR 0.0394 83
AUCH MAHI 0.00809 690
AUCW HADH 0.0388 140
AUCW MAYB 1.00E-04 140
AXMI CHIC 0.00687 2780
AXMI EXET 0.006293 2770
AYR- COYW 0.00192 1910
BAGA BONN 0.019517492 292
BAGA DRCR 0.007145 292
BAGB MAGA 0.005468 875
BAGB SWAN 0.00783 875
BAIN BONN 0.007497259 228
BARK BARP 5.77E-04 1700
BARK REBR 0.002222997 2470
BARK WHAM 9.87E-04 4020
BARK WTHU 0.001579 4020
BEAU CULL 0.0328 111
BEAU DOUN 0.06143 702
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BEAU FAAR 0.035125 264
BEAU FASN 0.029973978 252
BEAU INNE 0.01795 252
BEAU KIOR 0.0029 111
BEAU KNOC 0.003435 1870
BEAU MOTA 0.03397 252
BEDD CHSI 0.003778727 1705
BEDD ROWD 5.65E-04 2160
BEDD WIMB 0.001933714 1855
BERW ECCL 0.024304999 264
BESW COVE 0.0039505 1910
BESW FECK 0.015095 955
BESW HAMH 0.010067 820
BICF SPLN 0.00355 3160
BICF WALP 0.006488 3190
BICF WBUR 0.0056295 6660
BIRK CAPE 0.0034195 1910
BIRK LISD 0.002978 750
BISW FECK 0.009633 955
BISW KITW 0.005297726 1910
BISW PENN 0.012726 1040
BLHI DAAS 0.01381 525
BLHI KEIT 0.001 1090
BLHI KINT 0.01105 1050
BLHI KNOC 0.03756 525
BLHI PEHE 0.03576 1090
BLLA WISH 0.01917 705
BLYT HEDD 0.002583677 2200
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BLYT STEW 0.006948988 1360
BLYT TYNE 0.003576993 2480
BOAG FAAR 0.035125 264
BOAG GLFA 0.04957 126
BOLN LOVE 0.005633 5550
BOLN NINF 0.0044705 5560
BONB BONN 0.024949599 252
BONN CUMB 0.010294811 270
BONN LAMB 0.01495 795
BONN LOAN 0.00915 840
BONN STIR 0.012935 366
BOTW FAWL 0.001509 3820
BOTW LOVE 0.00252 3820
BRAC BONB 0.01115 252
BRAC ERRO 0.06705 264
BRAE BRAP 0.00256 250
BRAE GOVA 0.001195 250
BRAE PAIS 0.00745 268
BRAI BRFO 0.008395 2780
BRAI PELH 0.011469 2780
BRAI RAYL 0.002870749 5560
BRAP ERSK 0.00719604 204
BRAP PAIS 0.00986 274
BRAW ELLA 0.007134 760
BRAW KIRK 0.00855 760
BRAW MONF 0.018824 1200
BRAW PADI 0.011321 1000
BREC BRID 0.00605 224
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BREC DENS 0.0633 112
BREC FIDD 0.0726 112
BRED MACC 0.008305 950
BRED SMAN 0.004604 850
BRED STAL 0.006374 1090
BRFO NORM 0.012896 1590
BRFO PELH 0.012053 2780
BRFO SIZE 0.002509103 8340
BRIM TOTT 8.08E-04 4360
BRIM WALX 6.30E-04 4360
BRIN CHTE 0.004135178 2135
BRIN JORD 0.005918 555
BRIN NORL 0.006085 420
BRIN TEMP 5.85E-04 1910
BRIN THOM 0.003158 5040
BRIN THUR 0.002384 625
BRIN TINP 6.71E-04 1370
BRLE DIDC 0.00336075 5060
BRLE FLEE 0.0015265 5560
BRLE MELK 0.008163 2780
BRLE WWEY 0.004748 4400
BROA EDIN 0.09963 83
BROA QUOI 0.1487 83
BROR DUBE 0.0901 126
BROR SHIN 0.0799 126
BROX CURR 0.011935 264
BUMU CHAR 0.0976 132
BUMU GRIF 0.0684 132
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BURW PELH 0.003680489 6130
BURW WALP 0.00439575 6200
BUSB GIFF 6.70E-04 552
BUSB NEIL 0.0082 1090
BUSB STHA 0.00642 750
BUSH DRAK 0.016016 955
BUSH PENN 0.009078 1040
BUSH WIEN 0.003404 760
BUST DRAK 0.006361496 2400
BUST NECH 0.001631 1450
CAAD PORA 0.07265 198
CAFA KEOO 0.00584 132
CANT SELL 0.0025975 3860
CAPE DEES 9.92E-04 7160
CAPE FROD 0.001459492 5560
CARE COWT 0.014488 680
CARE USKM 0.010362 680
CARR DAIN 1.54E-04 4390
CARR KEAR 0.002574 2100
CARR PEWO 0.011179 2170
CARR SMAN 0.002202997 1670
CASS LAIR 0.0675 111
CATY DALM 0.001225 190
CEAN MILW 0.0086 111
CELL DAIN 0.010314 3100
CELL DRAK 0.004354839 4360
CELL MACC 0.006068 3100
CHAP DUMF 0.028524957 342
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CHAP ECCF 0.007439987 144
CHAP GRNA 0.014625 264
CHAP HAKB 0.03472 132
CHAR BIHI 0.004255 458
CHAR GLAG 0.0023 252
CHAR LYND 0.00225 252
CHAS DALM 3.25E-04 372
CHIC EXET 0.013205 2780
CHIC MANN 0.00469524 6140
CHSI WWEY 0.003117497 2640
CHTE HIGM 0.009015477 2760
CILF IMPP 0.004396 2780
CILF RASS 0.004679 2780
CILF SWAN 0.003540882 8740
CILF UPPB 0.001476 1500
CILF WHSO 0.006151 2780
CITR SJOW 2.87E-04 2820
CITR WHAM 3.88E-04 2820
CLAC INVE 0.0195 126
CLAC SLOY 0.033 132
CLAY REDM 0.0014 240
CLAY WIOW 0.0012 120
CLEH CANT 0.00282 3100
CLEH KEMS 0.00259 3100
CLUN COUA 0.0444 252
CLUN ERRO 0.018 252
CLYM DALM 9.25E-04 1390
CLYM EERH 0.00321 1500
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CLYM EKIL 0.001095 2240
CLYM LOAN 0.01917 1500
CLYN ELVA 0.00174 476
CLYS ELVA 7.90E-04 291
COAL ELVA 0.00507 2010
COAL LINM 0.007592479 268
COAL STHA 0.00413 2010
COAT NEAR 0.0013 352
COCK ECCL 0.006565 2180
COCK KAIM 0.00756 1090
COCK SMEA 0.00396 1090
COSO RAYL 0.002785 2010
COSO TILB 0.002476 2210
COTT EASO 0.011771239 5560
COTT GREN 0.025548 2010
COTT KEAD 0.003352483 4420
COTT STAY 0.002708843 4220
COTT WBUR 0.001321 3330
COUA BIHI 0.01705 252
COVE HAMH 0.007351 1150
COVE RATS 0.026384 1000
COWL CULJ 0.00113 2770
COWL DIDC 0.002001 2770
COWL ECLA 0.006314 2770
COWL LEIB 0.009095 2770
COWL MITY 0.018493 1180
COWL WALH 0.016366 1180
COWT PYLE 0.009291 935
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COYL COYT 0.01037 113
COYL COYW 3.10E-04 1910
COYL MAHI 0.02762 690
COYL MAYT 0.02179 114
COYT KILS 0.03994 132
COYT MAYB 0.04072 132
COYW KILS 0.002805 1910
CRAI FOGG 0.005285 264
CRAI KINT 0.01985 290
CRAI REDM 0.00765 314
CRAI WOHI 0.0011 260
CREB GART 0.002791249 5840
CREB SAEN 0.007587 1750
CREB SAES 0.007813 1750
CREB THTO 0.002586486 5840
CROO NEIL 0.01341 458
CRUA DALL 0.0018 566
CRYR FALL 0.00249 1250
CRYR TORN 0.00194 1250
CULJ DIDC 8.52E-04 2780
CULL DEAN 0.0212 111
CUPA LEVT 0.014895 286
CURR GORG 0.00463 222
CURR GRMO 0.01731 1090
CURR KAIM 0.00373 1090
CURR KINC 0.02269 1090
CURR LING 0.01285 264
CURR SIGH 4.20E-04 610
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CURR SMEA 0.00732 1090
DAIN CARR 4.96E-04 2170
DAIN DEES 0.005787249 6200
DAIN MACC 0.006516 2400
DALL INVR 0.00925 570
DALL WIYH 0.03247 570
DALM SANX 0.001435 448
DEES GWYN 0.002628 5560
DEES TREU 0.001401 4610
DENS TEAL 0.019 183
DEVM ERSK 0.03937 132
DEVM INKI 0.00269 1350
DEVM SPAV 0.00846 214
DEVM WIYH 0.00524 1000
DEVO STIR 0.02131 221
DEVO WFIE 0.07155 162
DEWP WHHO 2.82E-04 552
DINO PENT 6.42E-04 3360
DOUN GORW 0.03166 535
DOUN THSO 0.018 264
DRAK HAMH 0.005857 2010
DRAK OLDB 0.009795 1000
DRAK RATS 0.006532 2010
DRAK RUGE 0.004173 2010
DRAK WILE 0.00337 2010
DRAX EGGB 1.00E-03 4870
DRAX FENW 0.002338 2770
DRAX THOM 0.003992 2980
196
Appendices
DRAX THTO 0.0019635 5550
DRUM WIYH 5.09E-04 1910
DUBE MYBS 0.0486 126
DUDH GLAG 4.50E-04 240
DUDH MILC 0.00221 262
DUGR EDIN 0.01997 83
DUMF TONG 0.1071 132
DUNB INWI 0.00985 220
DUNE GALA 0.05514 152
DUNE SMEA 0.04207 152
DUNF INKE 0.00863 264
DUNF MOSM 0.01204 430
DUNG NINF 0.0037845 6140
DUNG SELL 0.00253725 3700
DUNO WHTB 0.02025 198
DYCE KINT 0.01325 290
EALI LALE 0.001956 1050
EALI WISD 0.001391 750
EASO WYMO 0.0030675 5560
EAST GLLE 0.0039 132
ECCL GALA 0.03494842 264
ECCL STWB 6.05E-04 5540
ECCL TORN 0.003265 2500
ECLA LEIB 0.002745 3820
ECLA PAFB 0.004457235 4020
EERH LOAN 0.01637 1500
EERH NEAR 0.00632 950
EGGB FERR 0.002063 2780
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EGGB MONF 9.02E-04 4090
EGGB ROCH 0.016214 1000
EGGB STSB 0.008363 2780
EGGB THOM 0.004911 2220
EKIL STHA 0.001095 2100
EKIS NEIL 0.01192 1090
EKIS STHA 0.0026 955
EKIS WLEE 0.00101 457
EKIS WLEX 0.00346 340
ELDE JOHN 0.002799991 458
ELDE NEIL 0.00408 458
ELGI KEIT 0.03215 252
ELGI NAIR 0.0411 252
ELLA FERR 0.018245 1320
ELLA KIRK 0.015765 760
ELLA STAL 0.016624 955
ELST MILH 0.001978746 1050
ELST SJOW 0.00176 1770
ELST SUND 0.003479739 2590
ELST WARL 0.012359192 1520
ELST WATS 0.001185623 1520
ELVA GRNA 0.01225 2010
ELVA HAKB 0.01277 2010
ELVA STHA 0.0092 2010
ENDE PAFB 0.0040255 4020
ENDE RATS 0.002933498 5560
ERRO FAUG 0.0984 264
ERRO KIIN 0.0858 132
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ERRO TUMB 0.0011 252
ESST KIER 0.0019 100
ESST PART 0.00641 203
ESST WIYH 0.00187 128
EXET TAUN 0.003792999 4020
FASN FAUG 0.02895 266
FAUG GLDO 0.0047 127
FAUG LAGG 0.0023 203
FAUG LOCL 0.0099 252
FAWL LOVE 0.004115 3820
FAWL MANN 0.010014 2780
FAWL MAWO 0.003062 2300
FECK HAMH 0.008621 2010
FECK IRON 0.013148 2010
FECK MITY 0.015677 1970
FECK WALH 0.013527 1970
FENW KEAD 0.002161 3070
FENW THOM 0.001653 2980
FERR MONF 7.70E-04 2340
FERR SKLG 0.004885723 1730
FFES TRAW 0.001538999 1030
FIDD FOGG 0.06157 112
FIDF FROD 0.001683 2640
FIDF RAIN 0.001339 2640
FIFE WFIE 0.00249 260
FINL KIIN 0.005 132
FLEE LOVE 0.004088 4420
FOUR HARK 0.023608 855
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FOUR STEW 0.011751 855
FOYE KNOC 0.005145 1050
FRAS LUMB 0.0117 252
FROD ROCK 2.38E-04 1100
FWIL KILO 0.05 132
FWIL LOCL 0.04055 252
GALA HAWI 0.02684 132
GARB GARE 0.005799569 252
GARB HELE 0.0352 126
GARB STLE 0.0633 126
GARE WHTL 0.002 200
GARE WIYH 0.039714994 218
GART KILL 0.006467 3160
GLEN LAGG 0.012 111
GLLE KEOO 0.01655 132
GLLE NETS 0.033814988 250
GLLE TONG 0.07678 132
GLLU NETS 0.024521803 98
GLNI MOSM 0.001395867 260
GLNI REDH 0.02259 157
GLNI WFIE 0.008 264
GLRB GLRO 0.0053 49
GLRO WFIE 0.00496 950
GORG TELR 0.001355 160
GORW STRB 0.00561 535
GOVA HAGR 0.001210472 138
GRAI KEMS 7.56E-04 5280
GRAI KINO 0.002028 3100
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GRAI TILB 0.004832 2000
GREN STAY 0.020259 2510
GREN SUND 0.003964724 4020
GRIW KEAD 0.00873 3070
GRIW SHBA 0.002284 2860
GRMO KINC 0.00591 1050
GRNA HAKB 4.00E-04 2010
GRNA HAWI 0.12417 132
GRNA JUNV 0.01136 132
GRSA LACK 2.33E-04 2230
GRSB LACK 1.49E-04 2260
GRUB MOSS 0.0032 252
GWYN BODE 4.52E-05 2710
GWYN PENT 0.004786 5560
HACK TOTT 0.0012585 1910
HACK WHAM 4.52E-04 3540
HAMH NECH 0.0019215 2360
HAMH OCKH 0.014112 820
HAMH WILE 0.01582 2010
HARK HAKB 0.0010055 3980
HARK HUTT 0.0081345 2780
HARK JUNV 2.729 111
HARK STEW 0.03549 775
HARM HAWP 0.007317 1090
HATL HARM 0.00602 1090
HATL SALH 0.003364 1380
HATL TODP 0.007606 1090
HATL WBOL 0.020909 1090
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HAWI JUNV 0.11252 132
HAWP NORT 0.003619282 1910
HAWP OFFE 0.004027 1090
HEDD STEW 6.01E-04 4720
HEDD STWB 0.0075445 6770
HELE WIYH 0.0565 109
HEYS HAMB 0.002227226 6660
HEYS QUER 8.25E-04 7150
HIGM RATS 0.012957 2150
HIGM THUR 0.019585 625
HIGM WBUR 0.002958 2210
HINP BRWA 0.003870994 480
HINP MELK 0.0085995 3920
HINP TAUN 0.00265125 4420
HUER HUNF 8.00E-05 292
HUER INKI 0.005607249 2640
HUER JUNA 0.00365 175
HUER KILS 0.01051 1390
HUER NEIL 0.0059 1350
HUMR GART 0.007015 3160
HUMR KILL 5.43E-04 2770
HUNF KILW 0.02926 146
HUNF SACO 0.0211 146
HURS LITT 0.001393 1730
HURS NEWX 0.002461193 1780
HUTT QUER 0.003435 3400
IMPP MELK 0.014129 1420
INDQ LAND 0.0049605 2780
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INGA LOCL 0.0058 126
INKI STHA 0.01613 1390
INNE KNOC 0.001899947 342
INNE NAIR 0.0329975 252
INRU PEHE 0.001919057 558
INRU PEHG 0.00205 252
INRU SFER 0.00546808 585
INVB INVR 5.00E-05 2000
INVE ANSU 0.02615 99
INVE FERO 0.03571 99
INVE KILC 0.0355 99
INVE PORA 0.0832 99
INVE SLOY 0.0525 126
INVR SLOY 0.01356 1000
INVR WIYH 0.02322 570
INWI TORN 3.05E-04 220
IROA MELK 0.008706907 1160
IROA OLDS 0.572906937 1820
IROA WHSO 0.007326243 1330
IRON LEGA 0.011938 2000
IRON PENN 0.002605553 2000
IRON RUGE 0.011701 1390
IRON SHRE 0.00291 2400
IVER LALE 0.007143 595
IVER NHYD 0.0017445 840
IVER WATS 0.003001746 1550
IVER WWEY 0.01059 960
JORD NORL 7.19E-04 420
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JUNA KILW 0.02629 146
JUNA SACO 0.01813 151
KAIM SMEA 0.0036 1090
KAIM WHHO 7.20E-04 552
KAIM WISH 0.02196 950
KEAD GART 4.95E-04 6360
KEAD KEAP 4.59E-05 6000
KEAD KILL 0.007345 3060
KEAD WBUR 0.00246498 6110
KEAR PADI 0.007296 2170
KEAR WHGA 0.003096231 1665
KEIT GLFA 0.09623 126
KEIT KINT 0.0244 1090
KEIT MACD 0.088 111
KEMS CANT 0.005411 3100
KEMS LOFI 0.003663896 3860
KEOO MAYT 0.07702 114
KIBY LISD 0.001197372 1520
KIBY RAIN 0.001889 2800
KIBY WASF 0.002242245 3040
KIER WIYH 0.00647 100
KIIN INVR 0.0392 264
KIIN LOCH 0.0058 111
KIIN SFIL 0.052 132
KILB WIYH 0.001019387 278
KILC NANT 0.0103 99
KILC TAYN 0.0178 99
KILL SHBA 0.003134 2860
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KILS KILT 7.80E-04 560
KILS MEAD 0.02711 162
KILS STHA 0.00678 1390
KILW MEAD 0.015195 292
KINB KINC 0.00215 86
KINC LOAN 9.35E-04 1240
KINO NFLE 0.004216 3100
KINO TILB 0.002893 2000
KINT FOGG 0.03742 112
KINT KINB 0.0731 955
KINT PEHE 0.012781939 2180
KINT PERS 0.0123 1090
KINT TEAL 0.017568123 2865
KIRK SKLG 0.002402 760
KITW OCKH 0.005743 770
KITW OLDB 0.003318 665
KNOC DAAS 0.02375 525
LACK NORT 0.00445 1590
LACK THTO 0.0082685 4840
LACK TODP 0.002415 1090
LAGG MILW 0.0133 111
LAIR SHIN 0.0252 111
LAKE LITT 5.63E-04 3880
LAKE TILB 0.001186727 3880
LALE WWEY 0.003434 750
LAMB LOAN 0.02073 820
LAMB PORD 8.15E-04 600
LAMB WIYH 0.00369 1900
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LAND LAGA 0.00213098 2780
LEGA SHRE 0.009028 2000
LEGA TREU 0.001158 5720
LEIB SUND 0.001154249 7640
LEVE LEVT 0.002454745 286
LEVT REDH 0.01995 143
LEVT WFIE 0.04157 143
LITT LOFI 8.16E-04 2780
LOAN MOSM 0.01078 760
LOAN WFIE 0.012 760
LOCL QUOI 0.0454 111
LOFI ROWD 0.0026735 3180
LONO CANT 0.030599 180
LOVE NURS 0.003172 5550
LUIC ORRI 0.035125 264
LUMB SFER 0.0073 252
LUMB STRI 0.0092 266
LUNA TEAL 0.01955 366
MACC STAL 0.006244 1710
MAGA PYLE 0.002592 1105
MANN NURS 0.006631 2780
MAWO NURS 0.001281 2420
MAYB MAYT 0.02896 132
MELK MITY 0.002792998 4220
MELK SEAB 0.009451 2550
MILC TEAL 0.0074 366
MONF PADI 0.016286 2520
MONF POPP 0.008300242 1010
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MOSH MOSM 2.99E-04 264
MOSM WFIE 0.00123 955
MOSS LUIC 0.0032 252
MOTA SHIN 0.0386 252
MYBS SHIN 0.2184 126
MYBS THSO 0.01875 252
NEAR WISH 0.00323 570
NEEP PITS 0.001378 420
NEEP SHEC 0.001494 420
NEEP STSB 0.002627 750
NEIL PAIS 0.007345 536
NEIL WIYH 0.01028 955
NEWX WIMB 0.0015435 1645
NFLE WTHU 7.47E-04 4000
NORL PITS 0.002752 420
NORL SHEC 0.001119 420
NORM SIZE 0.020412 1590
NORM WALP 0.006792498 5870
NORT OSBA 0.007965 4020
NORT SALH 0.00526 1370
NORT SPEN 0.002033 5100
OCKH WIEN 9.99E-04 1195
OFFE WBOL 0.003474 1090
ORMO HEYS 0.002153 165
ORRI BEAU 0.02431 264
OSBA THTO 0.00146 4790
PADI PEWO 0.007049 2170
PART WIYH 0.00969 203
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PEHE PERS 0.0208 1090
PELH RYEH 0.002019831 5560
PELH SUND 0.00752 3180
PELH WYMO 0.004469 2770
PEMB SWAN 0.014709 2770
PEMB WALH 0.038196 1110
PENT TRAW 0.009563 2810
PENT WYLF 0.0030645 5560
PERS WIOW 0.00105 240
PEWO HAMB 0.001955495 3490
PEWO WASF 0.004807246 3040
PITS TEMP 0.001713 420
PITS WIBA 5.81E-04 440
POOB SHRU 5.15E-04 540
POOB SMEA 0.0017 720
PORA ANSU 0.05705 99
PORD WGEO 2.61E-04 610
QUER PEWO 0.003070984 6200
RANN TUMB 0.02755 252
RASS WALH 0.012927 1110
RATS STAY 0.008685 2150
RATS WILE 0.002165963 3320
RAVE WISH 5.00E-06 476
RAYL TILB 0.004077 2010
REBR TOTT 0.00104358 2420
REDH WFIE 0.02162 157
ROCH STAL 0.013183 1320
ROCH WHGA 0.002465749 1745
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RYEH WALX 4.69E-04 5560
SAEN SAES 1.80E-04 1520
SEAB WHSO 0.005858 1420
SFER SFEG 0.00245 252
SFER SFEM 0.002785 264
SING KINO 0.003076 2890
SING NFLE 0.00114 2890
SIZE LEIS 0.030599 180
SJOW TOTT 0.001808217 1740
SJOW WISD 8.14E-04 1500
SLOY GARB 0.008262481 528
SLOY INVR 0.02614 132
SMEA STHA 0.01446 1390
SMEA TORN 0.00998 1250
SPEN STEW 0.003688495 4990
SPLN WALP 0.005117 3190
SSHI TYNE 0.002985 995
SSHI WBOL 0.001848 1090
STAL STSB 0.00556 1400
STAL THOM 0.012982 1040
STHA WISH 0.00504 1050
STIR WFIE 0.09286 162
STLE WIYH 0.03056 109
SUND WYMO 0.00302 3050
SWAN PEMB 0.007334117 5560
TARL FOGG 0.0399 264
TAYN FERO 0.01759 99
TEAL BIHI 0.005995 458
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TEAL GLRB 0.0167 955
TEAL KINB 0.0371 955
TEAL WFIB 0.0167 955
TEMP WIBA 9.23E-04 420
THOM WMEL 0.005400743 1530
THUR WMEL 0.007099 955
TILB WARL 0.002747135 2360
TRAW TREU 0.006433 3420
TREM USKM 0.007162 625
TYNE WBOL 0.004835 995
USKM WHSO 6.63E-04 3485
WAAW HEYS 0.024667 204
WAAW STAH 0.025965263 183
WFIB WFIE 0.0093 22.3
WHTB WHTL 0.00195 44.6
WIMB WISD 0.004733 740
WIOW WOHI 9.67E-04 522
WYLF PERH 0.014488 660
Table 3: UK transmission grid database
UK transmission grid base values
Base apparent power (MVA) Base voltage (kV) Soft penalty weight
100 10 0.005
Table 4: UK transmission grid base values
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